

BOOKS BY HARRY STEKOLL

THROUGH THE COMMUNIST LOOKING-GLASS
HUMANITY MADE TO ORDER

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*THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
RUSSIAN EXPERIMENT*



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P R I N T E D I N T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A

TO MY SON
MARION
AND MY DAUGHTERS
ETHEL, BETTY AND RACHEL



INTRODUCTION

"Life is better. Life is more cheerful." Everywhere I went in Russia during a visit I made in the summer of 1936, placards bearing this optimistic declaration of Stalin's greeted me, along with the ever present poster, "Workers of the World, Unite!" It was what I had hoped was true, what I had come to Russia to find.

I had made a similar trip five years before, covering widely separated and representative points in both European and Asiatic Russia. At that time I had found appalling filth everywhere. Now, as I saw at once a general improvement in cleanliness, I hoped that Stalin's statement was true; for cleanliness is a significant factor in a country as backward as Russia and is, of itself, evidence of both economic and cultural progress.

All arrangements for a trip through Russia are made through the Intourist, part of the Amtorg, or foreign trade corporation of Soviet Russia, which has elaborate offices in New York and other large cities throughout the world. From those points they advertise and propagandize extensively in order to

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get tourists from all over the world to visit the country of the great social experiment. This is one of their ways of obtaining *valuta*, or foreign money. The prospectus of the trip contains a set itinerary, which may be chosen from a number of similar tours. Arrangements include transportation, food, hotel accommodations, and trained guides.

There are first, second, and third class tours, with scales of prices depending on the quality of accommodations, fifteen dollars a day for first class, ten dollars for second, and five dollars for third. The differences which exist between the classes of tours is primarily in travel accommodations. A first-class tourist is supposed to travel in international pullman cars, and is theoretically given a single compartment alone. Second class is designated as "soft," and four persons are accommodated in one compartment; and third class is "hard," the mode of travel which the Russian people use. When you travel "hard" you do the best you can for yourself and are packed in with others as tightly as possible, with no reservations for anybody.

It often happens that a first-class tourist, in order to reach his destination as scheduled, has to be satisfied with "soft," or second class, as the trains in Russia are seldom on time, and are sometimes

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as much as twenty-four hours late. In our own experience, during a month's travel we were accommodated only twice in first-class compartments.

The same custom applies to hotel accommodations. A first-class tourist is entitled to a room alone, but it quite frequently happens that there are not enough rooms to go around and so visitors must double up.

American tourists are favored because the majority of the tourist trade comes from the United States, and as a rule Americans travel first class and are free spenders. In addition, although we are included among the "rotten capitalistic" countries, we have one redeeming feature which is highly respected and admired by the Russian people, especially official Russia, and that is our efficiency and technical skill; if a Russian does a thing quickly and well, his comrades say that it has been done in the American way.

The procedure of making your arrangement for a trip through Russia, the things that you are able to see, and the information you are able to obtain are very much the same as they were five years ago. If there is any difference it is on the side of less freedom of independent investigation, for Intourist has become more efficient, both in looking after the well-being of the traveler and in keeping

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him within a well prearranged and well handled itinerary, where his observation and information about the country and its people are limited only to things they want him to see and know.

Only two hours a day are spent covering the arranged tours, with a trained guide ever present to explain things. These guides are all products of special schools and are carefully taught what to say and what not to say.

During most of the remaining time the tourist is occupied with looking after his comfort and well-being. With all the efforts the Intourist organization exerts to make things as pleasant and comfortable as possible for its charges, and with the new hotels which have been and are being built for that purpose, a traveler in Russia is still much less comfortable than he can be in other countries.

There are a great many huge hotels, but fundamentally they are still run *à la Russe*. To be sure, the newer ones are modern, but even in them little conveniences are lacking. They have no writing paper, for instance, and the tourist has to spend time and effort in order to get it. After obtaining the paper and writing his letter, he finds that he has to walk some blocks to locate a letter box in which to mail it.

There is in process of completion in Moscow

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one of the finest hotels in Russia, and as a matter of fact, it would be a credit to any country. But in order to get up to your room in it you have to stand and wait for fifteen or twenty minutes, because the elevators they have built are few and so small that they can handle only a few persons at a time.

However, the Russians' genuine hospitality and their sincere desire to make your stay as pleasant and comfortable as is humanly possible make you overlook and forget these little inconveniences.

I have mentioned the fact that the time spent with a visitor or tourist is of only two hours' duration. If you want to use a car during the other hours, it can be obtained only through the Intourist organization. To obtain permission to hire a car is very difficult, and when that permission is granted it is done very reluctantly and the price is twenty-five roubles, or five dollars in American money, for one hour.

The idea of a visitor's departing from the pre-arranged tour and wandering off on a path of his own choosing is looked upon with great disfavor, and everything is done to discourage him from such a procedure. Even if a visitor makes such an arrangement, he must know the language in order to obtain any information of consequence. Yet

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many a visitor, knowing little or nothing of the language, and having no real background of knowledge of the country and its people, has come back to explain the new Russia to us.

Two other sources of intelligence give us most of the information we receive about this most talked of country on the face of the globe: the government, which gives us "official news," and professional journalists and writers, who make frequent visits to Russia or who live there. But the strictest censorship in the world is enforced, and the news which filters through is pro-Soviet and frequently distorted to such an extent that the information we are given is a maze of contradictory statements. Brilliant and able writers such as John Chamberlain, who lived in Russia for twelve years, admit that as long as they lived there, they were unable to give a true picture, and only after leaving the country for good, with no intention of returning, were they able to give us any accurate statement of conditions.

The visitor to Moscow has an excellent opportunity to see the government's principle of selectivity in information at work. Moscow has always been pointed out as the proudest achievement of the present communist régime. A tourist upon visiting that city is shown many new buildings, a

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good many miles of new pavement, and the crowning achievement of all, the new subway.

But if he should have the desire and the nerve to get away from the routine itinerary arranged for him by the Intourist organization and wander off from this path he would find, a short distance from the designated paths and places, right in the capital of Russia, the most dilapidated houses and buildings of all sorts and shapes where the majority of Moscow's people have to live, and streets with cobblestones that have not been repaired since the days before the revolution.

I happened to stumble on this by accident. On my second day in Moscow the itinerary which the Intourist had for us did not gratify my desire or my tastes. It was the same old stuff—some ancient museum, a church, a workers' house of culture and rest, and similar institutions which are shown to all tourists visiting the U.S.S.R. I balked against this program, and when I expressed a desire to visit a courthouse they told me that they had not made arrangements for such a visit.

When I insisted that I hadn't the slightest interest in their arranged tour, that I was perfectly able and competent to look after myself, that I did not expect them to furnish me with a car—although I had already paid for one on my prearranged

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itinerary—they begrudgingly permitted me to proceed on my own hook. After traveling on a street car only a short distance, the complete change of scenery I found was amazing. I visited court for a couple of hours, then wandered around, covering ground by street car and on foot, and found the conditions under which the great majority of the Moscow population is compelled to live deplorable.

Kharkov is another city to the improvement and modernization of which the government devoted every effort. It is second only to Moscow in its importance as a manufacturing center, and the government has built a good many modern buildings and plants. But just as in Moscow, I found a very different picture when I seized an opportunity to get away from the Intourist routine.

Here I managed it by visiting the homes of some of my friends' relatives, and there witnessed the appalling conditions under which the Russian worker lives. A single room of twelve by fourteen feet constitutes the average home for a family of five. It is needless to explain how congested and crowded it is. All the furnishings of the house consist of a few chairs, a broken-down table, and one bed, in which the man and his wife sleep. The children sleep on chairs pushed together or on the floor.

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But through all their suffering and poverty there is one trait which the Russian people have never lost, and that is hospitality. The family I was visiting asked me to eat with them and would not take no for an answer, and so I joined them in a meal. On this special occasion one of the children was sent out to buy a tin of canned fish, and the "feast" consisted of this, black bread, and *chai* (tea). Yet even as we ate this scanty meal—which was better than their regular fare—they told me that conditions were a good deal better now than they used to be.

All such similar excursions that I managed to make on my trip through Russia proved to me and convinced me beyond a doubt that the information which is obtainable through the regular sources is worse than meaningless, because it is distorted.

Although, since it was necessary to do so, I went to Russia under the general guidance of Intourist, I was going to a country which was neither new nor strange to me. And when I set out to learn as much as I could of the results of the Russian Revolution, I was only following out the history of something which at one time had been the most important influence in my life.

For I was born near Riga, Latvia, one of the provinces of the Baltic states which prior to the

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revolution was part of old Russia. The population of the Baltic states was very cosmopolitan, with Latvians predominating. The Baltic states were the hotbed of pre-war revolutions in Russia, and played an extremely important part in them, especially in 1905, a time of uprisings and strikes throughout Russia. And the Latvians were especially active as revolutionists both during and after the czarist régime.

When the government managed to suppress the uprisings of 1905 and gained control of the situation, it established martial law throughout the Baltic states and kept expeditionary forces there for a number of years afterward.

In this revolutionary movement in the Baltics, as in the rest of Russia, there were two predominating revolutionary parties: the Social Revolutionist Party and the Social Democratic Party, and there were many factions within them. The Social Democratic Party was fundamentally divided into two distinct factions, which were known as the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The distinction between these groups was not so much in their principles and ultimate aims as in policies and the methods each believed necessary to carry them out and accomplish their aims. All socialists have as their aim and principle the overthrow of the capitalistic sys-

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tem throughout the world, and the establishment of a free state made up of free co-operative groups and societies, under which the tools of production belong to the workers and in which each worker receives according to his work. The primary principle which distinguishes communism from other forms of socialism is that the communists believe in a society in which each individual gives according to his ability and receives, not according to his work, but according to his needs. This they proclaim as the ideal social order and the inevitable system into which the socialistic order will develop, just as socialism is an inevitable transition from capitalism.

Whereas the Social Revolutionists and the Menshevik faction of the Social Democrats believed that socialism could come through a gradual evolutionary change, which could be best accomplished by overthrowing the czarist régime and establishing a free democratic state, they believed that the purpose of the revolution was primarily political and not economic. The Bolsheviks, headed by Lenin, believed not only that it was unnecessary, but highly undesirable, to wait for this gradual change and that the revolution must be immediate both as to political and economic factors. It was this difference which played such an important part in the

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final outcome of the revolution in 1917, and which laid the foundation for the overthrow of the Kerensky government by the Bolsheviks.

The Social Revolutionist Party differed from both of the Social Democrat groups in that it derived its theory and philosophy of socialism not from Karl Marx and Marxism, but from the theories and principles of socialism expounded by Michaelovski and Chernovshevski. They questioned the infallibility of Marx's concept that the economic force is the underlying motive in the development and progress of human history. They based their beliefs on the theory that other than economic factors played their parts in the development and changes in human history, and held that economic factors are effects as well as causes and are conditioned, as are people, by other, underlying influences. They stressed the importance of great leaders of mankind in altering the development and influencing the historical trends of their epochs and periods.

From this concept they developed the theory that it was unnecessary for a country to go through the processes which Marx outlined in his *Kapital* in passing from capitalism to socialism, denying that, in Russia, a high development of industrialization and a high proportion of city workers or

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proletariat formed a necessary prerequisite to socialization. They based their hope of being able to socialize Russia, notwithstanding its industrial backwardness, on the fact that the Russian peasantry, comprising 85 per cent of Russia's total population, was entirely different from that of other countries; and on the belief that the conditions under which the agrarians existed were highly favorable for building a co-operative or socialistic order.

The commune-mindedness of the Russian peasant (conditioned by the *obshina* life and environment instituted by Alexander II) was to be the foundation for building a socialist state in Russia without passing through the intermediate stages necessary to other countries.

The Social Democratic Party, until 1903, was one unit; but in that year, in a congress of the leaders of the party, it split up into two groups—the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Lenin developed a theory which laid the foundation and was the beginning of the Bolshevik Party: that the evolutionary definition which other leaders gave to the Marx theory was not what Marx intended it to be, and expounded his own definition which stressed the plausibility and desirability of achieving socialism, and even communism, not by a slow, evolu-

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tionary process, but by a swift, revolutionary one.

Plachanov, who is known as the father of the Social Democratic Party in Russia, insisted that Lenin's idea was a deviation from true Marxism, and the congress split up, with the majority of its members following Lenin and the minority following Plachanov. It was then that the names of these two parties originated. The only significance of the party names lies in the common meaning of the words "bolshevik." "Bolshevik" means "majority," "menshevik," "minority."

The Social Revolutionist Party was distinguished from other socialist parties by its belief in terror and terroristic acts as an effective weapon for overthrowing the Romanoffs. This party had within its organization a "fighting squad" whose duty was to assassinate the higher-ups of the bureaucratic czarist régime whenever they became exceptionally cruel in dealing with the masses or in their treatment of political prisoners, and thus, by retaliating with terror, hasten the demoralization of despotism.

When I was quite young, as a high-school student in Dorpat, I was thrown among members of this group, and did some revolutionary work such as spreading illegal literature among workers, sol-

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diers, and peasants. I was found with such literature in my possession and horsewhipped so severely that I was laid up in bed for six weeks. A year and a half later, when I was sixteen and still in the city of Dorpat, a great university center, I was arrested with twenty other students, accused of belonging to the Social Revolutionist Party and conspiring to kill the head of the secret service police. The arrest of this group was made possible by a *provocateur* whom the government managed to place among us.

We were kept in three different prisons for two years and fifteen days. Then a military court sentenced thirteen of the group to *katorga* (penitentiary) in Siberia, and the rest, myself among them, were released. From the time I got out of prison until June, 1911, when I left for the United States, I spent all my time and energy traveling through Russia and abroad doing various kinds of work for the Social Revolutionist Party, having won the finest diploma and the highest degree a revolutionist could have—a prison record. During this time I lived under constant fear of being rearrested, with the ever-present problem of outwitting and out-generalizing the *Okhrana* (secret service police), hiding under assumed names with false passports furnished by the party, sleeping in churches, syna-

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gogues, on the banks of rivers, and in poorhouses, continuing my work among factory hands, peasants, and soldiers, in the meantime eking out my meager existence by doing all kinds of odd jobs.

In the town of Vilna I had a narrow escape, and it was only through the friendliness and ingenuity of the owner of the rooming house where I was stopping that I was able to save myself. The secret service police upon entering the place asked for me, and the proprietor was able to detain them by talking with them and offering them a drink of vodka, while I jumped out through a window and got away; and I had many other similar escapes.

After that I was constantly on the run. Every so often the secret service police, who were hot on my trail, would visit the village where my family lived, trying to discover my whereabouts. On one occasion they arrested my younger brother, whom they had mistaken for me, and kept him for twenty-four hours. With Stolipin (the prime minister of Russia at that time) determined to break up the revolutionary movement, which was at its lowest ebb, and with my life under the constant strain and fear of being hunted down, I resolved in 1911 to leave the place of my birth for the United States.

This early experience in various revolutionary activities in different parts of Russia enabled me,

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upon return to my homeland, to analyze certain phases of the present communistic activities and to gain information which is not available to the average tourist in Russia.

In the year of 1912 the Social Revolutionist Party assassinated Stolipin in one of the theaters in Kiev. This was the last act of terror that the Social Revolutionists carried out in Russia, for the czarist régime had gained control of the situation and suppressed all but a few small revolutionist groups scattered here and there. Most of the revolutionists were exiled to Siberia or shot, though many of them managed to escape and lived in exile in Switzerland, France, and England, trying to keep in contact with Russia and conduct their activities from abroad.

When the war broke out in 1914 the socialists played a minor part in political life in Russia. Many of the leaders were in sympathy with and supported the czarist régime in the war with Germany; and it was only after many catastrophes and defeats of war were suffered by the Russian army and people that the revolutionist groups exercised their influence upon the Russian population and became a factor of political importance in the country.

The dissatisfaction with the czarist régime grew

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in proportion with the disasters and defeats suffered by the Russian army through the incompetence of that bureaucracy. When the czarist régime was finally overthrown and the provisional government took control, the Social Revolutionist Party was predominant.

Kerensky's short-sightedness in his determination to carry on the war with Germany when the whole country was disheartened and sick of it, his indecisiveness and delay in carrying out his promise to give the land to the peasants, which antagonized both the city workers and the agrarians, and his failure to recognize the growing influence of the Bolsheviks, whom he permitted to carry on propaganda against his government among the workers, contrasted with Lenin's promise to declare peace immediately and give the land to the peasants, made the life of his provisional government tragic and short; and it was comparatively easy for Lenin and his followers to overthrow this tottering régime and take control of the government.

From America I watched with intense interest the great drama of the Russian revolution, for which I had given up a good part of my life. My vision and hope of seeing Russia develop her great mental, spiritual, and physical resources under a free democratic state were shattered.

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But Lenin and Trotzky promised the Russian people and the rest of the world a millennium in the near future which would surpass anything ever known or even dreamed of: Communism, a social order in which there would be no rich or poor, no exploiter or exploited, in which everybody would be equal regardless of sex, race, creed, or color, with a life of abundance and happiness for everyone. Each individual would be a human being devoid of all weaknesses and shortcomings and without any selfish or greedy inclinations or desires which the capitalistic system engenders in them. The new type of individual would be collectively constituted and collectively minded, would consider himself only as a part of a social whole, and would devote his energy and ambition to the benefit of the collective whole.

In the Marxian concept of human behavior, according to which the human being is conditioned by and is the product of environment, all that was necessary to make such an individual was to adjust his environment. In order to achieve this great aim, the communists confiscated all the tools of production from the original owners, abolished the old system of education, began to build the workers' own intelligentsia, proclaimed free love as the ideal of the new family life, destroyed the churches and

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the clergy as a drug for the people, established a workmen's jurisprudence, confiscated all land from the landowners and proclaimed it as state property, and uprooted everything else which resembled the old capitalistic order.

All their hope was centered in the new generation, and all their energy concentrated in its upbringing and training, which they took under their complete control. In order to exterminate capitalism and its institutions completely and finally, it was necessary to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat, a necessary evil of temporary character which would disappear as the cause for its creation was removed and the new generation developed and grew up. There were other necessary but distasteful deviations from true communism, but they too were to be only temporary ones. Russia was to become the torchbearer for mankind, or at least for all the workers of the world in building communism through a world-wide revolution.

It was nineteen years ago that the Bolsheviks made their promises. It was nineteen years ago that they began to build a new generation in an environment which they proposed to adjust in a manner that would allow the natural human being freedom in which to achieve his perfection under the ideal conditions of communism. It was nineteen

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years ago that radical deviations from the communistic ideal and principles were explained away as temporary measures.

The new generation has been built. The active adult population of Russia today consists of the infants, the children, and the adolescents of nineteen years ago—those who stood expectantly at the threshold of the new order. Has the millennium become a reality for them? Have the promises made to them and to the world nineteen years ago been fulfilled?

It was in the hope of answering these questions for myself that I returned to Russia in the summer of 1936.

HUMANITY MADE TO ORDER

I

The immediate aim of the October Revolution was to set up at once a dictatorship of the proletariat in order to destroy capitalism and the obsolete class of capitalists at one violent stroke and prepare the way for the establishment of a pure state of communism.

IN order to understand what is actually taking place in the U.S.S.R. it is necessary to know some fundamental events in the history of the Russian Revolution and the political, social, and economic developments and changes which have taken place since the October Revolution of 1917.

With the exception of the Social Revolutionist Party which was primarily a Russian agrarian organization and differed in other respects from the Social Democrats—or, as they were known, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks—the philosophy of all the varied groups of socialists stemmed from the theories expressed by Karl Marx in *Das Kapital*. Socialism, followed by communism, was theulti-

mate goal, the ideal social order aimed at by all these groups.

The underlying principle of Marxism is that economic conditions constitute the main driving force in human progress; that as feudalism is replaced by the industrial revolution and the origin of capitalism, capitalism will give way to socialism and finally to communism.

Marx's theory of socialism is based on the doctrine that when industrialization of the capitalist system comes to a stage of development in which the tools of production are concentrated, controlled and owned by a few, the worker, becoming more and more class conscious, will arise and overthrow capitalism, taking over the tools of production and thus creating a state of socialism. According to this theory, an agrarian country is not susceptible to socialization because the farmer, half capitalist and half worker, having a *petit bourgeois* psychology, is not collectively minded. Assuming the correctness of this point of view, it can readily be seen that a country will not pass from the capitalistic order to a social order until after it has become highly industrialized. Marx himself expressed the opinion in several instances that Russia, being primarily an agrarian country and the

least industrially developed, would naturally be one of the last countries in the world to become socialistic.

According to the Bolsheviks—or, as they prefer to call themselves, communists—Leninism is an improvement over Marx's theories of social order, the improvement or advancement consisting primarily in the theory that passing from a state of capitalism to a state of socialism and even communism is not an *evolutionary* process but a *revolutionary* one. Lenin claimed that socialism and even communism could be achieved in one coup without going through the stages of development outlined by Marx. He believed that a well-organized revolutionary group could and should, by taking advantage of chaotic conditions caused by war, famine, or other forces which are inevitable under an imperialistic, capitalistic order, immediately establish communism by overthrowing the weakened and disorganized capitalistic class.

Naturally there was no country in the world more fertile for such a plan than was Russia in the year of 1917, when the country was in a most chaotic state under the misrule of the Romanoffs. With the whole country disorganized, prostrated, bled and starved through four long years of war;

with the most exploited, backward, and poorly paid proletariat anywhere in Europe, tempted by alluring promises and prospects of immediately becoming the owners of their factories and the ruling class of the country; with the provisional government of Kerensky wavering and, regardless of his best intentions, unable and unfit to cope with the situation, it was really comparatively an easy matter for Lenin and his disciples to step in, overthrow that shaky, weak and tottering régime, and take over the government.

Lenin considered the enemies of communism to be not only the capitalists whom they were destroying, but also other groups of socialists who differed from the Bolsheviks, even though that difference was only in their conception of the methods necessary to achieving the same end. The thing which distinguished the Bolsheviks from all other groups was their insistence upon *complete and immediate discarding of the old order* and the immediate inauguration of a pure communist program by *force*. Their policy was thus known as military communism.

Lenin's belief, not only in the desirability, but also in the plausibility, of communism was based on the theory that human behavior is entirely

molded by and is the result of environment. It was his belief that the bourgeois environment which induced bourgeois psychology had to be eliminated completely in order to give place to the ideals of communism. It would therefore be necessary to uproot all the old concepts of the family, the old method of compensating workers for their work, the ancient religion, and even the system of education —the old order in every phase of life.

Lenin summarized his aims in his definition of communism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

Before the October Revolution was an accomplished fact, and even shortly afterward, there were still a good many Bolsheviks who thought it would be advisable to permit some of the other socialist groups, especially the ones who were more to the left, to participate in the government of the new Soviet. Lenin, however, convinced of the inadvisability and weakness of such a procedure, pointed out that any vacillation on the part of the communists, any inclusion within the Soviet of socialists who were not completely in sympathy with communism, would put the communists in danger of losing all the gains of the October Revolution. The alternative which he brought about was the estab-

lishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat by Bolsheviks only, with Lenin at its head. With communism as the immediate goal, a representative form of government was out of the question. In other words, a régime was set up in which a party consisting of approximately three hundred thousand members (which was the number of Bolsheviks at this period of the revolution) governed a nation of about one hundred eighty million people.

With the civil war that followed immediately after the October Revolution the communists and the other revolutionary groups in Russia grew further and further apart and became more and more irreconcilable. Lenin, Trotzky, Zinovyev, Kaminev, Molotov, and Stalin, each in the order of his importance, after getting complete control and the power to govern, directed their concentrated power not only toward destroying the capitalistic class, or the Whites, but just as mercilessly toward destroying and liquidating all other socialistic groups and parties, contending that any socialist who was not also communistic was an enemy of the Soviet.

The story of execution and exile which rewarded hundreds of thousands of true sons of the Russian Revolution who had made possible the overthrow of the czarist régime is one of the darkest pages in the

history of the Russian Revolution. Such great leaders as Chernov, head of the Social Revolutionist Party, which played the most important rôle in the overthrow of the Romanoffs, Plachanov, the exponent of the Social Democratic Party in Russia, the very party from which the Bolsheviks originated, and many other great revolutionists who were unable to flee from Russia were shot or exiled to Siberia, though their only sin was that they believed Russia to be not quite ready for a communistic order.

At that time the ruling party chose to consider Lenin and Trotzky as the Russian Revolution, Lenin as the guiding genius, Trotzky as the great organizer. Zinovyev ruled with a merciless hand what was known as the Leningrad District, Kaminev was head of the Moscow District; Stalin was mentioned occasionally as an important cog in the machine but was never as important as Lenin, Trotzky, Zinovyev, or Kaminev.

When Lenin became ill with a paralytic stroke, Trotzky was looked upon as the temporary head of the U.S.S.R., and both Russia and the outside world were expecting Trotzky to become Lenin's logical successor in the event of the latter's death. But while Trotzky was resting on his past glories and

absorbed in the contemplation of his own greatness, Stalin quietly managed to establish himself as the head of the Communist Party by getting himself elected as its general secretary, a position which enabled him to place his henchmen in all strategic points, and this shrewd political maneuver enabled him to become dictator of the U.S.S.R. after Lenin's illness and death.

The Bolsheviks, in building their communistic state, encountered insurmountable obstacles, not only in the remaining capitalist element in the country, but also in the peasantry, which comprised 85 per cent of the entire population. Just after the October Revolution, Lenin, in order to obtain the support of the peasantry, came out with his famous slogan, "Land and Peace," confiscated all land from the nobility, and divided it among the peasants. The peasants "came into the land," but they soon found out that they were not in ultimate control of the land or even of its products. The industrial machine, broken down by civil strife, Allied intervention, and other causes, was unable to supply badly needed manufactured articles to the rural population, whose farm products were being confiscated by a government which failed to give them anything in return. In answer the peas-

ants instituted a passive resistance by refusing to raise more than their families needed, and the result was the famine of 1921.

The communists were divided among themselves as to the procedure for overcoming this obstacle. They were faced with this dilemma: Should they give way to the peasants in order to stimulate production on the farms in order to feed the starving urban population, or should they stand by their ideals of a communistic state regardless of the opposition of the peasants? Trotzky insisted that the only way to solve these problems and to abolish private ownership in the villages was to collectivize the farms, in order to stimulate production, and to exterminate the *kulak*, who constituted the anti-revolutionary bourgeois element among the peasants.

Lenin, although he agreed with Trotzky's theory that so long as the Russian peasants remained "half-worker and half-capitalist" they could not be converted to communism, was nevertheless afraid to force collectivization on them for fear that it would antagonize them even more. In order to stop the passive resistance of the peasants and reconcile them to party policies Lenin created the NEP (New Economic Policy, which permitted private trading).

He explained to the workers that it was a necessary step backward in order to take two steps forward and to stimulate production, of which the country was in such great need. With the revival of this private trading, production on the farms was temporarily increased.

In the period which followed closely upon Lenin's death, the Communist Party, as a result of losing its guiding genius, disintegrated into three factions: a left wing, with Trotzky, Zinovyev, and others at its head; a center group dominated by Stalin; and a right wing led by Tomsky, Rykov, and others. Dissension among the three factions was the result partly of policy and partly of personal antagonism and ambition among the leaders, especially the extreme personal dislike between Stalin and Trotzky, and their individual ambitions and struggle to gain control of the party.

Trotzky was primarily an intellectual. He had spent most of his years outside of Russia, and he looked upon the Russian drama as a prelude to world revolution. He insisted that communism was by nature international and could exist and survive only through becoming universal. He believed that the duty of the Russian Communist Party, after disposing of the bourgeois element in Russia, was

to concentrate its energy upon creating revolutions in the rest of the world.

Stalin, on the other hand, contended that communism would ultimately gain more by concentrating all its efforts and energies in establishing and strengthening communism in Russia, and through its success becoming a good example to the workers of the rest of the world.

Not that Stalin and his powers were in the least reluctant to foment revolutions in the rest of the world. They were willing, and still are, to help with guidance and money any form of uprising or revolution in any part of the globe. But to them communism outside of Russia is a welcome by-product only; to Trotzky it seemed an essential to the success of the revolution in Russia.

Stalin, being a more practical type who had spent all his life in Russia working exclusively among the Russians, visualized and comprehended the enormity of the problems which confronted the communist party in Russia. While not disagreeing with Trotzky's desire, he insisted that it would be possible for a socialist country to survive in an otherwise capitalistic world, but that it would require all the energy of the Russian Communist Party to retain the gains made within Russia itself.

In the first stages of their struggle, they differed on another pivotal question, which involved the policy of collectivization of the Russian peasants. Trotzky insisted that the U.S.S.R. could never become communistic, or even socialistic, unless it liquidated the kulak and collectivized Russian agriculture.

It had soon become apparent that the NEP did not and could not work, for the reason that industry, being completely broken down, was unable to furnish its commodities to the peasants in return for their farm products. Villages went back to the practice of passive resistance which they had used effectively during the period of military communism. In addition, the NEP and the Nepmen were most distasteful to the communists, and at best were endured only reluctantly by the ruling party.

The exponents of the right wing were inclined to a more moderate course. They reasoned that with capitalism and the capitalist class eliminated—whether through execution, escape abroad, exile, or starvation—and the few members who did survive deprived of their power numerically and otherwise, the time was ripe to abolish dictatorship and to establish some form of representative government. Tomsky, one of the leaders of the right wing, ex-

pressed its position thus: The dictatorship of the proletariat was created as a force to eradicate the capitalist and capitalism. After accomplishing its aim it becomes a strait-jacket, is stifling not to the class against whom it was created, but to the creator—the proletariat.

Although Stalin would tolerate no opposition, no matter what its source, his pressure against the right faction was not as great as it was against that which he designated as “Trotzkyist.”

Stalin, retaining the general secretaryship of the Communist Party, was able to destroy any form of opposition by what is known in Russia as *chistka*, or purging. *Chistka* is a highly organized espionage system among the communists themselves whereby any sign of unfaithfulness, not to the Communist Party or to communism, but to Stalin, is brought to light and punished by expulsion from the party, taking away the communist card, and the consequent loss of the many privileges which the card bestows in Russia.

At first the methods Stalin used against his opponents within the party were not quite as drastic as the ones he now uses, such, for example, as the execution of the sixteen leading communists in the month of August, 1936. His earlier procedure was

to remove offenders from their positions and expel them to some remote points to meditate and repent, but after a certain length of time he would allow them to come before the Congress of the All-Soviet Union, and if they publicly repented and admitted their errors and sins, he even went so far as to accept them back into the party in many cases.

The story of Stalin's struggle with Trotzky for power has been written time and again. It culminated in the exile of Trotzky in 1928 to Alma Ata, a remote point in Central Asia, from whence he entered Turkey. Since leaving there he has been wandering from country to country, always an unwelcome guest. Stalin insisted that his motive for punishing Trotzky was anything but personal, that on the contrary there was a great and vital principle at stake—the principle of communism.

Each of the two parties and their followers claimed that they were the only true disciples of Lenin, and that the course the other party had taken was deviating from true communism. But these differences in policy, however important they may seem on the surface, played only a part in the conflicts between these groups. Personal ambitions were of greater significance.

Thus far history has proved that Stalin's prac-

tical wisdom was more nearly correct than Trotzky's ideas; and while Trotzky has tried unsuccessfully and is still trying to build up a new communist party, which he has called the Fourth International, to fit into his theory, Stalin is not only the ruler of all the Russian communists but is looked upon as leader by most of the communists in the rest of the world.

Stalin does not hesitate to use the opposition's ideas as his own if he decides that they fit in with his immediate plans, and often he has used ideas which a short time before he had condemned as anti-communistic or anti-revolutionary. In 1928, when the famous five-year plan was promulgated, Stalin carried out Trotzky's plan of collectivization of the peasantry, and the methods he used constituted one of the most horrible pages in the history of the Russian Revolution. Hundreds of thousands of the more well-to-do peasants were shot, and millions were exiled to the lumber camps of Siberia.

As of any country ruled by a dictator having complete control of every phase of life and strict censorship of the press, speech, and other rights, the outside world gets a picture which is painted to suit the dictator; and knowledge of any undercurrents or disturbances is available only when some

major event takes place, the news of which the dictator is unable to suppress because of its unusual importance. Of such importance was the exile of Trotzky and the execution of sixteen communists in August, 1936.

But the significant facts of the actual continuance of Russian revolutionary thought, the continuance of splits and realignments within the party, the secret divergence from loyalty to Stalin, who will brook no open criticism or divergence from anyone, remain hidden in the minds and hearts and guided speech of the Russians themselves. And I do not speak here of the Whites or capitalists, for this group has been completely destroyed in Russia. I mean the members of the Communist Party itself, many of the minority factions of which are today combined in their opposition to Stalin, as against a common enemy. Both the rights and the lefts in the Communist Party have organized throughout the land what they call "cells," small, underground, illegal organizations among workers in plants and factories.

The grievances which the Russian workers have against the present régime are numerous and have many angles. In this group of discontented are a great many of that old type of communist who sin-

cerely believes that the course Stalin has taken will destroy the fruit of the October Revolution. There is the other group which considers the revolution an accomplished fact and sees no reason for Stalin's personal dictatorship, disguised under the title of dictatorship of the workers. Then there is the multitude of workers and peasants who are not communists, who are not quite good enough to be communists (joining the Communist Party in Russia is a complicated and difficult achievement) who are greatly disillusioned and disgruntled by the false promises of the régime to better their lot. As they all realize by now, the famous *pjatiletka* or five-year plan, which has been extended into another five-year plan, did not achieve the millennium which had been promised to them.

By the end of the second five-year plan only a small proportion of the population—engineers, technical workers, and a few *Stachonovitzi*—had bettered their lot by obtaining better food and living quarters, and some clothes and shoes. The majority of the workers have gained very little because the food and living quarters they are able to obtain are only a little, if at all, better than they were a few years ago. Clothes and shoes are still as scarce and prices as high as they were before.

Men like the late Zinovyev and Kaminev found a fertile soil in this group for the spread of discontent, and the government has a far greater task to eradicate the movement against Stalin's dictatorship which these men represented than it would like to have believed. The followers of these men include not only professional communists but a large portion of the masses. That Stalin has realized this is evidenced by the ruthlessness with which he is trying to handle this undercurrent of unrest.

On my last visit to Russia the atmosphere was depressingly tense and expressions of anxiety were visible on many faces. After doing some investigating, I ascertained that the trial of Zinovyev, Kaminev and fourteen other communists was to take place in a few days. This trial the Russians, especially the communists themselves, felt would be a prelude to a period of more arrests, executions, and expulsions from the party. Their premonition proved to be correct. Since then a great many of the lights of the Communist Party—Radek, the editor of *Pravda*, the organ of the government; Boukharin, the editor of *Isvestja*, the official organ of the Communist Party; Rykov, and many others—men who were not only famous in their own country

but who had established for themselves an international reputation—have been arrested and indicted.

The shooting of sixteen men would seem of minor importance in a country where the number of executions reached into the millions, if it were not for the character of the men who were executed and the part they played in the revolution.

At the beginning of the revolution and for a long time afterward, Zinovyev and Kaminev were second in importance only to Lenin and Trotzky; and with Stalin's rise to power Zinovyev and Kaminev were found among the dissenters. They were often accused of disloyalty to Stalin, but their closeness to the prophet of all prophets, Lenin, their important rôles in the October Revolution and the period that followed it, their great influence in organizing the Bolshevik movement prior to this revolution, and the great following they had among the workers in Russia restrained Stalin from carrying out too drastic measures against them.

Then something happened which gave Stalin an excuse to dispose of them completely.

In December, 1934, Kirov, Stalin's closest friend and one of the members of the Polit Bureau (the government in Russia, comprising seven members with Stalin at its head), as he was walking out of

one of the government buildings in Leningrad, was assassinated by a communist. Immediately afterward the government arrested and shot hundreds of "suspects," and in addition exiled thousands of others to the salt mines in Siberia. These victims had not the slightest connection with the assassination, but it put such fear and panic into the hearts of the rulers of Russia that they went at the job of making a *chistka* in earnest.

In order to justify the shooting of men like Kaminev, Zinovyev, and Smirnov, it was necessary to build up a belief that they were not only Trotzkyists, leftists or rightists, but that they were terrorists; and to climax it, the charge was made that these men had relations with the Gestapo, the secret service police in Germany, and that the Gestapo not only aided in the assassination of Kirov, but also planned to assassinate Stalin and other leaders of the government. This last accusation was a powerful (though in fact a ridiculous) attack, for Germany is considered to be the arch-enemy of Russia. What the Bolsheviks and Stalin must have forgotten is that the same trick, the same accusation, was used against Lenin himself in 1917 when he arrived in Russia after his famous trip through Germany. This accusation, of course, had no foundation, but in

order to shoot people of importance a case of treason had to be built up, and the German Gestapo was selected as the most logical foundation upon which to build.

I happened to be in Russia when the trial took place. Without exaggeration I say that you could sense the tenseness in the atmosphere. Every newspaper, every meeting, every informal gathering, was charged with the tensity of this trial. Even the Spanish Revolution, which was played up very strongly in the U.S.S.R., became of minor importance.

Though this farcical procedure of trial by the government may have accomplished its purpose of deceiving the average person, on the other hand it helped to intensify the antagonism of a good many toward the present régime. Wherever I went among the more intelligent Russians I heard that this trial was a disgrace, that a baby could see through it, that it was not a question of the principles involved, but a struggle for power.

The undercurrent of unrest which was accentuated by this trial is not local but is prevalent all through Russia. (Prudence forbids me to divulge more specific information on this point, as it would endanger not only the well-being but also the lives

of some friends in Russia with whom I was able to discuss these matters.)

With such personages as Zinovsky and Kaminev, even Stalin's dictatorship is compelled to use at least a mock trial, but the smaller fry can be disposed of without ceremony, and hundreds of thousands of the U.S.S.R.'s citizens are living in constant fear and under a constant threat, not knowing when they will be next. The government is intent upon uncovering all the underground Trotzkyist organizations throughout the land. This purge that Stalin has undertaken is so intense and furious that thousands upon thousands of party members in good standing are being expelled from the party without any proof of their connection with this underground movement. When the government cannot connect them with any specific act or scheme, the fact that they visited a Trotzky meeting as far back as twelve years ago is used as grounds for their expulsion from the party. The government's suspicion of their disloyalty often originates from the report of some other member of the party who would benefit by their removal, who states that he has known the accused to attend a Trotzkyist meeting. Even if there are no other charges against him, this one charge is sufficient to expel him from the

party. By this and other methods the government is purging the party of hundreds of thousands of members.

There are many editors throughout the country who are under indictment, not for anything that they did against the government or Stalin, but for being too lenient in accusing and condemning those whom the government designates as Trotzkyists.

A large number of communists, both to the right and left, are hostile to the innovations and new policies promulgated by Stalin. The influence of both of these groups among a good many workers is far greater than the outside world realizes. It is easy to see that if a catastrophe like the death of Stalin or a war with another nation occurred, the U.S.S.R. would be plunged into a state of chaos which would alter the entire political, economic, and social picture in Russia.

By this last statement I do not want to intimate that Stalin is losing his power. Regardless of the restlessness existing in Russia, Stalin's régime is far from being in any immediate danger of breaking down so long as Stalin is alive. My belief is that his strength lies not only in his complete control of the army and of the best-organized secret service police in the world (kept contented and

loyal to the régime by being maintained as the best-fed and best-clothed groups in the country), but also in his innate ability as a leader. He has in large measure the two fundamental characteristics of leadership: the ability to mold and create public opinion and the ability to articulate the subconscious thoughts and desires of the group of people which he heads.

He did not inherit the depth, and he lacks the human element, which Lenin possessed, but he does have that sense of proportion and ability to grasp realities and facts that is necessary to all true leadership. He has ably expressed his own conception of the duty of a leader as follows:

“The art of leadership is a serious matter. One must not lag behind a movement, because to do so is to become isolated from the masses. But one must not rush ahead, for to rush ahead is to lose contact with the masses. He who wishes to lead a movement must conduct a fight on two fronts—against those who lag behind and those who rush ahead.”

But it must not be forgotten that he has also said, “No revolution can be made with silk gloves.”

It is not surprising that his power persists. What would the common people gain through an attempt to overthrow him? They have had revolutions and

seen little gain for the masses as a result. They had no freedom whatsoever when they were ruled by a czar; now they are ruled by a dictator and still have no freedom. The peasantry as a whole is as poor, and the worker as underpaid, now as then.

Yet there is a group which has benefited greatly by, and constitutes the supporters of, the Soviet government.

I was thrown in with a party member in a sleeping compartment (called in Russia "soft," meaning second class). We sat up and talked into the late hours of the night. He told me the history of his family and of his own life, which is similar to the story of many other Russian lives. He was born on a farm near one of the big landlords' estates, which were many in Russia before the revolution. After his father's death the family lost the little farm, and his mother, in order to support her many children, was compelled to hire herself out to the landlord for very meager pay. The family lived under the most deplorable conditions, the expected lot in those days of those who were compelled to do day work for their landlords. When he was still quite young the revolution came and uprooted the whole structure. The landlord was killed and his property

confiscated and divided among the peasants, this man's family participating in the division.

From then on conditions reversed themselves. All his brothers and sisters went to school, whereas in the past only the children of the landlord were given an opportunity to receive an education. He is now the editor of a newspaper, receiving a thousand roubles a month, and as a party member enjoys additional privileges, such as traveling second class and being able to obtain front-row tickets to any concert or show. His brother is the head of a railroad division; a car is furnished him, and a five-room apartment. His older sister, who had been illiterate at the age of twenty-three, having a touch of consumption and therefore unable to do any physical work, studied languages and now speaks and writes French, German, English, and Italian in addition to her native tongue. She now holds the position of editor of a weekly magazine published in Kiev. Another sister works on one of the *kolkhozi* farms as a supervisor.

Wherever you find a man like this you will find a supporter of the present régime. However, this supporting element constitutes only a minor part of the total population, and it represents only a part of the Communist Party itself.

Recently Stalin, in order to pacify unrest among the Communist Party members and other discontented elements in Russia, made the gesture of giving the U.S.S.R. a new constitution. This was drawn up by a constitutional committee of the Central Executive Committee, and the draft was approved on June 11, 1936, by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, for consideration on November 25, 1936, by the All-Union Congress of Soviets.

A careful study of the new constitution shows, however, that the new freedoms supposedly given to the Russian people were conferred in such a way that, given in one clause, they are taken away in another. The following quotations from the Articles reveal their contradictory nature (all italics are mine):

“Article 1: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

“Article 2: *The Soviets of Toilers’ Deputies*, which developed and grew strong as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists and the winning of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *constitute the political foundation of the U.S.S.R.*

“Article 3: All power in the U.S.S.R. belongs to

the toilers of town and country *as represented by the Soviets of Toilers' Deputies.*"

The Soviets of Toilers' Deputies are made up exclusively of communists. It is therefore obvious that the first article means very little, since the communists make up only 2 per cent of the population of workers and peasants. This predominance of a minority is even more obvious in the provisions of Article 126, which, under the heading, "The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens," states:

"In conformity with the interests of the toilers, and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the U.S.S.R. are insured the right to unite in public organizations—trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organizations, sports and defense organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and *the most active and politically conscious citizens from among the working class and other strata of the toilers unite in the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., which is the vanguard of the toilers in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and which represents the leading core of all organizations of the toilers, both social and state.*"

From this statement it is evident that the govern-

ment did not intend to create any new parties or give any additional freedom to the Russian people which would not be completely controlled and handled by the Communist Party.

“Article 12: In the U.S.S.R. work is the duty of every able-bodied citizen, according to the principle: ‘He who does not work, neither shall he eat.’ In the U.S.S.R. the principle of socialism is realized: ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.’”

“Article 118: Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to work—the right to guaranteed employment and payment for their work *in accordance with its quantity and quality*. The right to work is insured by the socialist organization of national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the absence of economic crises, and the abolition of unemployment.”

The definition of communism made by Lenin, “A social order providing from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,” has therefore been officially repudiated by Articles 12 and 118 of the new constitution. These articles are self-explanatory in that the present-day U.S.S.R. does not claim to be communistic, but claims to be only

socialistic. As a matter of fact, Russia has neither socialism nor communism, but a state capitalism.

“Article 13: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a federated state, formed on the basis of the *voluntary* association of the Soviet Socialist Republics possessing equal rights.” (Russia consists of eleven Socialist Republics.)

As stated in Article 14, “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as represented by its highest organs of power and organs of state administration,” controls all economic, social, military, international, and other activities of the country.

“Article 15: The sovereignty of the Union Republics is restricted *only* within the limits set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Outside of these limits, each Union Republic exercises state power independently. The U.S.S.R. protects the sovereign rights of the Union Republics.”

Article 16 makes it even clearer that their sovereignty is only an illusion because it states that “Each Union Republic has its own Constitution, which takes into account the specific features of the Republic and is drawn up *in full conformity with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.*”

Communism is disappearing in Russia not only in its practical application to economic life, but

also in theory. Nationalism, which goes hand in hand with militarism and is the antithesis of communism, is being daily preached and practiced more and more. Now the expressions "patriotism," "motherland," and "fatherland" are being used by the press and communistic orators as frequently as in capitalistic countries at the time of elections or patriotic celebrations.

Five years ago hatred for the capitalistic world was being taught and applied against all nations. In fact, the United States, as the most capitalistic country in the world, topped the list; but within the last year or two the attitude of the Russian government has undergone a complete transformation. On my travels I met one of the leading editors, the man who edits the newspaper for the railroad workers of Russia. He was very frank in telling me that they had orders from Moscow never to make unfriendly statements or take a hostile attitude toward the United States, England, France, Czechoslovakia, or Turkey, who are considered to be on the friendly list of the U.S.S.R.; but that they are required to write frequent anti-German and anti-Japanese articles and editorials.

This complete turnaround in policy and theory can be accomplished very easily under a dictatorship,

where an articulate public opinion does not exist. Moreover, such change of attitude is not a change of principle but only a matter of expediency. Since the Hitler régime came into power in Germany, with the consequent threat and fear of war with that country, and with an unfriendly Japan on the other side of her, Russia realizes that she has all the enemies she can handle without making new ones. But whatever the motive may be, Russia has grown more and more intensely nationalistic. In the schools and among the workers' meetings are preached national pride, national glory, a great national army, and similar subjects which would have been inconceivable, since they were then considered anti-communistic, just a few years ago.

In discussing its attitude toward Germany and Japan, I was told that the Russian government makes a distinction between the German and Japanese governments and their people. Russia does not look for trouble with anyone, needing all her energy and effort for building up her own country, but she is ready with a great many tanks, airplanes, and other instruments of war to resist any attack or invasion by any nation in the world. She has no grievance against the people of those nations, but

on the contrary has only the most friendly feeling toward them.

This is the attitude of the Russian people also, as well as that of the Russian government. They are more than anxious to avoid anything that may lead to war. Their submission to the most unfavorable settlement with the Japanese on the Manchurian railroad question and their acceptance of all sorts of abuse and insults from Hitler and his lieutenants are proof that Russia is doing everything within her power to avoid war, whether it is because she is not ready to be involved in a war or because her people are peace-loving.

Just as communism has never been achieved in Russia, so also has the promised dictatorship of the proletariat never materialized, as the proletariat is anything but dictator. The Russian worker has no choice whatever in selecting or electing his government representatives. The worker cannot by his own choice or desire become a member of the ruling party (the communists), and the few who are permitted to join this closed, bureaucratic organization must give up the idea of expressing their own opinions on any matter. The prime qualification for membership is the ability to take orders from Stalin and to carry them out unquestioningly. Any slight

deviation from his iron-clad rule is severely punished, and even the slightest suspicion of disobedience is sufficient reason for expulsion from the party and loss of the card which confers many privileges upon its owner.

The life of the average Russian is regulated to the minutest detail by this dictatorial régime. His education, his job, his wages, his rest, his home, every phase of his own and his family's life from the cradle to the grave—all are under the rigid supervision of the government. In Russia a strike by workers for better conditions would be considered treason and would be punished as such.

Thus does the government of Russia, which proposed in 1917 to set up a dictatorship of the proletariat for the purpose of destroying capitalism and establishing a communistic state, persist as a personal dictatorship long after every trace of capitalism has disappeared from within the state. And the communistic order, that promised land for which hundreds of thousands have suffered and died, is seldom even promised now in the U.S.S.R., the most unwholesome place in the world today for the true communist.

II

*Communism: From each according to his ability,
to each according to his needs.*

RUSSIA today, as it was five years ago, is full of apparently inexplicable paradoxes. The outstanding one is the fact that while there is an abundance of work, and even more jobs than there are workers to fill them, there is at the same time an acute shortage of the most ordinary necessities of life.

All able-bodied men from the ages of sixteen to sixty-five and a large proportion of women are working. Women work side by side with men at all jobs, including manual labor not only on the farms but in the heavy industries and road building, even digging ditches with picks and shovels. The number of women workers in some plants is as high as 40 per cent. Plant managements are constantly complaining about the difficulties they are having in getting enough men to run the plants throughout the country. Russian papers frequently carry ad-

vertisements inserted by trusts and factories seeking more workers.

Yet with everybody working and with the great progress in industry which the Russian government says it is making, the economic system still is unable to produce enough of such ordinary essentials as shoes and clothing for the great majority of the people. This paradoxical condition is an outgrowth of the economic development of the communistic régime from the time of the October Revolution in 1917, when the communists came into power, to the present day.

When the Bolsheviks gained control of the U.S. S.R. in 1917, Russia, although her industry was disorganized through four years of war, did possess a good many factories. Some of them—and these were by no means all obsolete—were Russian-owned and managed, and many were plants and factories owned by foreign corporations, since it was the policy of the czarist régime to give concessions to foreign capitalists as an inducement to invest capital in Russia and to build modern plants there. Among them were a great many American companies, such as the International Harvester and General Electric, who had built and were running large, modern plants throughout Russia. These

plants the communists took over, along with those which were Russian-owned, during the revolution.

Although Russia was not industrially developed to the extent of the more progressive western nations, she did have many modern, up-to-date factories, and to run these plants she had a group of very highly skilled technicians and engineers. They were not great in numbers, but in skill and intelligence they were second to none. The communists, however, in their earlier anxiety to eliminate anything even remotely resembling the capitalistic system, shot or exiled many of these technical experts on the slightest provocation; and the ones that remained were not allowed to run the plants.

Management of all plants was turned over to professional communists and party members. There was no discipline in the plants, as the worker was responsible to no one. If there was any misunderstanding between the worker and the technical staff, the worker was always right and the technical staff wrong. The only way in which a worker could be discharged, regardless of his faults or inefficiency, was by a vote of all the workers in the plant, and even this was resorted to only after his misde-meanor had been repeated three times.

When the Communist Party overthrew the Ker-

ensky Provisional Government and took over the control of the country, its most effective bait to the Russian worker was a definite assurance that the communists would immediately build not only a socialist, but a communist state, where each worker would give according to his ability and receive according to his needs. This was known as the "leveling-off" process, which meant equalization of wages between men and women, between efficient and inefficient workers, and between skilled and unskilled labor.

The results were disastrous, but the communists attributed their failure, not to the communistic economic system, but at first to the civil war between the Whites and the communists, to Allied intervention, and later to sabotage by the remnants of the old engineering group who were still working in the plants.

As an incentive for the worker to work harder and increase production, the government in 1926 introduced the capitalistic system of piece work (which is still universally practiced in the U.S.S.R.). However, the results were negligible, because the monetary system was manipulated in a way that caused the prices of commodities to vary according to the wages earned by the workers who

purchased them. Under the card or rationing system which existed then in Russia, after getting their allotment of food and clothing, the skilled workers found that the additional roubles they received were worthless to them because the commodities they wished to purchase were not only prohibitive in price, but, on account of their scarcity, were almost unobtainable.

In this state of affairs, with hardly any new plants being built and the old ones allowed to run down, production diminished to such a degree that the industries were not only unable to supply the needs of the rural population and the export trade, but were also unable to produce enough to supply the needs of even the workers in the cities. Productivity decreased in some cases to as low as 25 per cent of the pre-war level.

Those were dark and gloomy days for the Russian people, and the communist régime was living through trying times. It must be admitted that Stalin pulled the Bolsheviks up by their own bootstraps out of desperate straits by inaugurating in 1928 a planned economy with the slogan *Pjatiletka* (five-year plan). The aim and goal was to industrialize Russia by building up her heavy industries

and building machines to make machinery, in order to make Russia independent of any foreign nation.

It was an ambitious plan, yet there is no country in the world with natural conditions more favorable to the achievement of such a program. Besides being the largest country in the world, covering one-sixth of the globe, she possesses some of the most fertile black soil, a seemingly unlimited supply of timber, mines and minerals of all descriptions, and had, at the beginning of the five-year plan, a population of one hundred and sixty million people. She had everything with which to accomplish this project except the will and intelligence of a technical engineering force to utilize all these resources. In order to try to carry out this program, the government was compelled not only to buy all its machinery from foreign countries, but also to hire many foreign engineers and specialists to install the plants.

After building many huge factories at an enormous cost not only in money but in privation endured by the Russian people, the government found itself in possession of fine, up-to-date plants but without enough engineers and technicians of its own to run them.

Throughout the communist rule the government devoted every ounce of energy to building up and

educating its own technicians and engineers by throwing open to the workers the doors of Russia's technological schools and sending groups of engineers to the foreign countries from whom the machinery was purchased in order to learn the construction and operation of those machines.

However, the new engineers which the communistic schools were turning out were not only inefficient but—as the Russian communists themselves were compelled to admit—a large percentage were downright illiterate. It was not unusual in the plants of the U.S.S.R. five years ago to find their newly built machines either broken down through having been mishandled by inefficient workers, or standing idle for lack of experts and engineers to run them.

The U.S.S.R. had to continue to maintain a large force of foreign engineers not only to install but also to try to run the plants. This meant that she was forced not only to buy machinery with *valuta* (foreign money), but also to pay the foreign experts high wages at the foreign rates of exchange. Then, in order to obtain the *valuta*, she was forced to export her farm products, such as wheat, butter, and eggs, when she was in great need of them for her own workers.

The workers were told that for the present they

would have to tighten their belts a couple of notches until the government could buy necessary machinery, but that after the completion of the five-year plan the U.S.S.R. would be a country of abundance. The Russian proletariat, the government promised, would be better compensated than the workers of capitalistic countries; they would have more for their work than even the Americans.

Another important cause of the production shortage was the turnover of labor. Workers would suddenly leave their jobs to go to another town because of a rumor that a factory there offered rations a little better than those they were receiving. They never hesitated to do this because they were always certain of finding work somewhere.

But from the first, the communists based their hope of progress on their readiness to admit mistakes and correct them; and as far back as June, 1931, before the Economic Conference, Stalin admitted that there were some serious ailments in the industrial system which had to be remedied in order to stimulate production in the U.S.S.R. According to his statement, these ailments were fundamental. His speech before the conference included the following points:

- “1. We can no longer count in the old way on a

surplus of labor. In order to guarantee a sufficient labor supply for industry, we must accumulate labor power in an organized way; we must mechanize labor processes. To think that mechanization can be avoided under our tempo of work or scale of production is to believe that the ocean might be emptied with a spoon.

“2. The present turnover of labor in industry can no longer be tolerated. In order to avoid this evil we must reorganize our system of wages and create a more or less permanent staff of workers for each enterprise.

“3. Lack of responsibility in production must come to an end. A new organization of labor is needed to achieve this, a realignment of our forces so that each group of workers shall answer for their own work, for the condition of their own machine or work-bench, for the quality of their work.

“4. We can no longer depend entirely on that modicum of old engineering and technical strength which we inherited from bourgeois Russia. In order to increase the present tempo and speed of production, the working class must have its own engineering and technical intelligentsia.

“5. No longer can all the specialists, engineers and technicians of the old school be piled together

in a single heap. In consideration of changing conditions, we must change our policy and show the greatest possible concern for those engineers and technicians who have definitely turned to the side of the working class.

"6. We can no longer depend on the old sources of accumulation. To guarantee the further development of industry and agriculture we must make available new sources of funds, get rid of mismanagement, apply the system of economic accounting, lower costs, and increase internal accumulation."

The changes contemplated in these statements, although the government was able to carry them out only partially, actually changed the whole structure, aim, and program of the Soviet government.

After this declaration, the government proceeded to bring back the remnants of the old intelligentsia and engineering group from the remote wastes of Siberia and gave them the job of helping to run the plants.

But even after this censure of its most cherished principle, the U.S.S.R. was still reluctant to dispense with the leveling-off process. The government still tried to achieve this by artificial means.

Though the engineering intelligentsia was paid a wage much higher than that of the average worker, he found himself in a position similar to that of the efficient worker in 1926, when the piece-work system was established. The extra roubles he received were valueless to him for two reasons: first, the articles that he tried to purchase were practically unobtainable because of the general scarcity of all commodities; and second, if he was able to find what he wished to purchase, he had to pay for it vastly more than the prices charged the common workers on their card allowances. This card system permitted the worker to buy his ration of bread, his dinner at the factory, his allotment of a pair of shoes, and other necessities at a low figure; but when the highly paid worker's card allowance was used up, his supply of extra roubles was soon exhausted by the exorbitant scale of prices which was applied to his purchases.

The idea behind that plan was that the government, being compelled to use the remnants of the old engineering skilled workers, was very reluctant to compensate them for their work, and tried these artificial means of deceit, hoping that the need for them would be temporary. The government counted on being able to build up, through the com-

unist's fantastic system of education, an intelligentsia from the working class in a few years (this system of education, by the way, they were compelled to discard completely).

On my previous visit to Russia I pointed out to many communists the fallacy of not compensating ability or intelligence, and the disastrous results which would follow. They nodded their heads and explained that my inability to understand was due to my capitalistic upbringing and environment, and that under the Russian system, where each one had the same opportunity, it wouldn't be long before the workers would not only be paid equally but would be equally able to do the things taught by their leaders and communistic writers. Whatever we are, whatever we may be or will be, depends entirely on environment, the communists insisted. They believed that, with the proper communistic upbringing and training, the discrepancy between people would become of no significance and would gradually disappear. The government was basing this hope on its ability to create a collective-minded individual.

For several years the Soviet Union struggled to accomplish the leveling-off process, with disastrous

results. This equalization of the earnings of the different grades of workers by means of artificial manipulation and arbitrary prices of commodities for each group succeeded only in lessening productivity on the part of the worker because the incentive to work more efficiently was removed. (The ratio of productivity of a Russian worker in comparison with that of an American worker was from 5:1 to 3:1; that is, it required from three to five Russian workers to do a job which one American worker could easily accomplish.)

But Stalin, realizing early the fallacy of this unsound thinking, warned and prepared the country for the utilization of the old intelligentsia and the need to compensate its members for their work.

After a number of years of juggling with the leveling-off process, after an enormous loss in the form of new machinery broken down through mis-handling by the inexperienced and illiterate Russians that the new Russian schools turned out, the government made a complete turnaround and proclaimed the new doctrine or slogan (Russians are great believers in slogans): "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." By this new method of compensation they are trying to win over the remnants of the old engineering

group and intelligentsia and increase the productivity of the factories.

The much-hailed Stachonovitz movement, which took the place of the five-year plan, is only another form of the same old struggle to stimulate production of the Russian worker.

In 1935 a coal miner named Stachonovitz, working in a Don Basin coal mine, came to the attention of the government. Although he worked under the same conditions as the other workers and used the same equipment, he was producing five times as much coal as the average worker—simply through endurance and diligence. The government officials brought him to Moscow, wined and dined him, and proclaimed him a national hero. Through widespread publicity he was held up as a noble example to all Russian workmen. Then he was sent to other mines and factories throughout Russia to expound the theories of efficient work and inspire the other workers to greater efforts. This was the beginning of what is known in Russia as the Stachonovitz movement. The government is exerting all means in its power to stimulate this movement and spread it over all Russia.

A Stachonovitz (as an efficient worker is now

called) is not only the center of praise and glorification by the management of the plant in which he works, but his compensation for the additional work he does amounts in some cases to as much as four times that of the average worker.

The method of computing wages was explained to me by one of the heads of the coal trust. As an example, the average wage for a ton of coal is one rouble, and the average productivity of a worker, for argument's sake, is ten tons per day. If he produces eleven tons he receives a rouble and ten kopeks for all of it. If he mines twelve tons, he receives a rouble and twenty kopeks per ton. If he is able to produce twice the amount of the average worker, he receives two roubles for each ton instead of the one rouble which the average worker receives, thus earning four times the amount earned by the ordinary worker. There are a good many other inducements, such as obtaining the best living quarters, longer periods of rest with pay, and many other little favors.

But the government's hope of stimulating workers to greater exertion by means of the Stachonovitz movement has failed to materialize for the reason that the achievements of a Stachonovitz are the result of a natural ability and intelligence far

greater than that of the average worker. And with its minimum wage of ninety roubles a month (equivalent in purchasing power to about eight or nine American dollars), this movement is considered by the worker just another of the government's tricks, such as its use of the piece-work system, to make the worker believe that he can make more money by harder work.

The workers express their resentment against this movement in unmistakable terms. As I was told by workers and management alike, it is not unusual for the workers to gang up against a Stachonovitz and beat him up. In such cases they frequently break up his lathe or other machine, or his tools, as well.

A few years ago, when Russia was still experimenting with the leveling-off process of communistic economy, during the intensive drive to complete the first five-year plan, the system of "shock brigades" was instituted. These shock brigades would go from plant to plant, using propaganda appealing to the communistic class conscience and pride of the workers. With promises of better wages and a greater abundance upon completion of the five-year plan, they tried to persuade the workers to increase their tempo—or, in plain English, to

work harder. Results in increased production were negligible. In some respects the shock brigades were similar to the present *Stachonovitzi*, except that the appeal is made now not so much to their consciences as directly to their stomachs, and it must be admitted that results have proved this argument more convincing than that used by the shock brigades.

After staying for awhile in Russia, one comes to understand why a small group of people is fairly well dressed and the rest poorly and meagerly clothed. The disparity between the skilled worker or the engineer and the common worker is great. The average wage of Russian workers throughout the country is about one hundred seventy-five roubles (between fifteen and twenty dollars) a month. The minimum wage is ninety roubles. Engineers' wages are from seven hundred to two thousand roubles a month. Then there is another important group, important not in the sense of productivity but in the matter of position and compensation. These are the members of the Communist Party, comprising approximately three million, who are the best paid of all the Russian population. Their number fluctuates for the reasons mentioned.

in the previous chapter—the frequent purges of the party and the initiations of new candidates.

On my previous visit to Russia in 1931, it was dangerous, to say the least, to express the slightest doubt as to the success of the five-year plan. The government, through the daily press, radio, and public meetings, proclaimed it as the cure for all her economic ills. The hysteria of the *piatiletka* infected not only the Russians but even the outside world, and anybody who failed to have convulsions of ecstasy at the mere mention of the five-year plan was in grave danger of being suspected as a counter-revolutionary.

Tons of statistics, published in the form of books and pamphlets, proved with mathematical infallibility that upon completion of the five-year plan Russia would be in line with or even ahead of, the most industrialized capitalistic countries. The more intelligent Russians in their private conversations were not quite as optimistic as the government, but even the skeptical ones believed that the accomplishment would be much greater than it has actually proved to be.

After the completion of the first five-year plan, another five-year plan was inaugurated, to be completed in 1937; but even the official representatives

mention it only casually now, and even go so far as to say that they realize that a backward country like Russia cannot be built up in a few years. They maintain that in the next fifteen or twenty years, *if* Russia is not embroiled in some war, she will be able to build up an industrial system which will insure her people the more abundant life toward which she has been working. The statement itself is an admission of at least partial economic failure.

The reasons for this failure are clear:

1. The standing army numbering in the neighborhood of a million and a half men, an unproductive group well fed and clothed, well taken care of, creates a constant and heavy drain on the resources of a country as yet industrially underdeveloped.
2. The turnover of labor is still tremendous, even if it is not nearly as great as it was five years ago. In every railway depot in Russia may still be seen a constant flow of humanity, their worldly goods in a sack on their shoulders, crowding and jostling and pushing each other in an effort to get on the trains and to go places. Upon being asked why they are going, they answer with the same words they used five years ago. In the places where they have been working, the living quarters are

terrible, shoes and clothing and many other necessities are hard or impossible for the average wage earner to get, and so they are moving to other points with the faint hope of bettering their lot. The government has tried many methods in an effort to stop this, but all to no avail. A worker, upon getting a job, is required to sign an agreement to remain at his job for six months. If he leaves before that time he loses his union card. Some plants try to keep their men by offering to the better workers such inducements as a pair of trousers or a pair of shoes; but it frequently happens that a worker, after accepting these favors, staying a few weeks, and receiving his wages, simply fails to show up for work some morning and moves on to some other point. With work so plentiful, such coercive methods as the threat to deprive workers of their union cards are of no importance. Until a worker receives a wage which will enable him to have a decent place to sleep and such ordinary necessities as a pair of shoes and a suit of clothes, the government will never be able to stop this labor turnover. With the standard of living lower than in any other European country, the incentive to work, for the average Russian, is not strong enough to keep him tied down to one

place. The efficiency of the Russian worker is still enormously lower than that of either the European or the American worker. (Two other measures were used by the government to check this continuous exodus of laborers. One was a 25 to 50 per cent increase in the railroad fares, and the other a 25 per cent decrease in the number of passenger trains run. These also proved unavailing, although the latter measure improved freight movements throughout the country by diverting the equipment of passenger trains to the use of freight systems.)

3. The two and one-half or three million Communist Party members, a non-productive group receiving the best the country has to offer, are a tremendous load for the Russian workers to carry on their shoulders. The prime cause of Russia's economic weakness is this group of communists who make up the government. Its intricate mechanism for running the country by a complicated, bureaucratic system of red tape hinders the normal development of Russian economic life.

The following specific cases will serve to clarify this fact. In Baku, the center of the oil industry, with which I am very familiar, I made a visit to the oil fields. I was able to do this because I had a letter from the industry's main office in Moscow,

which I obtained through the courtesy of the Russian representatives who visited my home town, Tulsa, Oklahoma, at the time of the world oil show in the spring of 1936. Through their recommendations and letters of introduction, I was able to see and visit places which are closed to tourists.

In the most prolific pool in the Baku territory, the Koly field, one of the engineers told me that they were running at that time sixty strings of tools. When I pointed out that only about ten of the sixty strings were in the process of drilling, with the rest idle, he told me that they had been shut down for some cement jobs. (In drilling wells it is the practice to cement the pipe in order to shut off the water.) When I remarked upon the unusualness of this coincidence in which nearly all of the pipe was being cemented at the same time, he finally confessed that they were shut down for lack of pipe. Moscow had failed to furnish the necessary materials, although they now had some telegrams promising to get the pipe moving soon, the engineer said. After much questioning I found that this field was producing only 67 per cent of its normal quota. This condition exists in spite of the fact that the oil industry has always been the most efficient and best run of all Russia's industries, and has always

been her main source of *valuta*. In addition to its value as an export commodity, oil is also of the highest importance to Russia at home, since it is essential to all modern industry and modern military machines.

I was told by the head of the Standard Oil Company in Roumania that Russia is becoming less and less a competitor in supplying European nations with oil. And this in spite of the fact that from the beginning the government made every effort to develop its old pools and discover new fields. This decline can be explained only partly by the fact that the U.S.S.R. is building a huge military machine with many airplanes and tanks which increase the consumption of gas. Nor does consumption of gasoline by automobiles furnish anything like an adequate answer, for Russia has the lowest ratio of automobiles per capita of any country in Europe.

I found that there are very few new cars being built in Russia, and of those only a small number are in use. In Moscow, the capital of Russia, there are only thirty-five thousand cars (less than one car for every one hundred persons), including new and old ones and foreign-made cars. The ratio in the provinces is far lower. Moreover, the present

roads in Russia are almost impassable for automobile traffic, and the government has not even made a beginning in improving old or building new roads. The unimportant part that Russia plays as an exporter of oil on the world market can be explained and understood only as the result of the retarding effect of the Russian system on Russian industry.

On my visit to one of the largest *sovkhosi* (government-managed farms), consisting of over a hundred thousand hectares, located about fifty miles from Rostov, I found that they had an acute water problem. They had drilled three or four deep wells but found only an inadequate supply of water, and even that was so bad that it was not fit for watering cattle, to say nothing of home use. The agronomist told me that they could have an ample water supply from a creek less than a mile away which would not only give them a plentiful amount for human consumption but would enable them to raise a herd of cattle profitably. For they had, he said, a surplus of waste from the grain which they could use, with a good water supply, for raising stock on the *sovkhoz*. He was, however, unable to get Moscow to send them pipe and

machinery to lay the line and install the water system.

The head of one of the big industries in Russia, under whom something like thirty thousand people work, could not go from place to place to look after his work as efficiency demanded because, although the government provided him with an automobile, the severely rationed allotment of gasoline for it was inadequate for his needs.

In many places I visited businesses and factories. Wherever I could I talked to the manager, and in every case where I did so I found that he was a member of the Communist Party and was manager in name only, since he knew little or nothing of the business, to which his usefulness was, naturally, negligible.

These and many other conditions are evidences of the appalling waste caused by the lack of co-operation and co-ordination of the overcentralized, remotely controlled management of the government which results in duplications, omissions, and other inefficiencies.

The communist cry against the whole capitalist system justly pointed out that its main weakness was its unfair method of distribution. From the first, their program purported to aim at a system

which would be not only fair but also equal. The idea of equality has been admittedly given up as a complete failure, but let us see how fair distribution is in Russia today.

Food has improved greatly, both in quantity and quality, during the past five years. Russia under the czars, with primitive methods of agriculture, always produced for export a surplus of wheat and other grains and farm products. After the complete breakdown of collectivization of the Russian peasants there was a terrible famine in 1932, the worst Russia had ever known. It had this effect: the government, in order to calm the aroused peasantry, still maintained the *kolkhozi* (collective farms), but modified this collectivization and permitted the farmers to sell their surplus products as they saw fit. This gratified the innate bourgeois psychology of the farmers and went a long way toward reconciling them and making them produce more.

Another reason for the increase in Russia's food supply is that the government has discontinued the exportation of its farm products, which it had been selling to foreign countries for many years prior to the famine. Both of these measures were beneficial in giving the Russian people more to eat.

Another causal factor in the more abundant supply of foodstuffs is that Russia has built and is building a great many industrial plants. Although they are not running as smoothly as do factories in the more advanced industrial countries, they have made a great deal of progress in the last five years. This is due to the government's recently inaugurated policy of rehabilitating the old engineering group. Even though the engineers were not placed in managerial positions, as they should have been, they were reconciled to their jobs by both material and social compensations: material, in the form of better living quarters, food, and clothing; social, by removal from the "de-classified" category in which they had been placed by the revolutionists when the Bolsheviks came into power. With industry improved, the government is able to supply to some extent the needs of the peasants in the form of manufactured articles, and the peasants in turn have raised and furnished more foodstuffs for the urban population.

But the bulk of the Russian workers have benefited very little by all this—a fact that is apparent upon analysis of the high cost of commodities and the low scale of wages, which leaves the Russian worker with little choice as to what to buy beyond

the bare necessities of life. I have been told time and again by workers that they are in many respects worse off than they were even under the card system. Under that system they had at least their allowance of bread, their daily meals at the factory, and a few other commodities such as sugar and occasional meat. With the lower, arbitrary prices that the government charged the average worker, he was actually getting then as much as he is getting now.

From this it can readily be seen that although Russia had more foodstuffs on the market, the distribution is anything but ideal, not only because of the scarcity of commodities but because the benefits derived from this betterment are effective only for the upper strata.

The only people who benefit greatly by the improvement in production are the communists and the more specialized workers, the technicians, and the engineering group. Their lot is by far better than it was five years ago, when the rouble was almost worthless to them after they had used up their card allowances. Now the rouble has as much value to them as it has to anybody else, and they have more roubles.

The government is making an effort to furnish

the villages with manufactured articles which the peasants need. These the latter are able to purchase with roubles which they receive from the sale of their surplus farm products. At present the Russian stores, bazaars, and other places where manufactured articles may be purchased are crowded each night with eager buyers. At least 80 per cent of shopping in Russia is done at night. I visited many stores as late as eleven o'clock and found them crowded with customers. This is explained by the fact that women, as well as men, work in Russia, and the most convenient time they have for shopping is at night. Stores are not opened, as a rule, until ten o'clock in the morning, and then for only a part of the day, but at night they operate in full force.

Although the card system has been abolished, the queues still exist there. Walking through the streets of Russian cities, one can still see lines of people, as in the time of the card system, stretched out for blocks in front of stores and newspaper stands. The reason for this is the extreme scarcity of commodities that still exists in Russia. When a store selling clothes or shoes receives a small stock of these articles, thousands of eager buyers arrive, and everybody is anxious to get inside first in

order to be sure to get what he wants to buy. Even newspapers are not printed in sufficient quantities to satisfy all the eager readers. People stand in line for blocks waiting for the delivery of the morning paper, and only the early birds are able to get their worms of news and propaganda.

Russia's monetary system has gone through gradual and important changes under the present régime. After the October Revolution she abolished all banks and all money. Socialists, and especially communists, considered money a contradiction of their principles. Their theory was that under a system of pure socialism money would not be needed as a medium of exchange.

In 1921, with the inauguration of the New Economic Policy and the reinstatement of the middleman, the government was forced to establish state banks and re-establish money in order to take care of trading under the new system.

In 1924 the government tried to stabilize the rouble by establishing a gold standard. Originally the new rouble was backed by more than 50 per cent of its value in gold, other precious metals, and stable *valuta*; the rest was covered by notes, or *chervonetz*. But the ratio diminished until in 1930 it was only about 25 per cent of precious metals

and 75 per cent *chervonetz*. Later several issues of roubles were printed which had nothing at all back of them, since they exceeded even the *chervonetz*.

The government hoped, in setting up a gold standard, that its money would be stabilized as a medium of exchange on the world market. But in this it failed, for no government has at any time recognized the rouble, a fact which is not surprising in view of that currency's actual instability.

The government tried also to build up and keep a gold reserve as an emergency measure to pay for imported goods in cases where Russia's trade balance was unfavorable.

Like the NEP, the reversion to banking and money as a medium of exchange and an economic factor was distasteful to most communists. The government was gradually reorganizing the banking system in the hope of getting to a point where trade between different combinations, trusts, and other enterprises would be not in the form of money, but a mere bookkeeping process, and money would be used only for wages and individual trading. Then, by establishing commune homes, kitchens, and other places where workers would be charged and credited against their wages, the government hoped eventually to create a con-

dition in which money would no longer be a necessity for wages and individual trading.

This whole idea has been given up and a new monetary system, which went into effect in 1935, is endeavoring to establish a uniform rouble equivalent to twenty cents in American money. This ratio, of course, fluctuates with the fluctuation of other moneys on the world market.

Simultaneously with the inauguration of the new monetary system the government discontinued the Torgsin stores, where only foreigners or Russians who had relatives in foreign countries who could send them foreign money or *valuta*, were able to purchase. During the period of their existence, these stores stocked everything that Russia had to sell and were used by the government as a means of obtaining *valuta*. The use of *valuta* as a medium of exchange was abolished and everybody, whether foreigner or Russian, now buys in the government-owned stores for roubles and at a uniform price. With the equalization of the purchasing power of the rouble and with the great difference in the scale of wages that divides the common worker from the engineering group and the communist, Russia has created a small minority of fairly well-to-do and a great mass of poorly paid workers.

After all is said, a workman's wage in any man's country is worth only as much as he can get in exchange for it.

The average monthly wage of a Russian worker, as I have said, is one hundred seventy-five roubles, the equivalent of eighteen or twenty dollars of American money in purchasing power. Bread, the main food of the Russian worker, costs him from 2.5 to 2.8 roubles a kilo (a kilo is equal to 2.2 American pounds), thus a pound of bread costs over twenty cents in American money. Butter costs from 14 to 17 roubles a kilo; cheese costs about 9 roubles a kilo. Swiss cheese costs as much as 27 roubles a kilo. Meat, of which there are a great many grades, runs from 5 to 21 roubles a kilo. A bowl of *borsh* (beet or vegetable soup, a national dish in Russia used by all groups) costs from 1 to 2 roubles, depending on the quality; and so on down the line. With the rouble worth 20 cents, the prices of all commodities in Russia average from three to five times as much as in the United States. Lemons, for instance, which are used freely by all classes in the United States, are considered an extreme luxury in Russia, and cost 3.5 roubles, or 70 cents, each. Prices for shoes and clothes, which are extremely scarce, are still higher than food

prices. Ordinary shoes, shoes which we can purchase for as little as four or five dollars here, cost 150 roubles, and an ordinary suit of clothes costs from 600 to 1,000 roubles. With such price ranges, it does not take much imagination or figuring to realize how underpaid the Russian worker is.

By special arrangement, upon our visit to Khar-kov, we were permitted to go through the tractor plant, which is justly the pride of the U.S.S.R. It is a modern plant, most of its machinery was made in the United States, and it is run as efficiently as any plant anywhere. It turns out one hundred fifty tractors a day—one tractor every two and a half minutes (the Russian working day is seven hours). The plant is run on only one shift because, as the engineers explained, they do not have enough experienced workers to run the plant full force. They are planning to divert this plant from its present type of tractor (similar to our Fordson tractor) to the manufacture of caterpillar tractors. This is significant, as a great many Russian factories are planned so that they may be converted at short notice into factories for military purposes, and this plant is obviously destined to make tanks in case of war.

There are twelve thousand men working in the

plant at present, and the plant is building a community for these workers. In speaking of it, one engineer boasted that they have hot water every other day. It may be difficult for an American to understand his pride in their hot-water system, but this is more than is obtainable in other parts of Russia, even in the better hotels. The houses and apartments of this community are being built in two separate groups: the most modern ones, for which even a swimming pool was proposed, are for the upper crust—the management and engineering group; the other apartments, which are far inferior, are for the workers. The *stalovi* (restaurants) for the workers and those for the engineers are in separate buildings, and there is a great difference in the menus. This system is followed throughout Russia.

Evidences of this change in policy are kept from visitors, and the Intourist organization uses every deceit to camouflage the situation. They will tell you about it very grudgingly and only when they are forced to do so. I had a most difficult time in getting permission to visit the workers' homes. Whenever they would take us through one of them, I would find in every case, after talking to the people living there, that they were the homes of

engineers, experts, or *Stachonovitzi*. When I insistently repeated my request to visit an actual workers' home one of the managers became very indignant and said, "What do you mean, workers' homes? Everybody is a worker in the U.S.S.R."

With all the patience at my command I explained that I meant the homes of the plain, everyday, average workers. After being refused by all sorts of excuses, I managed in my own way to visit a good many apartments occupied by these workers. The relative difference between living conditions of the average worker and those of the highly paid one is tremendous, although by our standard even the living quarters of the upper strata are nothing to envy. I found that though many communists and engineers have two and even three rooms, in the lower-paid workers' homes as many as four or five persons are crowded into one room. The discrepancy in rent between the more modern apartments and the old ones is so great that only the best-paid workers are able to rent the former. The common worker has to pay from ten to thirty roubles a month for his living quarters, but the same space may cost as much as ten times that amount in the more modern, newly built apartments. These new apartments are not only finan-

cially out of reach of the average worker but are also unavailable because of their scarcity. There are so few of them that they are not always obtainable even by the highly paid workers.

With all the new building that is being done in Russia, the housing shortage is as acute now as it was five years ago. This is explained by the growth in the last few years of the industrial centers, caused by the influx of labor from provincial villages and by the naturally rapid growth of the Russian population. Moscow more than doubled its population within the last decade; Kharkov and many other industrial centers more than trebled their population in the same period. The government hopes to be able to solve the housing problem in the course of the next five-year plan.

On my previously mentioned trip to Baku I had an interesting discussion with the head of production and drilling in the oil fields, to whom I had a letter of introduction from Moscow. When I arrived in Baku he was out in the fields and I didn't get to see him. The next day I had a call asking me to visit him in his office that evening at ten o'clock. He asked us how we found conditions in the oil fields, and I could truthfully tell him that I thought they had made a great deal of progress in the last

five years. The U.S.S.R. is trying to keep up with new ideas developed in American oil fields, and is maintaining engineering forces throughout California, Oklahoma, and other oil-producing states to learn of any improvements taking place in the industry. The country is also straining all its energies toward producing its own machinery and equipment for its oil fields.

In this connection it is not out of place to mention that Russia does not believe in patent rights and has been in the habit of ordering from America or Germany only three each of those tools and machines which she needs. She then tries to reproduce or duplicate them in her own machine shops without paying the cost of patent rights, as all other countries are compelled to do.

Although Russia is running her plants now without foreign technicians, the need for engineers and other specialists is very keenly felt. Moreover, until their new educational system, which was put into effect only a year ago, begins to turn out real engineers, this condition will be a retarding factor and will continue to hold back production in Russia.¹

¹ Since this book has been written the following Associated Press dispatch from Russia shows that the government is now more fully aware than ever of the need to incorporate new

I told the Russian producer that I was very favorably impressed with their method of drilling, which is very similar to the improved methods now being used in Oklahoma, Texas, and other oil fields in the United States. When he asked me if I had any criticism to make, I pointed out that I found some articles, especially their tubular products, inferior to ours. At this his friendly attitude changed completely. He began lecturing to me on communism, and without mincing words he told

methods in production and is now taking steps to that end: "MOSCOW, Dec. 28.—The Soviet Union's highest industrial authority today demanded immediate reorganization of Russian industry according to American methods and standards to eradicate inefficiency and waste officially admitted to exist here.

"Gregory K. Orjonikidze, commissar for heavy industry, began a drive against bureaucracy in the factories by citing the report of a Russian mission just returned from the United States which found that 600 American workers produce what it takes 1,700 to make in Russia.

"Orjonikidze's attack centered on the Kalinin Machine Tool Factory in Moscow, where the government discovered there were three office-workers, supervisors or bosses for each skilled worker.

"The mission to which Orjonikidze referred reported that whereas in the Soviet Union only 30 per cent of factory employes were engaged in productive labor, 75 per cent of those on American factory payrolls were skilled workmen actually engaged in production.

"Taking up the commissar's crusade the newspaper *Industrialization* said that mere imitation of American industrial technique would not be sufficient. The Soviets, the publication declared, must follow American methods of organization, cut down the useless, bureaucratic overhead, the checking, rechecking, supervision and inspection, all of which merely multiply the unit cost of production."

me how rotten we capitalists were. On my visits to Russia I had heretofore managed to occupy myself with observing and listening and had refrained from criticising or suggesting, but this time I lost my equilibrium and we had quite a row.

One outstanding fact which this discussion disclosed was that the communists not only admit the great disparity between the wages of the average worker and the specialist, but they consider this a progressive step in developing their industries, a point of view with which I heartily agreed and still agree. Not only the old engineering group but also the newly brought up and trained communists realize that the communistic system of production was a complete failure.

I don't want to leave the impression that communism *as a theory* has been discarded in the U.S.S.R. Nothing could be farther from the truth than this assumption. They still keep in their plants and factories the "pep squad," whose job is to lecture or preach on communism for thirty minutes each day. They still maintain what are known as communistic universities in every large city throughout Russia for the purpose of training communists and teaching communism.

But even in that respect a definite change has

taken place in the last few years. They now have a new brand of communism, or, as it might be called, a communism in name only. With the government's complete control of the press, and with no form of opposition tolerated, all phases of public opinion are molded by Stalin to his own pattern. Hence any change that suits Stalin's whim can be put into effect and called communism because he says it is communism, regardless of what that change may be.

III

The new type of individual would be collectively constituted and collectively minded.

THE Bolsheviks, in their effort to establish a communistic industrial economy, had the whole-hearted support of most of the city workers, who were easily won over with the alluring promise that they would become the owners of the plants and factories. Although the government was compelled to discard this policy as impractical after a process of trial and error, its main support was always derived from the proletariat.

But the industrial worker constituted less than 15 per cent of Russia's entire population. The success or failure of communism and the collective movement hinged upon the degree in which the government could gain the co-operation of the country's agrarian population, which constituted 85 per cent of the total. Collectivization of the farmer and mechanization of the farm obviously went hand

in hand, since only on large farm units is industrial farming practical.

The tractor is the backbone of industrial farming. Theoretically the tractor and the mechanical units which accompany it are capable of multiplying many times the work of a man and a team. It enables the farmer at plowing and sowing and harvesting times to take advantage of short periods of favorable weather and speed his work to completion.

But the underlying idea of mechanized farming is that the land on which it is employed must consist of great expanses of level country. Obviously, it is not suited to broken up farm land, of which there are millions upon millions of acres in Russia. And even when applied to large areas of level land, other difficulties may be encountered which make mechanization impractical and uneconomical.

But the difficulties encountered in the task of industrializing agriculture lie not only in the physical and topographical obstacles, but even more in the innate difference between the farmer's psychology and that of the city worker.

Farming, by reason of its nature, does not have the same characteristics as industry. The industrial worker is only a minute part of a whole, and his

work is interdependently linked up with the work of thousands and thousands of other workers; he is a small cog in a large machine. As a result he possesses a collective mind. For that reason alone socialistic ideology finds a fertile ground for its ideas among the proletariat. The farmer, by the nature of his work and psychology, is the direct antithesis of the industrial proletariat. He is typically the center, and often the whole, of the man power in his unit of industry, and he is dependent upon few if any others. Thus, as a natural individualist, he furnishes barren soil for the collective ideas of socialism.

For a long time the government was hesitant to force on the peasants the economic policy of the complete abolition of private ownership. It was only in the year 1928, when the country and the Soviet régime were in desperate straits, that Stalin as a last resort proclaimed the collectivization of the agricultural industry; and from the very beginning the plan met with a hostile resistance on the part of the peasants.

In bloodshed and brutality the methods used by the Bolsheviks in trying to force collectivization on the Russian peasants had no parallel in the entire Russian Revolution. Even the period of military

communism, from 1918 to 1921, when the communists were destroying the capitalists and the landlords, was not as severe and its cost in human life was not as great as in this process of forcing collectivization.

After the October Revolution, Lenin, in order to gain the support of the peasantry, came out with his famous slogan, "Land and peace," and went about confiscating all land from the nobility and dividing it among the agrarian population. For awhile, even though this division of land did not make the peasant communistic-minded, it did reconcile him to the new régime. However, the farmers soon found out that they were not in ultimate control of the land or even of its products. There was a joker in this granting of land to the peasants. Each owned his piece of ground only so long as he worked on it; he "owned" only such acreage as he could work, and the state was the actual owner of all the land in Russia.

In addition the government confiscated a large part of the peasants' products. Some of the levy of grain and other produce was for taxes of various kinds. For the rest the government ostensibly paid. But the prices it paid were set arbitrarily by itself. And the roubles with which

settlement was made were practically worthless to the farmer since he could buy little or nothing with them. For, with the whole country in a turmoil of civil war and Allied intervention, with transportation and industry broken down, the city workers were not producing enough to supply even their own needs, and were unable to furnish the farmer with the manufactured goods of which he was in such desperate want.

At the same time that it was confiscating the land from the nobility and dividing it among the peasants, the government went about trying to establish a communist order within the peasantry through a leveling-off process, and used taxation as a means of accomplishing this. The poor peasant was made completely tax free, and the middle class paid taxes proportionately far lower than those exacted from the *kulak* (well-to-do farmer).

Both of these procedures—trying to force communism in the villages by the leveling-off process, and confiscating the produce of the farmers without giving them anything in return—not only failed to make them communistic but actually turned the farmers against the new régime. Being illiterate and disorganized, they used the only effective method they knew, and retaliated by a passive re-

sistance, cutting down their acreage and refusing to raise any more on their land than they needed for themselves and their families. This resulted in the famine of 1921, in which millions of people, both in the cities and the villages, and especially in the Volga district, died of starvation. It was at this time that the American government, through its relief organization, saved many millions of Russians from starvation.

Trotzky insisted that in order to break down passive resistance and make the revolution a success, the government would have to exterminate the *kulak* element in the Russian villages. He believed that the *kulak*, with his innate bourgeois and capitalist psychology, was an enemy within; that the Soviet would never make any progress among the peasants in establishing communism as long as that influential and dominating element was in existence; that the Soviets must destroy the *kulak* in order to make any advance in bringing about a communistically conscious state of mind among the peasants; that regardless of how strong and loyal the city worker might be, the revolution could not expect to survive with 85 per cent of its population consisting of the "half-capitalist, half-worker" who

was the agrarian. And as a remedy for this he propounded his theory of collectivization.

With famine ravaging all Russia, Lenin and many other communist leaders believed that the time was inopportune for such a move. He realized, however, that something had to be done, and as an immediate, though temporary, remedy he made his famous declaration that Russia would have to take one step backward in order to make two steps forward, and created the NEP, or New Economic Policy, whereby private traders were permitted to act as middlemen between the peasants and the urban population.

By creating the NEP the government did succeed in stimulating production for awhile. The peasant was permitted to sell his products to the Nepman, who paid him a great deal more than the arbitrary prices he had received from the government; and the Nepman was thus enabled to supply the city workers with the food which they needed so badly. With private trading legalized, many commodities appeared in the bazaars and markets, and although the prices were exorbitant, living conditions throughout the land improved enormously.

This improvement was of short duration for two reasons: (1) Conditions in industry continued to

get worse and worse and it became more and more difficult for the Nepmen to obtain manufactured articles to offer in exchange for the farm products of the peasants. Trading dwindled to dealing in goods of second-hand quality, remnants, and left-overs bought from the upper classes of the old régime. The Nepman's original usefulness as a stimulator of productivity in the villages disappeared because the farmer refused to exchange his farm products for the rouble, which had become inflated and therefore worthless. (2) The Nepman, who had always been distasteful to the communists, was being taxed and persecuted by the government; and the same government that had created the Nepman proceeded to destroy him.

The peasants found themselves again at the wrong end of the deal and took up once more their weapon of passive resistance, raising enough for themselves but falling far short of the needs of the government. It was during these years (1927 and 1928) that the Russian Revolution lived through the most trying time of its existence, and local uprisings against the government occurred in many villages throughout the U.S.S.R.

With the failure of the New Economic Policy there appeared again the question of collectivizing

the Russian peasants. Trotzky, who was still a power in Russia, insisted, as he had before, that collectivization was the only way out of the predicament in which the country and the government found themselves. Stalin, in his struggle with Trotzky, claimed that this plan would be detrimental to the communist cause (the question of collectivization of the farmers was one of the excuses which Stalin used not only in expelling Trotzky from the party but in exiling him from Russia).

Stalin, however, after exiling Trotzky, made an about-face and adopted collectivization.

Collective farming, or group agriculture, was not new in Russia. After Alexander II freed the serfs, the Russian peasantry was organized in *obshinas*. It was different from any other peasantry in the world. There were no individualistic farms, and a peasant's house was not built on the parcel of land belonging to him. The peasants lived in villages, and the land surrounding the villages belonged to the commune or *obshina*.

Each village was run by a *zemtchina*, a committee having many characteristics of the present Soviet. The piece of land that each peasant owned was not a separate and distinct parcel, but was part

of the land of the whole village, and each year the *zemtchina* designated the portion of land which each peasant was to work; the pasture was always a commune pasture.

Until 1911 or 1912, this method of farming was practically the only one in use throughout Russia.

Stolipin, one of the ablest ministers of the czar's régime, considered this situation a menace to despotism, because it provided too fertile soil for all sorts of revolutionary and socialistic theories, and promulgated a rule to break up the *obshina* and to create individualistic farming, with the object of destroying a system whereby the peasantry did not act or think except as part of a collective group.

Stolipin's plan was not carried out. The originator was assassinated while he was attending a theater in Kiev, and the World War, coming immediately afterward, prevented the accomplishment of his project. When the Bolsheviks overthrew Kerensky's régime and took over the government, they found only a small percentage of the Russian farms individually owned and run.

At the time of the promulgation of the five-year plan in 1928, Stalin made a drive against the *kulaks* and put the peasants on the *kolkhozi*, or

collective farms. The plan called for collectivization of the entire agricultural industry by the end of 1933. When the government tried to carry out this plan it met an irresistible force of opposition among the peasants, especially among the *kulaks*. The government went about confiscating all the belongings of the well-to-do farmers and put them at the disposal of the *kolkhoz*. The farmers retaliated in a way that was disastrous to themselves and to the Russian people as a whole.

When Stalin's order for collectivization was issued, the peasants began killing their livestock and consuming the meat, because they knew they would get nothing for it by putting it into the *kolkhoz*. Within a few months' time they managed to kill from 30 to 40 per cent of the total livestock of Russia, which had already been diminished by other causes to 50 per cent of the pre-war level. The government, in order to stop this wholesale slaughter, decreed that the killing of cattle was a counter-revolutionary act, carrying with it a penalty of death. (This killing of the livestock was the main cause for the great scarcity of meat in Russia for many years, and only recently has the government been able to supply the Russian people with meat.)

The communists had thousands of peasants shot, though their general practice in the extermination of the *kulaks* was exile; they were made to leave their birthplaces upon very little notice and sent to remote lumber camps on the White Sea or to Siberia or Turkestan.

It was not only the *kulaks* who resisted collectivization; the bulk of the peasants, with the exception of the very poorest element in the villages, were also opposed to the *kolkhozi*. In many cases the communists, in their zeal and anxiety to put over collectivization, by using too coercive and drastic measures antagonized the peasants, who proceeded to kill a good many of the communist organizers, and there were local uprisings in different parts of the country. The soldiers who were sent to quell these uprisings, being in the main peasants themselves, in many instances refused to use force against the offenders, who were of their own origin and often even of their own blood.

In spite of all this opposition the government did make a temporary success of collective farming for the first two years—in which time it succeeded in collectivizing 30 per cent of Russian agriculture. This was made possible by turning over to the

kolkhoz the personal belongings of the exiled *kulaks*, the most fertile land, and the best cattle; also by advancing liberal credit and supplying modern machinery, exempting the *kolkhoz* from taxes while heavily taxing the individual farmers, and increasing the tillable land by eliminating the hedges which were formerly used for subdividing the land into small parcels.

So great was the government's hope for the success of these measures during the first two years of its drive for collectivization that in 1931 it made contracts with many wheat-buying nations, such as France, Italy, and Holland. However, its hope was short-lived. Many of the modern tractors which had been imported from other countries had a short life due to the fact that the peasants frequently did not understand their operation, and after a minor breakdown would abandon them to ruin in the fields. In addition to this difficulty, the first tractors that the Russian plants turned out were of inferior quality.

These factors—added to the most destructive of all, that is, the abolishment of the *kulaks*, the most productive, intelligent, and industrious element among the farmers—soon nullified the advantages which had been gained through increasing tillable

land and furnishing machinery, and made it impossible to fulfill the contracts with the foreign wheat-buying nations.

At the same time that the drive for collectivization was going on in the villages, the government was also making every effort to complete the five-year plan in industry, which called for building up the heavy industries, machinery to build machinery, and perforce neglected the light industries which manufactured articles used by the agrarian population. And so, in spite of the shortage of foodstuffs which resulted, the government, needing *valuta* in order to buy foreign-made machinery and hire foreign engineers and experts, confiscated from the peasants their grains and other products for export and paid them with roubles which were still worthless to them since the city workers were still unable to supply the goods of which the peasants were in such great need.

The peasants retaliated once more by raising on the *kolkhozi* and on the individual farms only what they needed for the *kolkhozi* members and for their own families, with no surplus for exportation. The whole population of Russia was put on meager rations.

Stalin, who is given credit even by his enemies

for having a sense of proportion, was finally forced to charge the communists with having become "dizzy from success." He called the party members to a halt in their efforts to destroy the *kulaks* and ordered them to use greater moderation in their dealings with all grades of peasants on collective farms. But the drive for collectivization went on even though its methods were less ruthless.

These somewhat modified methods, however, did not end the resistance of the peasants. As a result there occurred in 1932 the worst famine Russia (who has always suffered from periodic famines) had ever known. More than five million Russians died of hunger (a figure admitted officially by the Russian government). This calamity compelled the government to make important changes which altered completely the trend and development of the Russian agrarian industry.

The Soviet method of collectivizing the farms was as follows: The land, implements and livestock of certain villages or districts were pooled and the work done by the whole community. Each *kolkhoz* selected from its members a soviet or committee which ran the affairs of the enterprise, and at its head the government managed to place a party member. In one respect the *kolkhozi* members had

an advantage over the city workers—their daily food allowance was advanced to them before they gathered their crops. Wages were based on piece work, as in the factories, and there was a minimum wage of two pounds of black bread per day for adults and one-half pound for children (this has been discontinued since the abolition of the card system). When the crops were gathered, the committee deducted from the members' crops an amount equal to the allowances that had been advanced to them. The government paid the costs of machinery and the wages of agronomists, mechanics, etc. It furnished the *kolkhoz* credit for such things as seed and cattle, reimbursing itself out of the farm's produce at prices which it had arbitrarily fixed. After collecting for all advances, the government divided whatever surplus remained among the members of the *kolkhoz*, in proportion to the amount of work each had done. However, as private trading was prohibited, the members could sell this surplus only to the government at its fixed prices.

Before I left Russia on my last visit, I happened to run into Walter Duranty's book, *I Write as I Please*, and was impressed by two important statements which he makes.

In his chapter entitled "Collectives Spell Civilization," he says: "Future historians—perhaps not Soviet historians alone—may well regard the Russian struggle for collectivization as a heroic period in human progress. As the world saw it in near perspective while it was happening, there was general sympathy for the *kulaks*, hard-working peasant farmers torn from their homes to labor under task-masters on alien soil, but this sentimental 'close-up' omits the real point at issue, which was the attempt to regulate on an equitable scale the old quarrel between the interests of Town and Country."

In his résumé in the last chapter he makes this comment: "To begin with, there is an absurd confusion in foreign minds between the genuine socialism of the U.S.S.R. and the pseudo-socialism, or more correctly war-socialism, of Germany and Italy. . . . No less an expert in foreign affairs than David Lawrence suggested in an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* of July 20, 1935, that there was no great difference in the systems of the U.S.S.R., Germany and Italy, and said, 'In none of these countries is there any semblance today of socialism.' This is sheer ignorance."

When I was in Russia last August I tried my

best to erase out of my consciousness this "sentimental close-up." I tried hard to forget the horrible things I had witnessed five years before in Russia when thousands of so-called *kulaks* died in the unhealthy climate of the places to which they were exiled; I tried hard to ignore the five to ten million peasants who had died of hunger in 1932; and I hoped to find the "human progress" which this drive for collectivization has made. I was looking for the genuine socialism of the U.S.S.R. which the "ignorance" of David Lawrence and others failed to recognize.

I admit that the followers of Marx and *Das Kapital* include as many shades and degrees of socialists as the followers of Christ and the Bible do of Christians; but I have never as yet read or heard of any socialistic concepts which include private trading.

And despite the socialistic or even communistic aim of the Bolsheviks when they made their drive for collectivization, they were forced away from their chosen direction into private trading as a desperate remedy. After costly trial and error they indirectly admitted the failure of their attempt to collectivize the agrarian industry and, in Article

7 of the new constitution, included this concession to necessity:

“Public enterprises in collective farms and co-operative organizations, with their livestock and implements, products raised or manufactured by the collective farms and co-operative organizations, as well as their public structures, constitute the public, socialist property of the collective farms and co-operative organizations. *Each collective farm household has for its own use a plot of land attached to the house and, as individual property, an auxiliary establishment on the plot, the house, produce, animals and poultry, and minor agricultural implements—in accordance with the statutes of the agricultural artel.*”

Only after the government gave up its original *modus operandi* of collectivization as a hopeless and costly task and modified it so that the *kolkhozi* members, in addition to their work for the *kolkhozi*, were permitted to raise their own products and sell them on the open market, did any marked advance take place in the productivity of the agricultural industry.

Even ignoring the loss of human life and the suffering which preceded this change, improvement in the well-being of the Russian peasants them-

selves and the population as a whole is more than problematical. To be sure, general conditions in Russia have improved somewhat in the last year or two. But whatever credit is due for this belongs not to collectivization but to a departure from its strict principles—a change in the attitude and policy of the government which permits each farmer to have “for his own use a plot of land attached to the house and, as individual property, an auxiliary establishment on the plot, the house, produce, animals and poultry, and minor agricultural implements.”

Thus the human element seems, on the surface, to have been the thing which throughout the history of the Russian Revolution has impeded the advance of the collective idea in farming. But in considering the elimination of the *kulak*, the non-co-operation of the peasantry as a whole, and the modifications of its original plan which the government has made in an attempt to overcome these difficulties, it must not be lost sight of that the economic factor plays an exceedingly important part in any consideration of the whole idea of agrarian collectivization.

Disregarding the human element—the aversion which the Russian peasant had and still has for

communism—there are many topographical and other physical elements which frequently make mechanized or tractor farming impossible. These may be listed briefly as follows:

1. As in any other country, great portions of Russia are broken up by rolling country, and in this the use of tractors and other mechanized units is impossible.
2. In theory the collective farm was, through industrialization, to take advantage of the methods of production used in industry; but in practical application it was found that the advantages of the tractor and other mechanical units as time-saving devices were often nullified by the length of time it took the agrarian worker to get to and from his work on account of the large units of land which made up the collective farms.
3. Methods of supervision and management which are effective in industrialized units because the plant and the workers occupy a comparatively small area are impractical on the collective farm because the individual workers are scattered over miles of territory.

In the conduct of its own farms, the *sovkhози*, the government encountered many of these problems.

When the Bolsheviks confiscated the land from the nobility and divided it among the farmers they retained huge tracts of land which had belonged to the imperial family. These lands they used as a nucleus for the development of government-owned farms, or *sovkhosi*, which are managed on the same principle as factories.

They are worked by two groups: the permanent workers, who live in the *sovkhosi* all year round, and the seasonal workers, who are hired from different co-operative farms for short periods at planting and harvest time. The workers and their families live in government-owned houses and apartments. They have commune kitchens and *stalovi*, and in every other respect are similar to the factory workers. The difference between this form of farming and the *kolkhozi* is that the *kolkhozi* members participate in whatever profits there may be, whereas *sovkhosi* workers get only wages according to their work, without sharing the profit or loss.

The communists visualized and hoped that this form of agriculture would become common throughout the country, and at the beginning they hoped to raise crops for export in order to gain *valuta*. Neither of these hopes materialized. After

many experiments they realized that an overexpanded or oversized agriculture was a very uneconomical system, and that industrial methods were not applicable to the agricultural industry. They broke up the *sovkhosi* into many smaller units, and although they still raise some crops on them, these farms are primarily used for experimental purposes.

Even where topographical and physical conditions of the land are suitable for the use of tractors and other modern farm machinery, and mechanized agriculture or collective farming would make for more efficient economy in production, the system as it exists today in Russia could be greatly improved by a change in its supervision. The present centralized, state-capitalistic method of management by remote control could well be abandoned, and authority placed in the hands of a local committee. Distribution among the members of the *kolkhozi* of the profits derived through diligence and efficiency might also provide a stimulus to increased effort.

When the Soviet government exiled the *kulaks* to Siberia, Central Asia, and the White Sea to build canals and work in the lumber camps, thousands died of exposure. Now, just as the remnants of the old intelligentsia have been brought back and

placed in factories, those of the *kulaks* who have survived exile are being returned and placed on the farms. And just as the engineering group was reconciled by means of higher wages and social recognition that lifted it out of the disfranchized and declassified category, so also the *kulaks* are being coaxed into the *kolkhozi* by government concessions that permit each to have a small parcel of land with a few chickens, a cow, and a few hogs and sheep, the products of which they are permitted to sell on the open market.

In every railroad station on our long trek through Russia we found peasants with their families peddling their wares—a little milk, a few cucumbers, watermelons, chickens, and other edibles—to the passengers on the trains. This small private trading, insignificant as it may seem, becomes quite an important item in the aggregate, both as a source of some income to the peasant and as a source of food supply to the urban population. With a total of twenty-five million farmers throughout the country, it is obvious that this one item alone has been of great service in elevating somewhat the living conditions that exist in Russia today.

In the maze of statistics and figures published by

the Soviet government in the effort to prove the success of collectivization to its own people and those of the outside world it is easy to lose sight of the fact that Russia under the czarist régime, with the most primitive methods of agriculture, was the granary of Europe and was always able to export about 20 per cent of her total agrarian production. Except for the few years when she put her entire population on the strictest rations, when everyone in Russia had to pull in his belt a couple of notches more and when she exported farm products by depriving her own people, Russia has fallen behind her pre-revolution export record. At present, even with the much ballyhooed *kolkhozi* movement and with the abolishment of the rationing system, she holds only a minor place as an exporter in the world market.

If the reader infers from these facts that the Soviet, by stopping exportation, became a country of abundance in the matter of foodstuffs he will be in error. For when it is recalled that the average wage of the Russian worker is one hundred seventy-five roubles a month, which is equivalent in purchasing power to about twenty American dollars, it can easily be seen that the daily meals of the Russian worker are not feasts. His main standbys are

still black bread and *borsh*; his budget permits very little meat and eggs, or other expensive foods. As I have mentioned before, the latter commodities are only within the reach of the members of the Communist Party and the specialists and engineers.

On looking back through the history of the Russian peasantry from the days of the October Revolution to the present time, there can be visualized a picture of one hundred thirty-five million souls who were used as laboratory material for experiments in communistic ideas and doctrines—a system which was not only foreign to them but for which they had the greatest aversion. First the Bolsheviks tried to force communism on them by the leveling-off process, which meant simply that the government, without any compensation to the peasants, confiscated the grain and cattle which they had worked so hard to raise. Then it invented the Nepman for the peasants' benefit, and they found their pockets bulging with roubles which were worthless to them—again on the wrong end of the deal. Then came the days in which the great idea of collectivization was conceived and hatched (which Mr. Duranty calls “a heroic period in human progress”), the great idea which deprived the industry of its most productive and intelligent force when it liquidated

the *kulak*, and which culminated in the most disastrous famine that even Russia ever went through, a famine at the thought of which even the communist blushes and of which he does not like to be reminded.

Let us see how the Russian peasant shares in the more abundant life, and what rights and privileges he has under the “pure socialism” of this much-heralded collective movement.

The underlying principle of a free socialist co-operative or artel demands that the tools of production be owned jointly by all its members. (It must always be borne in mind that the *kolkhoz* is not made up of *free, voluntary* members. The methods used by the government to recruit members were forcible, or at least coercive.) Though it compels the individual farmer to join the *kolkhoz*, the government fails to supply him with tractors, and exacts exorbitant taxes from him.

In Russia the tractors, binders, and other farm implements are owned and controlled by the state, and the *kolkhoz* or co-operative is compelled to rent them from the government at a price fixed by the government. The prices of the results of their labor, the products of the *kolkhozi*, are arbitrarily fixed

by the state. The members of the *kolkhoz* have no alternative as to the disposal of these products, for they can sell only to the government-owned granaries and elevators. They have no voice even in the management of their *kolkhoz*, because the supervisor and the agronomist, always party members, are appointed by the state and are paid by the state, which also collects their wages from the *kolkhoz* in the form of produce.

The economic inefficiency and unsoundness of the *kolkhozi* have compelled the government to permit the *kolkhozi* members limited private ownership of small parcels of land and livestock, and private trading in the produce of this land, while they are still working on the *kolkhozi*, in order to stimulate their production. Only with this inducement as an incentive was the U.S.S.R. able to increase production in the agricultural industry.

In order for Russia to regain anything like her old standing in grain production the government will be compelled to move still further in the direction she has been forced to take. Far from being the granary of Europe, as she once was, Russia today does not raise sufficient food to provide her own workers with a "full dinner pail." The underlying faults are not laziness on the part of the Russian

peasant, but an overcentralized, bureaucratic economy, a state capitalism which stifles the initiative and the desire of the farmer to put forth his best effort—an economic system which is a complete rejection of the principles of communism or even socialism.

Despite all the efforts of the government to collectivize Russian agriculture, individually run farms still constitute an important factor in agricultural production. It is hard to ascertain the exact percentage of individual as against *kolkhoz* farms in Russia. The government states that from 70 to 80 per cent of its agriculture is collectivized; this would mean that 20 or 30 per cent of its farms are individually worked. (All available figures come from only one source—the government.)

The individual farms which still exist in Russia survive in spite of the fact that they do not have the benefit of credit and the use of modern farm implements which the government allows the *kolkhozi*, and that they have to pay exorbitantly high taxes. Their survival side by side with collective farms seems to prove that individual farms are not only economically as sound as collective farms, but in many instances are more desirable and profitable.

But whether better or worse, they exist, nineteen years after the seizure by the Bolsheviks of this country in which Mr. Duranty says pure socialism is now practiced.

IV

The communists proclaimed free love as the ideal of the new family life. . . . All their hope and energy were concentrated on the new generation, whose training and upbringing they took under their complete control.

IN the first constitution of the U.S.S.R., drawn up by Lenin and given to the new nation at the assembly of the soviets of workers, soldiers, and peasants called soon after the October Revolution in 1917, a new order in the relationships between men and women and a new mode of family life were decreed. Family loyalties, the instinctive clan partisanship which are the natural outgrowth of traditional family organization, were declared subversive to the growth of communism and were placed on the condemned list to be destroyed.

The decree abolished the old system of marriage and divorce. Free love was the foundation for the new family. The sex life of the individual was left to his own discretion. Neither marriage nor divorce

required any ceremony. Mutual consent was the only basis for marriage, and divorce required simply the notification of one party by the other.

"Marriage and divorce courts" were set up by the government in order that those who desired to marry or divorce each other could register if they desired, but even registration was not compulsory. Registrants for marriage were asked only one question, which they were compelled by law to answer truthfully: whether either was afflicted with tuberculosis or a venereal disease. If this question was answered untruthfully by one of the applicants and the proof of deceit was later furnished through contraction of disease by the other, the offender was sentenced to ten years of hard labor—the maximum sentence in Russia, even for premeditated murder. If both husband and wife registered for divorce, no questions whatever were asked.

Abortions were legalized and, in the first stages of the experiment, were performed in the clinics for anyone who desired them.

The stigma of illegitimacy was completely abolished. All children, whether born in legal wedlock or not, were of equal status.

One of the primary principles of the new marriage system was equality between men and

women. This meant, of course, that women had not only equal rights and privileges, but responsibilities and obligations equal to those of men.

Just as a new basis and new rules for relationships between men and women were established, so also were the relations between parents and children revised in the new order. The rearing of a child by his parents under the old form of family life, according to the communists, built up a type of individual with a psychology alien and subversive to communism. They believed that this individualistic type, with his feeling of family ties and family attachments, made an undesirable and unfit member for the new society—a society composed of persons detached from individualistic ways of thought, who would adapt themselves to the communistic or collective way of acting and thinking, who would consider themselves only as part of a collective whole.

The authority of parents over their children was denied; such authority belonged only to the state, the communists held. They evolved a grandiose plan to build “commune homes” in which the workers and their families would live, where the environment would be such that it would enable the government to bring up children according to its

own pattern by turning their upbringing and training over to communistic-trained nurses and instructors.

The principle of equality between men and women, one of the most fundamental of all of the new social concepts, commendable as it may be in theory, did not work out in practice as successfully as the communists had contemplated. The responsibilities and obligations which it conferred upon women laid the new marriage system open to severe abuses. In urban centers, especially, young men took advantage of their new freedom. It was not unusual for some of them to marry and divorce as many as fifteen or twenty times within one year, with frequently disastrous results to the women. Thousands upon thousands of women found themselves left alone, either pregnant or with children, with no husbands to support them and with no employment for themselves. Suicide was prevalent among these women.

It was a time when the whole country was torn asunder and everything was topsy-turvy. Work was not plentiful, as it is now as a result of the industrial drive. It seemed as if the bottom had dropped out of everything. Bad as conditions were in regard to food, they were a lot worse with respect to hous-

ing and living quarters, especially in the urban centers. In many cases these were unobtainable at any price, and it was not an unusual thing for men and women to get married or live together for the sole purpose of having a place to lay their heads. This abnormal condition created many tragi-comic episodes. Many men and women abandoned their marriage partners simply to take on new ones who happened to be fortunate enough to have slightly better living quarters.

It is unnecessary to say that a condition like this was anything but wholesome for family life, especially for the children. Men would wander off and leave their wives and children, and many of the women, finding themselves without means of livelihood, would abandon their children to the mercy of fate.

Thousands upon thousands of women thus deserted had abortions performed. This practice became so general among certain classes of women that the clinics were filled with waiting lines. Conditions in the clinics were appalling. It was impossible, with the equipment and materials available, to maintain septic conditions in the face of such a rush of patients. The drug supply, of which pre-war Germany had been an important source,

had been greatly diminished by the war. It was necessary to perform many operations without anesthesia. The medical staff, composed of the old Russian group, one of the finest in the world, had been reduced by the war, and its remaining members, considered as enemies of communism and treated as such, had been relegated to the lowest category in the entire social scheme, Class D. Rationed and housed accordingly, their entire supply of food consisted of one pound of black bread a day for each person.

Under such medical and surgical conditions thousands of women died as a result of septic curettages. Yet even in the face of the fatalities that ensued, the privilege of abortion was so abused and the practice reached such enormous proportions that as time went on the government realized that it must be discouraged, and gradually modified its practice until by 1929 abortions were permitted only in cases where pregnancy was not advanced beyond two months, and then only upon medical advice.

In 1935 Stalin issued a new law under which abortions are now permitted only in emergencies in which they become necessary in order to save the life of the mother. In all other cases they are illegal and both the patient and the doctor who per-

forms them are subject to punishment. Thus the abortion laws are technically even more stringent in the U.S.S.R. today than in capitalistic America, where only the doctor who performs an abortion is punishable; and in actual practice they are considerably more severe, since it is generally recognized in America, especially in large cities, that the abortion laws are easily evaded.

Disregarding for the moment the obvious evils of the earlier practices in regard to abortions, it is significant that the new decree, restricting such operations so stringently, came about in the more recent stages of the Stalin régime, along with many other changes in the family status, such as the revised law making divorce also more difficult, all of which are directed toward the raising of larger families. Along with the proclamation announcing the new regulations, a statement was issued by the Stalin government to the effect that it expected a population of one hundred eighty million in Russia during the next ten years. In the history of all dictatorships this process of increasing the population for the purpose of building up large armies has played an important part.

Obviously, one of the causes of the great harvest of abortions which the U.S.S.R. reaped in the early

stages of its history lay in promiscuous marriages. This situation and other attendant evils the government endeavored to remedy by instituting alimony. Here, as in other things, the women were affected by their new status of equality with men. In case the woman had work and her husband had none, she was required to give up one-third of her wages to help support him, just as the husband was required to support his divorced wife if the conditions were reversed; and in case the woman was receiving alimony she was still not freed from the necessity of working if work was obtainable, since a third of a Russian workman's wages was sufficient only to buy a small fraction of the amount of food necessary for sustenance. Hence in order to eat and have a place to sleep it was necessary for women to do the same kinds of work that men did. Naturally, the alimony system, like any other, was open to abuse, and it soon became one of the stock materials of comedy in Russia. Cases were common in which women tried to collect as many as six separate alimony allotments by marrying and divorcing six men in different places.

Alimony was always payable for only one year, but in addition both the parents were responsible

for the support of the children until they reached the age of sixteen.

Under the present ruling, divorce becomes more and more difficult to obtain for the habitual maker and breaker of marriages. It is now necessary for six months to elapse between any divorce and re-marriage, and the court costs become higher with every divorce that is granted to the same individual. Under such provisions divorce becomes a luxury for the well-to-do and an impossibility for the average worker.

Early in the new social program commune homes were established, where the children, from the time they rose in the morning until they went to bed at night, were under the direct care of communist-trained nurses and instructors. Contact between the children and the parents was nearly non-existent; the parents saw their children only at bed time, since in the morning both men and women as a rule had to get up and go to work while the children were still sleeping.

By making this sort of environment general, the communists hoped to create gradually a new type of person devoid of individualistic tendencies and fitted to the new collective mode of living. They stressed the point that in addition to molding the

lives of the children to this pattern, commune homes would relieve the women of the drudgery of the old family life and enable them to attend meetings and engage in other cultural work and thus enjoy life more fully.

But the communists' program of collectivizing the children encountered many obstacles, and at no time did the commune homes play as important a part as the government had anticipated that they would in the abolition of the old family life and the creation of the new one. Even when the government leaders' belief in these commune homes was at its height, they were unable to build enough of these institutions to take care of even a small portion of the total population of the U.S.S.R.; but the principal cause of their failure lay in the complete lack of enthusiasm, or even willingness, on the part of the workers to move their families into them.

The communists were unable to eradicate by decree the maternal instinct; and family ties, which exist among the Russian people just as they do among people of the rest of the world, proved stronger in the end than the authority of the government. They discovered that the average mother is by nature so depraved that she would rather stay at home, changing her baby's diapers or putting him

to bed, than attend a communist meeting, and that playing with her baby gives her more gratification than anything which she may do to advance the social order. They learned that she preferred the society of her own children and her maternal activities with them to that of the group she encountered in the "house of culture and rest."

Bit by bit the government was compelled to recognize the failure of the commune system of family life and to abolish the commune homes, at least in their original form and with their original implications. It gradually dawned on the present rulers of Russia that training and bringing up children is a more intricate problem than they had expected it to be. After all, the home, the mother and father, are more desirable and fit and more logically situated for bringing up children than are commune homes manned and managed by sexless nurses and instructors. Except for the requirement that children attend the communist organizations designed for them—such as the Pioneers for children from five to twelve and the *Consomoltsi* for adolescents from twelve to twenty-one—the problem of looking after and raising children was turned back to the parents. Respect for their parents is now encouraged in the young, and the govern-

ment, which insists on discipline, holds the parents responsible for their children's behavior.

Meanwhile, the cost of the government's experimentation in family life had fallen more heavily upon the shoulders of the children of Russia than upon anyone else. In the great drama of the Russian Revolution, the story of the price paid by the children during its first stages, in consequence of the frequent marriages made possible by the new free love, and the breaking up of the lives of many families of the old régime by exile, imprisonment, and execution, makes one of the most tragic episodes in its history.

There was a time when millions of these homeless waifs, who literally infested every nook and corner of Soviet Russia, had nothing to eat, nothing to wear, and no place to sleep. Ragged, half-starved, diseased, they roamed the country like wild beasts, banded together, and fought for their existence by stealing and robbing as they faced a future dark and hopeless and full of despair. They died by the thousands and their ranks were replenished by fresh recruits. The government and the people were confronted with an ailment and a disease that appeared to be getting beyond control. It

seemed that this epidemic would infect the whole country.

When the government and the people were about to throw up their hands in despair, Mme. Krupskaya (the wife of Lenin) and others suggested the idea of building homes for these unfortunates, where they would be given another chance in life, where they would be treated with kindness and consideration and taught some useful trade or occupation. There were many, even in the official government, who were skeptical as to the expected accomplishments of such homes, but after a comparatively short time the phenomenal results attained by them were even beyond the hopes of the originators.

When the results became known to the Russian people, the whole country put its shoulder behind this movement and built a great many such homes for the homeless throughout Russia. These institutions and the methods employed in their management form one of the most commendable features of the present régime in Russia, and should serve as a great example to other countries in solving and handling similar problems. The finest types of humanity, idealistic and unselfish, are chosen as the caretakers and overseers of these children. The infinite patience, consideration, and kindness which

they show to these unfortunates is one of the most gratifying sights I have witnessed in Russia.

On my last trip to Russia I visited one of these homes in Kharkov where about eight hundred children, boys and girls, are being looked after both physically and mentally. The instructors in this home take great pains in trying to study and analyze the inclination, ability, and possibilities of each child, and train him accordingly. In this particular place there are two shops, one for making small dynamos, and the other for making cameras (this is the only place in Russia where cameras are manufactured). In addition to this mechanical training the children are encouraged to articulate and express any artistic tendencies they may have. Any of the children who show an aptitude and desire for higher education are sent to universities or colleges.

Some paintings which were the work of these children were shown me. One in particular, displayed in the center of their educational room, impressed me as a fine piece of work. It portrayed a waif being caught and arrested in the act of stealing. The instructor introduced me to the boy who painted it, and among other things this boy told me that his ambition was to become an attorney so that

he would be able to help unfortunate criminals who had not been given the opportunity to adjust themselves as he had.

I cannot help but repeat that this salvaging of its waifs is the most heroic task and achievement that the present régime in Russia has accomplished.

Although the government had to give up the commune system of family life, it maintains many nursery homes for children whose mothers work in the factories. These children are well cared for by trained nurses during the day and are turned over to their parents after working hours. There are also many other institutions, playgrounds, and other places where every effort is made to look after the welfare of the children of the workers. The treatment, care, and consideration given the children is one of the most commendable and constructive features in the U.S.S.R.

The government encourages workers to build their own co-operative apartments, whereby each worker becomes owner of the apartment in which he and his family live. But on account of the acute housing shortage in Russia it often happens that the original builders are unable to move into their own apartments because the government allows other workers to use them.

When I was in Moscow during the summer of 1936 I met a woman doctor whose husband was a statistician. Both represented the highest type of the old intellectual, and both were comparatively well paid. In addition to her medical work, this woman was engaged in the translation into Russian of material from medical journals in many other languages. In common with many other professionals and intellectuals of her type, she and her husband were living under the most deplorable conditions, in quarters that lacked both privacy and sanitation. I asked her why, in view of the government's encouragement of co-operative apartments, she and her group did not better their conditions by such a project. She answered quickly that they had already done so, that the apartment had been completed three years before, but that so far none of the members of the group who had built it had been allowed to move into it. The government had commandeered it for housing the workers on the new Moscow subway. Adequate housing for these workers was considered a much more important problem, since the difficulties and dangers of the subway project made it necessary to offer extra inducements in order to keep the workers on the job.

But though Russia has not yet solved her housing

problem, she has apparently found the solution to a more ancient and difficult problem—that of commercialized vice.

Prostitution as a profession has disappeared from the U.S.S.R. From the first the communists regarded that institution as a product of the capitalistic order, and turned their energies upon the problem of caring for the prostitutes whom they had inherited from the old régime. Institutions were established, not for punishment, but for the rehabilitation of prostitutes. Here those who were diseased were given careful physical attention until they were cured, and all were taught some useful trade or other occupation. When they were ready to be discharged from the institutions jobs were found for them. Today work is so plentiful in Russia that women do not have to resort to this method of obtaining a livelihood.

“Free love” has passed through many phases since its initiation in Russia. It did not achieve its original purpose and even failed to eradicate the shortcomings in the relations existing between men and women. The Russian people have their share of infidelity and jealousy, which is intensified in many cases by the fact that they are compelled to live in overcrowded quarters, with four of five

people in one small room and a consequent complete lack of privacy, regardless of their relationships.

Practical experience molded free love and brought out its good and bad points. For a while promiscuous marriages and frequent divorces, widespread resort to abortion with its injurious consequences, and the millions of homeless children who infested Russia were the results of free love. On the other hand, marriages in Russia, being based on love, are never mercenary. Even when divorces could be obtained with comparative ease, their percentage was lower in Russia than in many European countries and the United States.

Like all the other communistic experiments, the U.S.S.R. was forced to abandon as contrary to human nature the idea of communizing the family and raising children collectively. Not only did the government give up the idea of building a family life based on its original communistic principles, but at the present time it even preaches and encourages the old idea that the home is the nucleus of the community and the foundation of society.

V

In order to achieve this great aim and principle, the communists abolished the old system of education and began to build the workers' own intelligentsia.

IN the effort to discard the old order and build a new, communistic educational system and with it a collective- and communistic-minded individual, the communists were confronted with even more difficulties than they met in building a new economic system or a new family life. The working class, which did not possess its own intellectual and cultural force, encountered insurmountable obstacles in its efforts to build such a group.

Under the czarist régime the government considered that an illiterate population was more submissive and more easily controlled than an educated one, and made education for the masses difficult of attainment. Attendance at the universities and even the high schools was very costly and within the reach of only the upper and well-to-do classes. The

free elementary schools were by far insufficient to give even a small portion of the population the opportunity to learn to read and write. While the same government did not spare money or effort to build throughout the villages of Russia all kinds of churches, the clergy of which were used as a tool by the government to teach the people to be submissive and contented with their lot, it was very miserly in building schools. These were few and located as far apart as fifty or sixty miles, which made it possible for only a small percentage of children in the rural districts to attend them. As in the rural districts, so even in the urban centers, elementary schools were scarce, and those which existed under the czar were below the standards set by those in other European countries or the United States.

The period of attendance in the elementary schools covered only three years of seven months each. This short school year was necessitated by the fact that even very young children of agrarian parents in czarist Russia helped their parents in the fields and were not able to start school in the fall until after the harvest season was over. Likewise, it was necessary to release them early enough in the spring to help with the work of that season. Even

the few children of peasants who were able to attend school at all under these conditions obviously received the most meager and perfunctory education.

Only 17 per cent of Russia's total population was literate, and this percentage at that time included the Baltic provinces, in which the literate population was as high as 40 per cent, and Finland, whose literacy was about 80 per cent, and urban centers in which the percentage of literacy was greater. It is conservative to estimate that less than 10 per cent of the agrarian population was literate.

The communist régime inherited from the czarist government not only too few schools of all classes to enable it to carry out its intention of giving the Russian people a general education, but also a very limited intellectual and pedagogical force.

The higher institutions, such as universities and technological schools, although they were second to none in the world in their standards of education, were not sufficient in number to take care of the masses of new students who were flocking to them eager to obtain training and knowledge. In addition, the pedagogical forces were deplorably inadequate, as the only personnel available was composed of the intellectuals of the old régime,

whose effectiveness was impaired by the persecution of a government which distrusted them as being alien to its ideas.

The control and management of the universities was taken away from them and complete authority was placed in the hands of inexperienced and, in most cases, illiterate, Communist Party members. The instructors were required to emphasize the superiority of the new communistic ideology over that of the old or capitalistic system. This applied not only to courses in sociology, economics, political and historical sciences; but even in the teaching of the exact sciences, which have no relation to social questions, such as physics, chemistry, and mathematics, they were expected to insert the new communistic doctrines and cite their advantages over the old capitalistic ideas.

With the teaching staff, at best too small to take care of the vast body of students, compelled to spend great amounts of time in expounding the finer dialectic doctrines of Marxism and Leninism, both students and teachers were deprived of much-needed time for other subjects. Yet upon the slightest suggestion—often no more than a suspicion reported by the illiterate communist members who controlled and dominated all the faculties of the

schools—that an instructor was deviating from this policy, he was expelled from his position and perhaps even exiled to Siberia. Under such conditions it is not surprising that many who could do so at the beginning of the revolution escaped from Russia and became emigrés without home or country, scattered throughout the world.

To be sure, there were individual cases of scholars and scientists of the rank of Pavlov, who refused to be stifled in their work by communistic obstructiveness and who still remained and continued their work in Russia—men whose renown and standing was so great not only in Russia but throughout the world that the government did not dare to persecute them—but these were rare exceptions to the general rule. Nevertheless, when the whole world cried out against the persecution by the communists of men of science and letters, the government invariably pointed to these exceptions to prove that the accusations of persecution were exaggerated and untrue, and they said further that such accusations originated with their enemies—the capitalists.

In education, as in all other departments of the new social order, the communists acted ruthlessly on the principle that “The sins of the fathers are

visited on the children unto the third and fourth generations." In revising the school system they began by expelling all students whose origin was what they classified as "non-worker." Any student whose origin had the slightest taint of the despised bourgeois or nobility was then barred from all schools. The mere presence there of such a student was considered contaminating and detrimental to the inculcation of true communist thought in this new generation of workers. The one qualification necessary for a student in order to enter school was his worker origin, and the children of what were classified then as "heavy workers" were on the preferred list.

So great was the eagerness of all classes of Russian youth for education that many of the children of the declassified categories left their homes, went to far-distant points where they were unknown, and there presented falsified papers to substantiate their declarations that they were of worker origin. This becomes even more remarkable in consideration of the fact that in doing it they were running grave risks, for the government had established a system of espionage in the schools, just as it had within the Communist Party, and as in the latter so also in the schools it had instituted *chistkas* or purges, which

uncovered students who had entered under false pretenses. Students under suspicion were subjected to investigations in which the most absurd and inconclusive evidence of their bourgeois origin was frequently sufficient to exile them to Siberia.

Although there was some basis of logic, in the primitive reasoning of the Soviet, for excluding such students, since due to the shortage of schools even a good many of the workers' children had to wait years for their turn to enter, the irreparable damage which such a policy brought about, not only to the persecuted group but to the Russian educational system as a whole, is obvious. Despite the communists' original belief that they could build an intelligentsia out of the workers in one generation, not only their history but all history has proved that an intellectual group comes about only through the accretion of knowledge and training over many generations.

While all the factors previously enumerated—the inadequacy of schools and of teachers, the obstructionism of the government's insistence upon devoting educational time and energy to communistic theories instead of to sciences, and the expulsion from all educational institutions of the more intelligent element of Russia's population—played

a part in the failure of the new communistic method of education, the main reason for the eventual breakdown of the system was the group method of education, called the "towing" process. More than any other one factor, this undoubtedly brought about conditions which caused the government finally to give up its original educational system as a complete failure and to inaugurate its present educational policy, which is very similar to the system used by despised capitalistic countries.

The idea behind this fantastic group education was the communistic concept that human behavior in its entirety could be molded and conditioned by environment. The communists believed that by placing individuals under similar environment and conditions and giving them all the same opportunity, they would turn out a uniform, factory-made article, constructed according to their own specifications.

A group of students, considered as a unit, would be taught a subject, without taking into consideration the peculiarities in natural ability, inclination, or aptitude of each individual student or his application to and understanding of the subject. If only a few mastered it, these more intelligent and able students "towed" the whole group with them, and

the rest of the students would be advanced into a higher grade without the necessity of grasping or comprehending the subject themselves.

Since the pedagogical forces were unable to exercise any authority over the students, and the students themselves completely lacked discipline and individual responsibility toward their work and their teachers, the graduates turned out were of such inferior quality that it was a travesty to say that they had any education at all. I was told by many communists themselves that it was not unusual for some students to be "towed" through even higher educational institutions and to be completely illiterate after the process had been completed.

Lenin realized that Russia would ultimately have to become an industrial nation in order to succeed in her fight for communism. He stressed the importance to the communistic order of the electrification of all of Russia. It was his great dream to see Russia industrialized and electrified. He could not carry out his plan, for he was occupied during most of his rule with civil war and internal disturbances, and before he could go on with the constructive work of which he had dreamed, he died.

In substance the five-year plan which Stalin inaugurated simply carried out the original idea of

Lenin. Lenin had pointed out the need for the workers to try to educate themselves in order to be able to run their own businesses and industries. For that reason technological schools and training for the proletariat were considered essential to the process of building an industrialized Russia and developing it economically.

But the system of education inaugurated for this purpose failed so miserably that when the five-year plan to industrialize Russia was set up in 1928, the country was completely lacking in a technical or engineering force to build and install the necessary plants, and was forced to hire engineers from the United States, Germany, England, Sweden, and other foreign countries. This was an extremely costly procedure, as the imported technicians had to be paid high salaries in *valuta*, and even after the plants had been built and installed the engineers and technicians who had been turned out by the new Russian schools were so incompetent and inefficient that they were not able to run the factories which had been built at the cost of such heroic effort and so much money.

When I was in Russia in 1931, only three years after the plants were built, I found many of them partially broken down or completely shut down to

repair the damage done to them by the newly created workers' technicians.¹ At this time Stalin, in a statement to the Economic Conference, grudgingly had to admit the fundamental faults of the system. He pointed out that the workers' intelligentsia was not able to run the plants and that they would have to bring back and reconcile the members of the old intelligentsia. His speech read in part:

"We can no longer depend entirely on that modicum of old engineering and technical strength which we inherited from bourgeois Russia. In order to increase the present tempo and speed of production, the working class must have its own engineering and technical intelligentsia.

"No longer can all the specialists, engineers, and technicians of the old school be piled together in a single heap. In consideration of changing conditions we must change our policy and show the greatest possible concern for those engineers and technicians who have definitely turned to the side of the working class."

Even after Stalin himself indirectly pointed out the faults of the new educational system and its

¹ Even in 1936 I found the Kharkov tractor plant, one of the most modern and finest plants that Russia possesses, running with only one shift because of the lack of technical workers.

failure to create a new workers' intelligentsia, as with everything else in Russia, the remedy, improvement, and change came in a slow and round-about way. Although the shortcomings of the system became very obvious as early as 1931, it was only in the year of 1935, four years later, that the government gave up the group system of education, or "towing in," and re-established the old capitalistic system of discipline, examinations, merits, report sheets, and so forth.

Since the new law went into effect in 1935 and there are no longer categories or declassified elements among the people, the government has removed the stigma from the children of the former declassified groups and they are permitted to enter the intermediate and higher educational institutions. Moreover, the acceptance and advancement of a student is based upon his individual efforts, and he must pass strict examinations. If a student fails for the third time in his examinations, he is permanently expelled from school, in order to make room for the more capable students. Stipends had been paid to all students in order to enable them to attend the higher educational institutions, but under the recent ruling only those who pass the examinations are paid such stipends, and the more

able or capable students receive additional compensation in proportion to their progress in scholastic work.

On my trip from Rostov-on-Don to Baku I met a young man who was studying architecture at Moscow University, a youth who reminded me a great deal of the old intellectual type which existed in pre-war Russia. His frankness, modesty, and great eagerness to find out and learn about many things commanded my respect. He was a brilliant conversationalist and possessed a store of knowledge which was phenomenal considering his age. It is true that his ideas about the outside world were greatly distorted through the source from which he was compelled to obtain his information, but his inquisitiveness and his ability to distinguish between the trifling and the important was marvelous. Through him I was able to learn a great deal about the mechanisms of the discarded and of the newly established educational systems in Russia.

His story was in many respects similar to a good many others that I heard about education, old and new, stories that showed how fantastic and stupid the discarded system had been, especially in its "towing" process. He enumerated from his own experience and observation many cases of students

who, after two years of university training in some particular field, when the new system requiring examinations was put into effect were found to have not the slightest inkling or knowledge of the subject they had supposedly been studying. Just as he spared no words in condemning the discarded system, he could not find enough to say in praise of the newly inaugurated educational policy.

I mention this youth's reaction for the reason that this attitude of condemning the old and glorifying the new is the inevitable accompaniment of any change that takes place in Russia. Regardless of what the idea or method may be, any criticism, even though constructive, while an experiment is still being carried on is looked upon with great disfavor, and in a good many cases it is even considered counter-revolutionary. But whenever the government decides to replace the old idea or experiment with a new one, then it is not only permissible to criticize, condemn, and even ridicule the old, but such condemnation of the old is expected as confirmation of the superiority of the new—is, in fact, an expression of approval of the new. Of course the fact that the new (and glorious) and the old (and ridiculous) ideas emanate always from the same source has to be overlooked and cannot be

mentioned; and invariably some scapegoat is invented on whose head all the condemnation and accusation is heaped.

There is no question concerning the greater desirability and efficiency of the present method of education as compared with the system which the U.S.S.R. has been compelled to abolish. However, the progress that the Soviets are making in building up an intelligentsia of their own is necessarily very slow.

In spite of the meager resources at their command, they have built communistic universities in every large center throughout the country. The purpose of these is to prepare teachers to train the Russian youth. The most important studies in these universities are Marxism and Leninism, and not sufficient time is spent on the sciences and other subjects. These universities, which were established before the recent change in educational policy, were and still are the main source of supply for the faculties of Russia's educational institutions; and the disadvantages of the old system, in which Marxism is considered more important than the sciences, are still a retarding factor in the process of building a technological and engineering intelligentsia.

With the old intellectuals gradually dying out,

and with the newly trained pedagogues—those which the communistic universities turn out—highly steeped in Leninism and communism but not too well versed in other subjects, the Soviets are still confronted with problems which must be solved in order to build up, train, and educate a new intellectual force sufficient and efficient enough to run and develop as huge a country as the U.S.S.R.

Slowly but surely, and in a zigzag manner, the Russian government has been forced to deviate from its original communistic doctrines and experiments in the fields of agriculture, industry, and family life; but in education it has made a complete turn-about and gone back to the methods of the old capitalistic system.

VI

The communists established a workers' jurisprudence.

JUST as family relations and education have been modified materially, so the judicial system in the U.S.S.R. has passed and is passing through radical changes which are carrying it farther and farther away from the original Bolshevik concept of "crime" and "punishment."

In the beginning, when the Bolsheviks became the *de facto* power in Russia, they not only abolished all the old courts, but also the entire form and concept of the old jurisprudence. They postulated the deterministic idea in their belief that the human being is born with no inclinations for wrongdoing. His evils and crimes, they thought, were not the result of the individual's free will but were engendered by the capitalistic order and environment. The words "crime" and "punishment" were replaced by "transgression" and "measures of social defense." The jails or prisons were termed "houses

of correction"; the courts were no longer places where punishment was to be meted out, but where correction was to be prescribed, and the judge was not an avenger but an adjuster.

During the first stage of revolution, when military communism was in control, there were no courts. The machinery of punishment consisted of one force, the dreaded *Cheka*, whose sole object and duty was to exterminate with dispatch anyone who was suspected of being counter-revolutionary or opposed to the new régime. In the year of 1921, when military communism was abolished and when the *Cheka* was replaced by the GPU, the Soviet established what it called a "workmen's jurisprudence," with five courts of varying jurisdictions, including an appellate jurisdiction and culminating in the supreme court as the court of last resort. The most popular one is the *Narodnoje-Sud*, or people's court, where the bulk of litigation is handled.

This court is made up of one judge and two assistant judges. The judge is appointed by the state and his two assistants are selected from among the workers in the district in which the court is located. The period of a judge's training is short, lasting only two years, and the assistants are not required to have any judicial preparation. How-

ever, all of them are selected from among members of the Communist Party.

The court procedure differs greatly from that in the United States, although there is a prosecuting and a defending attorney. In the U.S.S.R. the defending as well as the prosecuting attorney is paid by the state, and the latitude given the judge in conducting a case is far greater than in any of our courts. The judge may stop any questioning or cross-examination by the prosecuting or defending attorneys, he conducts the questioning and cross-examines the witnesses or litigants himself, and terminates the case and trial in accordance with his own best judgment. The result is that cases are conducted and decisions handed down, if not always justly, at least always very swiftly. The final decision is made by the majority, or two of the three judges, and as a rule the two assistant judges are guided by their superior's opinion.

Though this, like so many other phases of Russian life, has been changed now, it was not so long ago, when millions of Russians were still included in the declassified categories, that the courts, more than any other institution in the U.S.S.R., portrayed the tragic-comic side of Russian life. When the litigants involved were a worker on one hand and a

member of the disfranchized category on the other, the decision was a foregone conclusion, as the de-classified was always wrong and the worker right; and since the judge was always a communist and a party member, justice was anything but blind.

Capital punishment is meted out only for political offenses, and the highest penalty for all other crimes, even for premeditated murder, is only ten years—a term which, as a rule, is greatly reduced for good behavior. Prisoners are taught to read and write in the jails; each is taught some trade; and when they are turned out they are not looked upon as criminals but on the contrary are given every opportunity to find work and adjust themselves in society.

Communistic terminology does not change human nature and does not eradicate crime; but the communists' treatment of the criminal during the time he serves his sentence, and the opportunity he is given after he gets out of prison, are beneficial both to the criminal and to society in that they eliminate many repeaters and therefore reduce crime.

Prior to the abolishment of categories, when class consciousness and the class struggle were on the daily calendar and extermination of the capitalists

and the capitalistic system was the daily diet, stealing was considered a minor offense, or, as it was called, a "transgression." But the attitude of the government toward what it considers crime and criminals has changed materially. It is still true that political crimes are the only capital offenses. But with the abolishment of the declassified categories, crimes of minor importance committed by individuals, even by those of worker's origin, are very often construed as counter-revolutionary.

It has become common practice in the U.S.S.R. for the Soviets to construe a simple act of carelessness or inefficiency as a crime against the government and to punish it with death. This is especially true in the government's treatment of train crews and railroad officials on the occasion of an accident or wreck. And wrecks—some of them extremely serious—are frequent in Russia. In 1935 alone the government officially admitted that there were sixty-two thousand minor and major train accidents. But although the Russian government at first blamed the train crews for these wrecks, the truth of the matter is that the communists inherited a badly run-down transportation system from the czar, and the government has been unable to do very much to improve the situation brought about by worn-out

tracks and lack of serviceable locomotives, though it has one achievement in this field to its credit: the double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian and the Turkestan railroads. However, both of these roads are in countries very thinly populated, and the improvements were made for military purposes.

It goes without saying that the nervousness of the crews, who worked under the constant fear of incurring the death penalty for an accident due to circumstances they could not control, did not help the situation. When in 1935 Kagonovitch was made head of the railroads in Russia, he apparently realized this, and recently abolished the death penalty for unpremeditated accidents or wrecks. The Russians claim that this act alone will help in diminishing accidents. Nevertheless, inefficiency and carelessness can still be construed as acts of sabotage and punished as such.

This attitude of greater leniency toward the personnel of the railroads is an exception to the general trend, which is constantly toward enlarging the category of political or social crimes and therefore increasing the severity of punishment.

An ordinary case of thievery, by the laws and decrees now in effect, may be construed as a crime against the government, and therefore a capital

offense, punishable with death by shooting. As far back as eight years ago, when the government made the drive to collectivize Russian farms, it decreed that killing cattle was counter-revolutionary and a capital offense. Later, hoarding metal coins was considered a counter-revolutionary act. In 1934 a new law was passed whereby ordinary stealing from state properties or from *kolkhozi* was made a crime against the state, or a political offense. Crimes which are considered minor in capitalistic countries and which are punished accordingly, at present may be and often are punished even with death, under the new Russian laws.

As the criminal laws themselves have become more and more severe, the attitude of courts and judges toward the individual who commits the crime has also completely changed.

I visited a court in Moscow (which visit I was able to make by outmaneuvering the Intourist guide) where five workers were being tried for stealing some vegetable oil from the factory or trust for which they were working. This trial, like all trials in Russia, whether in the past or present, was highly melodramatic. It drew a big crowd, and the judges, whether intentionally or not, obviously played up to the audience. In the midst of the

procedure of cross-examination one of the defendants addressed the judge in a manner which is proper at present throughout the U.S.S.R. by calling him *tovaritsch*, or comrade. The judge very indignantly called the defendant's attention to the fact that the latter was not a comrade of his, added that he did not care to be addressed in that manner by the defendant, and in unmistakable terms told him what he thought of anyone who stole from the government—all this despite the fact that the guilt of the accused had not yet been established.

It is not necessary to relate what the consequences of this trial were and what happened to the defendants. I have cited the case simply as evidence of the startling change which has taken place in the attitude of Russia's judiciary since my previous visit five years ago. At that time I witnessed many trials of prisoners accused of such crimes as stealing, and listened while the judge did nothing more drastic than to reprimand the accused and wind up the case by giving a lecture on communism and pointing out the injustice and rottenness of capitalism.

The new laws—by which the government hoped to stop the frequent petty thievery existing in railroad stations, freight cars, and other places—severe

though they are, have thus far failed to accomplish their object.

As I was about to leave Russia from Odessa, someone broke into my room and that of another tourist, both of which were on the third floor of a hotel, by entering from the roof and through the window, and stole all of my clothing except that which I was wearing. And I can say truthfully that after having witnessed the shoes and the clothes that the Russian people have to wear, I felt anything but bitter toward the person who took some of both from me.

The workers' jurisprudence and the Bolsheviks' program in relation to crime and punishment have failed as measures of correction. Incentives to crime have not disappeared from the conditions under which the average Russian lives. Petty thievery—one of the most significant of all crimes as an indication of social conditions—is as prevalent in Russia today as it is in any capitalistic country, and more so than in many. And the causes are the same as they are the world over wherever petty thieves exist—poverty and want.

The original communistic "workmen's jurisprudence" which was supposed ultimately to eliminate punishment completely, and all the high

communistic terminology such as "transgression," "measures of social defense," and "houses of correction" have become meaningless; and under the influence of the new criminal laws and the latitude given to the judges to construe any crime as counter-revolutionary or against the state, the present U.S.S.R. jurisprudence is more severe than that of any capitalistic country in the world.

VII

Religion is opium for the people.

THE Russian government has pretended to the outside world that religion is being left to its own fate in the communist state. The new constitution expounds the principle of religious freedom. The Soviets explain that religious belief or disbelief (atheism) is left to the individual and that he is free to exercise either of them. Article 124 of the new constitution states:

“In order to insure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.”

Here, as in so many other cases in Russia, principles and names do not coincide with reality and facts. Anyone who has read or heard about Russia during the last nineteen years, since the Bolsheviks have been running the country, knows from unanimous tales and stories that the communists have

persecuted all forms of religion, executed a great many priests and representatives of the churches, confiscated nearly all churches, synagogues and mosques, and converted them to other uses. I have seen several saloons in buildings which were once churches. Karl Marx's definition of religion, "Religion is opium for the people," is one of the pivotal dogmas of Marxism and communism, and, acting on it, the communists went about exterminating religion with the same zeal and furore which they directed against capitalism.

In order to understand the comparative ease with which they accomplished their aim and the phenomenal success of their attack, it is necessary to know and understand the position held under the czarist régime by the churches—especially the Greek Catholic church, which was the religion of the greatest majority of the Russians and the official church of Russia. The church was subservient to the state, and the state controlled all clerical activities. The czar was not only the secular but also the religious head of all the Russian people. Through this complete control the church became one of the most reactionary forces in the hands of the czarist government, and was an integral part of that régime. The state used the church as a tool for suppressing

among the people any movement toward enlightenment or culture, and in the people's struggle for emancipation and their rights it was always on the side of the oppressors.

When that despised, tyrannical government was overthrown, the church went down with it. After the overthrow of the czar, when the Whites and the Reds were engaged in a life and death struggle, the representatives of the church, as a rule, were on the side of the Whites. It was therefore easy for the revolutionists or communists to point out to the people that the church was against them and their interests, that it acted only as a tool of the enemies of the people.

Another important factor in estranging the Russian people from formal religion, and one which made its abolishment comparatively easy for the Bolsheviks, was the fact that the church had accumulated immense wealth not only in money but in great tracts of very desirable land, the confiscation of which, and its division among the peasants, appeased their land hunger.

I do not want to leave the impression that the process was as simple as all that. Many of the Russian people resisted the government's policy and its move to wipe out religion; and the government,

knowing and realizing the hold that the church had on many Russians, went about cautiously in carrying out its plan. Its procedure in confiscating more and more churches and houses of worship and in persecuting the clergy, though consistent and relentless, was slow. On the other hand, the Soviets established what were called "universities of atheism," for which purpose they used many of the confiscated churches, and the Russian people were induced and encouraged to attend them and listen to and absorb the new gospel of atheism.

Not only the clergy but even parents are prohibited from influencing or teaching their children any form of the old religion until the children are eighteen years old, and any deviation from or violation of this rule is punishable. In the schools for Russian children are posters depicting religion as the opium of the people, and it is stressed that all religions are used by the capitalists as a tool to exploit the workers. The teachers are required to train the children in the principles of communism and atheism.

A small portion of the older generation still clings to the old beliefs and religion and attends church, and the government has left a few churches for that purpose. But for an outsider to realize how

small this element is at present in Russia it need only be pointed out that in Kharkov, a city of approximately eight hundred thousand people, there are only two churches for religious worship; and when I visited there, only one was open for services.

It might be said, although it sounds paradoxical, that the official belief of the present régime is disbelief, or atheism—the legitimate child of communism. For it is a great mistake to imagine that Russia is without some belief, and some faith for which to fight. For the communists, Leninism is not a political or social experiment or theory; it is a faith and a dogma. *Das Kapital* of Karl Marx replaces the Old Testament, and the writings of Lenin, the New Testament. In the present struggle among different shades of communists, as among different sects in any other religion, the members of each insist that they are the only real disciples of their prophets and the true followers of his teachings. As Trotzky accuses Stalin of being an untrue communist, so Stalin also condemns Trotzky for being a heretic, a liberal, and a bourgeois. The miracles of the old religions have been superseded by the cheap and ready magic of communist prestidigitators. Their pomp and ceremony have been

replaced by the parades and meetings of the new order, their images superseded by pictures and statues of communist gods.

There is no place in the world where hero worship is preached and practiced as it is in Russia today. One of the most thriving and prosperous industries in the U.S.S.R. is the manufacture of effigies and statues of Lenin, Stalin, Karl Marx, and many lesser prophets. These are produced by the millions, from life-sized ones to those of smaller dimensions, and they are placed not only in all public buildings and parks, but also in all homes.

Right now Stalin's busts and pictures are greatly predominant. On my recent trip, in Tiflis, the birthplace of Stalin, I visited a huge new building which is called the museum of arts. With the exception of one statue each of Lenin, Marx, and a few others, all the walls of the building were hung with paintings depicting the life of Stalin from his childhood to the present day. From his biographies and from stories of his past and present life, he can hardly be visualized as a saint or saintly; but in those paintings the communist artists tried and managed to picture him as saintly and Christlike. Through all stages of his life he is portrayed as a high type

of idealist, a crusader, with saintliness expressed in his every feature, a leader surrounded by groups of workers, peasants, and fellow-revolutionists, preaching his high ideals of communism and persuading them.

In his very latest portrait he is shown with the most kind, humane, and tender expression on his face, patting the head of a little girl. (Incidentally, when I passed through Germany on my way to Russia, I noticed that Hitler is using the same technique. He, too, is shown bending over a young girl, with his hand on her head, beaming all over.)

Commentaries on Stalin and Stalin's life point out that one of the characteristics of Stalin is his publicity-shyness. If he ever suffered from this ailment, he is surely completely cured by now. It is true that he shunned public places when the going was the roughest, but now he is frequently present at public gatherings and celebrations, and he seems to enjoy publicity and public acclaim enormously.

The newspapers in Russia are dominated completely by Stalin, who rigidly dictates their policies and contents; all articles and news emanate from one source, the Kremlin; half of the space in the two leading tabloids (Russian papers are made up

of about six small pages) is devoted to praising and glorifying Stalin and his achievements.

Every day open letters to Stalin are printed in the papers. Frequently such letters fill more than half of the front page of a paper. All of them are replete with the fulsome praise of religious worship. Here is a part of one from *Isvestja* of August 27, 1936. The letter is from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Gruzinia, Stalin's birth-place.

"Our own dear Comrade Stalin:

To you, our native father and teacher, to you, our great leader of communism, in the name of Bolsheviks and toilers, we, the toilers of Gruzinia, turn our fiery love, our faithfulness in our readiness to sacrifice ourselves in our struggle. Drop by drop of our blood, we are willing to give up our whole lives for new victories in the socialistic proletarian revolution. To you who raised us and looked after us in the heavy and gloomy past, to you who give us happiness and joy, we bring a Stalin's oath to be alert, to be wide-awake, on the lookout for the enemy, regardless of how he masquerades, and to be merciless in destroying him. . . . Long

live our powerful, undefeated party of Lenin and Stalin! Long live our leader, our teacher, our father, our friend, our dear, our own, the great Stalin!"

Here is an excerpt from another letter which appeared in *Pravda* (August 25, 1936). It comments on the trial of Zinovyev and the other fifteen communists. This letter is to "Comrade Stalin, from men and women workers of the engineering and technological force of the Red Knight."

"Our dear, beloved friend and leader, Comrade Stalin:

"We understand perfectly our enemy, blood-thirsty and ugly as a snake, who tried to injure the building of our social order, and we say, 'Be alert and stand guard on your post. Not with words but with deeds we will strengthen our class wide-awareness. We will surround our party, our Stalin's Central Committee, with a steel wall through which it will be impossible for a traitor or turncoat to penetrate. We shall be like the eyeball, like a battle flag; we shall watch our own, the most loving, the closest to our heart, our leader, our friend, Comrade

Stalin, our pride, our happiness, our joy! Live, Comrade Stalin, for the sake of the happiness and joy of the toilers, for the sake of our great, powerful fatherland (*rodina*), for the sake of socialism! We plead with you, our Comrade Stalin: Watch your life, it belongs to us, it belongs to the whole nation and to the toilers of the whole globe. With all our heart we wish you, our own loving Comrade Stalin, health and joy."

Here is a "people's song" from the same issue of *Pravda*. It was written in Daghestan Aula, in the lower Genguti, and translated from Kumic by Effendi Kapief:

"Our Stalin:

"As if it were possible in a song by a singer to tell how dear thou beloved, our father, art! Thou, like flint, wert tempered in the front line of the crusaders! We hold thee in the cradle of our arms! In the cold of the winter thou art a shelter for us; in the heat of the summer thou art a cooling garden; thou art the wings that raise us to the skies; for the one that goes down under the ground thou art the air. Over our enemies thou art a stormy cloud; over the toilers'

people thou art the sun; thou art the guardian who watches over ships in storms; to all born with an honest heart thou art their glory! How is it possible in a song for a singer to tell how dear to us thou art, Our great father, the son of his country (*rodina*), we bow to thee! As we hold our honor, we swear to thee to safeguard thy life; thy vision is our vision; thy thoughts our thoughts to the last one; thou art the flame of our thoughts and our blood. Thou art the high symbol of our strength."

Following is a letter addressed to "Comrade Stalin, from toilers of forty-five thousand horsemen," also taken from *Pravda*.

"Comrade Stalin, our blood-father:

"We, the horsemen of the Voroshilov Cavalry of Moscow, Leningrad, Crimea, Azov-Black Sea, Stalingrad, Northern Caucasus, and other republics and districts of our great Union, are gathered here at Rostov-on-Don to compete in the All-Union Horsemen's Society. First, together with the workers of Rostov, the Cossacks, and *Kolkhozniki* from Azov-Black Sea, we want to express our feeling of great joy in the growth

Наш Стalin

НАРОДНАЯ ПЕСНЯ

Разве может в песне рассказать певец,
Как нам дорог ты, лояльный наш отец.
Ты, как птиц, испытав в праведных боях;
Нами кован, нами пощен из руках.
В стужу зимнюю родная кровя ты,
В лето огненное — сад прохладный ты.
Для поднявшихся на небо крылья ты,
Для спустившихся под землю воздух ты.
Над врагами грозовая туча ты,
Над трудящимся народом солнце ты.
Кораблям, плывущим в бурю, берег ты,
Всем рожденным с честным сердцем.

слава ты.

Разве может в песне рассказать певец,
Как нам дорог ты, великий наш отец.
Солнце родины своей, клянемся мы,
Жизнь твою, как честь, беречь клянемся
мы.

Твои взоры — наши взоры, вождь родной,
Твои думы — наши думы до одной.
Наших мыслей, нашей крови плазма ты,
Нашей крепости высокой знамя ты.

Записал в дагестанском ауле
Нижний Джengутай и перевел с
кумыкского ЭФЕНДИ КАПИЕВ.



A Communist Party member writes a psalm of
love and praise to Comrade Stalin.
(Translation appears on page 189)

in strength of our country and our Red Army; a feeling of great joy at our new, free workers' life and great love for our fatherland (*rodina*), for our party with the wise Stalin as its head; whether learning to master horsemanship, armaments, and the technique of defense, or as toilers in the factories, in the mines and *kolkhozi*, and on the tractors and combines, all the workers of our country are standing like an impregnable wall in case our enemies attack us. We are all an inexhaustible reserve for our glorious Red Army. Our horses are fast, our sabers are sharp, and our hands are hard. We are ready at a moment's notice to stand as one to defend our fatherland (*rodina*). We note that the name of Stalin, with his fighting colleagues, Klemon Voroshilov and Boudine, were created from the workers and the peasants from all nationalities of the first cavalry, and were the ones who destroyed the Denikens, the Wrangels, the Polish *pani*, and the cavalry of the Whites.

"Comrade Stalin, our blood-father, the hope of all the toilers, we cannot find enough words to express our hatred of the murderers and the ones who sold out to the Fascists—the Trotzky, Zinovyev bandits. The ugly reptiles, they dared

to lift their dirty hands against the most dear, the most holy of our nation, our leaders, and you, our own and beloved. From you, our bright sun, is the road of mankind illuminated to communism. We, with all the hundred and seventy million people of our nation, congratulate the verdict and the shooting of the dwarfs of mankind, the murderers, Zinovyev, Kaminev, Smirnov, Bakiev, and all who participated with the dirty bandits who came before the court. Their names will be anathema for ages. The names of Trotzky, Zinovyev, Kaminev, and their associates our grandchildren will rightfully mention with hatred and scorn. We swear to you, dear Comrade Stalin, wherever we are—in the stables, on the *kolkhozi*, in the Red Army, on horses, in tanks, in airplanes, we will honorably carry out our obligations as citizens of the U.S.S.R., and with no let-up we will fight for the victory of the deeds of Lenin and Stalin—to our last drop of blood we will give up our lives for our *rodina*.

“Live, our Stalin, many, many years. Live for the sake of our happiness and the joy of all toilers. To you our flaming love, to you our happy songs, to you our limitless loyalty.”

Сталин—наш родной отец

Письмо 45-тысячного митинга участников всесоюзных конноспортивных состязаний и трудающихся Ростова-на-Дону товарищу СТАЛИНУ

Товарищ Сталин!

Мы, конники, «ворошиловские кавалеристы» Москвы, Ленинграда, Украины, Азово-Черноморья, Ставрополя, Северного Кавказа и других республик, краев и областей нашего великого Союза, сошлись здесь, в Ростове-на-Дону, чтобы сравнить свое мастерство на всесоюзных конноспортивных состязаниях.

Первое, что мы совместно с рабочими Ростова и казаками-солдатами Азово-Черноморья хотим выразить,—это чувство земской гордости за растущую мощь нашей страны и Красной Армии, чувство великой радости новой, свободной трудовой жизни и великой любви к нашей родине, к нашей партии, возглавляемой мудрым Сталевым.

Мы учимся владеть конем, оружием, техникой не для забоя. Мы все, работающие на заводах, в шахтах, колхозах, на тракторах и комбайнах, все трудающиеся нашей страны, становим несокрушимой стеною, если враг нападет на нас. Мы все—ненкостощий резерв нашей доблестной Красной Армии. Наши кони быстры, шашки остры, руки тверды. Мы готовы в любой момент, как один, стать на защиту родины. Мы знаем, что именно Сталев со своими боевыми соратниками Климентом Ворошиловым и Буденным впервые создали из рабочих и крестьян всех национальностей Первую военную армию, которая крепко была Деникина, Бранделя, польских панов и других белогвардейцев.

Товарищ Сталев, родной отец наш, надежда всех трудающихся! У нас нехватает

слов, чтобы выразить свой гнев и неподдельную ярость по отношению к подлым убийцам, к проданным наем фашизму—троцкистско-зиновьевским бандитам. Гады гмердящие, они осмелились занести свою потаскую руку на самое дорогое, на самое священное для народа—на наших вождей, на тебя, наш родной и любивший, на тебя, ясное солнце, освещающее человечеству путь к коммунизму.

Мы приветствуем приворот суда, приведшего всего 170-миллионного народа, о расстреле выродков человеческого рода, гибелих двурушников и убийц—Зиновьева, Бакунова, Смирнова, Бакасова и всех участников этой подлой банды, прошедших перед судом.

Их имена прожжены в веках. Имена Троцкого, Зиновьева, Бакунова и их сообщников наши дети, взрослые, поколения будут прожигать с омерзением, с гневом и генапистостью.

Благослови тебе, дорогой товарищ Сталев, что неиз—у станка, в колхозе, на учебе, в Красной Армии, на коне, на танке, на самолете—ты честно будешь выполнять долг гражданина Советского Союза, будешь беззаветно дратись за победу дела Деникина—Сталевого, до последней капли крови отдашь жизнь для защиты нашей родины.

Любовь, наш Сталев, многие годы, живи на радость нам, на счастье всех трудающихся.

Тебе—наша пламенная любовь, тебе—наши радостные песни, тебе—наша беспредельная преданность.

A convention of horsemen write a letter to their "blood father" Josef Stalin. (Translation appears on page 190)

The papers from which I have taken these letters and the song are the two leading papers in Russia. In both there are many other similar letters and other encomiums for Stalin. Nor is this an exception to the general rule. Letters and articles expressing the same extravagant worship appear in every paper in Russia and form a large part of the Russian moral and intellectual diet. The word *rodina*, which I have translated "fatherland" for want of a better word, is really an idiom peculiar to the Russian language, expressing "fatherland," "motherland," "country," "birthplace," and other concepts of intense nationalism. Whereas not so long ago the names "Lenin" and "communism" were used as though they meant the same thing, now "Stalin" and "*rodina*" are synonymous, just as in the days of old, under the czar's rule, *rodina* and the czar were inseparable.

To believe that this is the general attitude and feeling of all the Russian people would be highly erroneous. All articles and letters of such nature as those quoted are "home brew," encouraged and manufactured from the same source from which all other opinions, expressions, or ideas originate. They are anything but private or personal effusions.

All such material is a source of satire and humor

in the drab life of the more intelligent non-communist Russians. They have no way of expressing their feelings openly, and it would be dangerous to do so, but in private conversations there are many stories and anecdotes spun about these hymns of praise.

In the communists' recent purge within the party, climaxed by the execution of the sixteen communists, the leading journalist and editorial writer in Russia, Karl Radek, was arrested. His friends' hope of saving his life is based on an article he wrote about Stalin just recently, in which he stressed the greatness of Stalin and his achievements, and this alone may spare him from the fate of the sixteen other communists.

Though a few remaining members of the older generation still cling to their old faiths, the new generation which has been brought up under the complete control of the present régime—with its atheistic universities and schools, and its parents prohibited from mention or discussion of religion with their children until they are eighteen years old—is void of religion in the old sense. The supposed freedom of religion which the new constitution grants them is meaningless and is nothing but a gesture for the consumption of the outside world.

If religion is construed as meaning the church, it is disappearing so rapidly that it will be virtually out of existence with the passing of the older generation. But if the word "religion" is taken in its broader meaning, as an urge within the human being to have faith, to be willing to make sacrifices for a cause which may not immediately and directly benefit himself—then such a religion does exist in Russia, and is at present one of the great driving forces which motivate Russian youth, especially those who are members of the Communist Party.

Today this new religion is the opium of the people in the U.S.S.R.

VIII

IN order to grasp the complete set-up of all phases of the U.S.S.R., and the relations and influence they have upon each other, it is important to scrutinize more closely the mechanism of the political situation and the government. Even in free, democratic countries the economic and social life are not only closely interwoven with the political structure of these countries, but their trend is greatly influenced and modified by its workings.

The influence of the political structure is vastly greater in a totalitarian or a dictatorial régime. Its force is felt in dictatorial countries like Germany and Italy, where, although factories and the tools of production are privately owned, not only the working hours, conditions, and wages are designated by this régime, but the method, degree, and intensity of production and its management are regulated and prescribed by the government. But its influence is far greater in Russia, where the dictator not only dominates the policies of eco-

nomic and social life, but is in complete control of the economic system through ownership and management of the system. In Russia, where the government is owner of all the land, the tractors and combines, all forms of transportation and communication, all the minerals and timber, all the plants and factories, all tools of production, and manages and runs them, its influence and importance in economic development and progress is obvious.

For dictatorship does not stop at owning and regulating the economic structure of the nation; it tries to condition and regulate every human idea and every phase of human behavior.

The conditions and surroundings which make people of a nation submissive to a dictator are similar and parallel in all countries where such a system exists. The phenomenon of dictatorship is the result of a situation in which the whole economic structure is disorganized and on the verge of breakdown, and the morale of the people at its lowest ebb. This condition of despair and loss of nerve may be the outcome of prolonged misrule and abuse, or it can come about through sudden upheavals such as war or an acute economic crisis, or both. This causes a condition of uncertainty, the

endurance of which becomes so unbearable that the mental state degenerates into one of resignation.

One extreme creates another: dictatorship is the result of chaotic conditions, or anarchy.

In 1917, Russia, as a result of the prolonged misrule of the Romanoffs and four years of a most disastrous war followed by a complete breakdown of the economic structure and morale of the nation, was susceptible to submission to a dictatorship. Lenin, with his idea that historical changes could be accomplished by revolutionary forces and a revolutionary act, sensed the opportunity afforded by this historical moment to carry out his idea of communism and the establishment of a communistic state, gained control of the country, and set up "the dictatorship of the proletariat."

He explained that a dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary so long as there is the old capitalistic element within a country. Freedom, in the sense that it obtains in bourgeois, democratic countries, was unthinkable in that particular period in the development of his plan, as it would have played into the hands of the bourgeois, giving them a chance to gain their second wind and enabling them to organize themselves in their struggle against the workers and communism. It is obvious

that the purpose of the dictatorship was to destroy the remnants of that bourgeois, capitalistic class, which was still an important factor in the land; for, as Lenin pointed out, an obsolete class, before it disappears from the historical scene, dies hard. With the disappearance of that class, the dictatorship would also disappear, he said.

Then, with no classes existing, it would be replaced by a free, democratic society in which all people participated in selecting and electing their representatives, a social order of free associations of free workers managing their affairs for their own benefit—a socialistic or a communistic state. Lenin pointed out that dictatorship was a distasteful expediency, but that the end justified the means—a principle frequently preached and practiced by the Bolsheviks.

The genius of Lenin foresaw the danger of a dictatorship in any form or under any name, and he warned the workers to be alert and on the look-out, explaining that the danger lay in the fact that the revolutionary force which was placed in power temporarily would soon lose its identity and degenerate into a bureaucratic machine; that dictatorship is reluctant to give up the power it has gained, and eventually becomes not the spokesman and repre-

sentative of the workers who placed it in this position, but an oppressor and a tyrant even to the class which created it.

Lenin explained that the sacrifices of freedom involved by a dictatorship over the workers would be transitory. This statement was based on the belief that the workers of the rest of Europe—with the exception of England and the Scandinavian countries—and especially those of war-torn Germany, France, and the Balkan States, would soon fall in line with the Russian Revolution and establish communism, eventually carrying with them the rest of the world. In fact, the Bolsheviks were so convinced that this would take place that when they wrote their constitution they included an article which stated that each republic that joined Russia reserved the right to secede freely from the U.S.S.R. They believed that this clause in the constitution would serve as bait for other European countries to join the communist régime.

History has proved that this assumption, like many other communistic assumptions, was erroneous; that the better organized, the more intelligent and cultured workers in other European countries did not believe in the possibility and the plausibility of Lenin's and Trotzky's communistic mil-

lennium. Lenin soon realized that his dream for an immediate world revolution would not materialize. He often said that life and facts are stubborn, and he realized that the process of establishing not only a communistic world, but even a communistic Russia, would take longer than he had originally anticipated.

As the revolution went on, the process of building a new communistic Russia, which in the beginning was thought to be simple, proved to be highly complicated; the difficulties encountered became insurmountable, and the new problems created became intricate and unsolvable. Three years after the October Revolution Lenin was forced to "take a step back," as he called it, and re-establish private trading, saying that it would eventually help him to take two steps forward.

With his great feeling for, and sense of, reality and facts, what Lenin's methods and plans for the future would have been, and what policies he would have tried to carry out, is problematical; but it is obvious that he feared for the completion of these plans and policies in the hands in which they would be left, for just before he died, in 1924, when in his illness he was exercising personal guidance in directing the affairs of the government only on rare

occasions and the machine was run by the other members of the Polit Bureau, he warned the communists in his last will and testament of the danger of Stalin's gaining control of the party, describing the latter as unfit, too rude, too tactless with his comrades, too ruthless, and too ambitious for personal power.

Lenin's strength lay perhaps as much in the greatness of his personality and his powers of persuasion as it did in the actual control of the party and the government. Although his rule was the ruthless rule of a dictator when it applied to enemies existing without the country or within the remnants of the old régime in Russia, or to other socialist groups in the country who were opposed to the Bolsheviks' methods of accomplishing their aim, it was tempered within the party itself by his encouragement of intelligent and honest criticism from his associates, and by the fact that he made the actual conduct of the government to some extent at least a composite of his own ideas and those of his closest associates within the party. Once a party decision had been made, there could have been no more ruthless disciplinarian than Lenin in seeing that that decision was carried out to the letter.

Thus his dictatorship became actually a rule of the Communist Party, headed by him.

When Stalin came into power, however, after Lenin's death, this order was immediately changed by the central fact that, just as Lenin had predicted, Stalin, driven by his intense personal ambition and lust for power, would not tolerate interference with his own plans, even from party members. Within the party, as without, he depended upon ruthless force to carry out his designs.

He established a most complete espionage system within the party itself, in order to get rid of any opposition or dissenters from his ideas. More and more he found it necessary to use this espionage system and to institute *chistkas*, or purges, to remove dissenters from the party. These purges went so far as to bring about, at his order, the exile to Siberia, and even the execution, not only of great numbers of the Communist Party members, but even of some of its most important builders and leaders. This process was climaxed in the execution of Zinovyev, Kaminev, and the other fourteen communist leaders in the summer of 1936.

Lacking Lenin's intense magnetism and genius for leadership, he could maintain his position only by his ruthlessness and by filling the party with

members who were completely his tools and who carried out his orders unquestioningly, thus building a political machine carefully designed to further his plans in every department, not only of the government, but of social, industrial, and economic life. In other words, upon the rise of Stalin, the government in Russia, which was never a dictatorship of the proletariat, as it pretended to be, descended from the state of being a dictatorship of the Communist Party to that of being purely the personal dictatorship of Stalin.

The communists not only had a ready answer and solution for all the economic and social problems and ailments with which the Russian people and the rest of mankind are struggling and suffering, but they had a simple formula to remake and recondition "man, the unknown."

In Lenin's original statement on the establishment of a dictatorship, he pointed out that besides carrying out its historical mission of exterminating the remnants of the old bourgeois and silencing other forces opposed to communism, or, as he classed them, "the enemies of the workers," its most important duty and mission was to create an environment in which the masses of the Russian people, and especially the new generation, would

be conditioned so as to produce a collective-minded individual. He based his belief in the plausibility of building such a type of individual on the Marxian concept that human character and human behavior are the product of the economic system, and that mores, religion, family relations, are the by-products and the results of the economic system.

But since the Russian workers did not possess an intelligentsia of their own to manage their affairs and businesses, it was necessary and essential for the revolutionary group, the Bolsheviks, to manage and run the workers' affairs for their interest through the medium of a dictatorship until the workers could build an intelligentsia of their own. This was to be accomplished during the time that it would take to wipe out the last vestiges of the old system. Lenin said, "Give me four years to teach the children, and the seed I will have sown will never be uprooted."

Using the absolute powers of dictatorship, the communists confiscated all of the lands and all of the tools of production of Russia, and set up a new economic system in which, through what they called the "leveling-off process," they proposed to equalize wages between skilled and unskilled labor and thus bring about the ideal of communism, "From

each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

But no government exists, and no system has ever been invented by the ingenuity of man, in which something can be divided which has not been produced.

The process of equalizing wages between skilled and unskilled, between efficient and inefficient workers, was disastrous to the productivity of the industries, since it took away from the skilled or efficient worker the incentive to do his best.

Thus the communists were caught in a vicious economic circle. Their dictatorial policy of excluding dissenters had eliminated the old intelligentsia. The leveling-off process, far from increasing the production of the unskilled and inefficient worker, operated only to decrease that of the trained and efficient worker.

The lowered productivity of the nation only increased the evils of the economic environment that the Bolsheviks were trying to adjust. Of course there were other elements and factors which aggravated this difficult economic condition, such as the complete lack of co-operation on the part of the peasants and the breakdown of transportation, as a result of which carloads of food would be rotting

at one place while in another the workers would be literally starving for want of that food. But the main fault lay in the leveling-off process itself, and it might be said that the other difficulties were the result of that system.

The Bolsheviks tried to remedy the situation by establishing piece-work rates in industry, with the hope of stimulating production, but this was actually only a continuation, in another form, of the leveling-off process, since the efficient worker was unable to use the money he received above the rate of pay of the average worker because most of the commodities which he needed were unobtainable; and even in those cases where they were obtainable, prices were tremendously increased for him as soon as he had used up his card allowance and attempted to spend his additional earnings.

Nevertheless this "leveling" policy was carried on, by deviations and zigzaggings, groping in the dark, without visible signs of progress until, after fourteen years during which the economic system was under the complete control of the dictatorship, the dictator himself pointed out that there was something radically wrong with his system, and he said:

"We can no longer depend on the old sources of

accumulation. To guarantee the further development of industry and agriculture we must make available new sources of funds, get rid of mismanagement, apply the system of economic accounting, lower costs, and increase internal accumulation."

But even after the government actually completely gave up the idea of the leveling-off process and created a well-to-do and well-paid group of technicians and engineers by establishing a new monetary system, progress in the economic field was still slow. The Russian workers are the most meagerly paid in Europe, and, with everybody working, the ordinary necessities are out of reach of the average workers.

After all its costly experiments designed to do away with the old economic order and set up one which would properly condition a collective-minded individual, and now even after it has abandoned those experiments as failures and has taken back much of the technique of the capitalistic economic system, the U.S.S.R., with its unlimited natural resources and man power, is still unable to give its workers more than bare subsistence.

The "increase in internal accumulation" has not been successfully achieved; and calling capital

“accumulation” does not change the fact that without it no economic system can expand and grow.

The fallacy (both in theory and fact) of the communistic economy working through a dictator—an overcentralized government—was even more obvious in its application to agriculture than to industry. It is pointed out by the Russian government and commentators on Russia that the present régime made wonderful strides and progress in collectivizing the agrarian industry.

The truth is that the original plan of collectivizing and industrializing farming had to be given up. Co-operative farming, or mechanized farming on a large scale, is not the invention of Russia, nor is it a new idea. In the United States, where topographical conditions permit, this method of farming has been practiced for some time; its practicability has been proved. It can and doubtless will be used in certain parts of Russia to greater advantage than the old method of individual farming.

The relatively meager results which the Russian government has been able to accomplish in the way of stimulating production in agriculture are due to the opposition of the peasants to the government's form of collectivization, to the government's management, which has been largely

mismanagement, and to the unfair distribution whereby the farmer does not reap the actual benefit of increased results in production, which decreases his incentive. Russia, who once, with primitive methods and primitive implements of agriculture, was the granary of Europe, now, even with the application of sounder theories and with improved equipment, holds a position in agriculture in which she is not only of very minor importance in exporting agricultural products, but does not even raise a plentiful supply of food for her own workers.

The reasons for her lack of success in other respects are equally apparent. The complete change of attitude of the present régime in carrying out its original program of family relationships can be traced to three sources: (1) the uneducated, undiscriminating elements, especially numerous in the cities, who, through their abuses, multiplied social problems by flooding the country with homeless children and creating dependent mothers; (2) the government's inability to change the human maternal instinct and divert it into social channels; and (3) its decision to stimulate an increase in population, even in the face of the limited supply of food and the shortage of clothing and housing, in order

to retain the large army necessary in all dictatorships.

The fundamental harmfulness of a dictatorship is especially obvious in its control of education. Even under the Czar, Kaiser Wilhelm, and other absolute monarchs, the educational institutions were wholly or at least partly autonomous. But under a dictatorship the uniformity of thought and action emanates and is directed from one source only—the dictator. Neither the merely undesirable nor even the harmful effects of that method can be checked until the damage is done, as criticism in any form, even though it be constructive, is not permissible.

History teaches that greatness and progress do not thrive in a uniform, militaristic system. The military Spartans, living side by side in the same historical epoch with the Hellenic Greeks, did not develop Platos, Aristotles, or Socrates', and they did not leave anything for posterity save the tradition of Spartanism. In Russia the result of the militaristic, dictatorial control of education, which eliminated the old intelligentsia and failed to produce a new one, has been to leave the U.S.S.R. with only a fraction of the trained intelligentsia necessary to the health and progress of any country.

In her handling of the religious problem Russia has met with more apparent success, yet in abolishing the old religion as "the opium of the people," the Soviets actually cleared the ground only to establish a new religion—a fanatical worship of the state, the principles of communism, and its leaders. It has zealously encouraged and built up this worship, knowing how powerful religious opium can be, and in doing so has actually adopted the faults, the obstructionism to constructive thought and action, which made the despised Russian Church of the old régime such a retarding factor in social progress.

When you approach the present Russian situation with an unbiased viewpoint it becomes clear that the source of the paradoxical phenomena which exist in Russia is within the government itself. The government points out that the faults of the present economic system are the results of mismanagement. The truth is that the source of the mismanagement is the government itself.

The prophecy of Lenin has been fulfilled. The dictatorship, which was intended for the proletariat, has become a dictatorship over the proletariat and has degenerated, as he predicted, into a bureaucratic machine, the antithesis of a socialistic state,

a machine which by its very nature and existence has made impossible the achievement of its own stated aim. The new order is neither capitalism nor socialism, but is a state capitalism under the complete control of a dictator. There is a Russian epigram which says it more tersely: "*Ni goroch ni kapusta*"—"Neither beans nor sauerkraut."

In Russian history there is a legend which relates how, when a delegation of Russian people approached Prince Rurich and invited him to become their ruler, they expressed their difficulties in these words: "Russia is a great country but it has no order." That statement is equally true today.

IX

TRAVELING through Russia, visiting factories and homes, and looking out of train windows, there dawns on you the immensity of what is known as the U.S.S.R. Here before your eyes, in a country where nature was extremely kind, are unlimited riches in land, in forests, in grains, in minerals, in man power—and want visible everywhere. After looking back on the great drama of the last nineteen years in the U.S.S.R., and piecing all together the efforts to solve this problem, and the important changes which took place and are still taking place, you ask yourself, Where is all this leading?

The problem which Russia faces of feeding and housing her people adequately is essentially the acute problem which many countries of Europe face today, but especially the other dictatorial countries, Germany and Italy. The specter of want haunts all of them with similar persistence, and this, along with so many other things, the three

great dictatorships of Europe today have in common.

But the parallel and similarity are only to the extent of their main, underlying principle of totalitarianism, or the supremacy of the state, and the insignificance and unimportance, or even the totally negative valuation, placed upon the individual. Of this principle and way of reasoning the rest of their policies are the outcome and result. They are similar in origin, as they are all the result of a state of uncertainty and despair; they are similar in method, in that the dictators promise to relieve the uncertainty by make-believe accomplishments. By gaining control they try to exercise their authority and influence not only on every phase of life but even on every thought and act of human behavior.

Their method of retaining their power and their influence on the masses is properly described by Spencer in expounding his theory that the hypnotic power which leaders or heroes exert on the mob is made possible by a weakened mental state of the populace due to prolonged suffering and monotony. They retain their power by the constant outpouring of propaganda and the repetition of the same misstatements and lies, which act as a drug on great

portions of the discouraged people. Their main supports are fear and hatred, which are constantly engendered in the masses. They are all intensely militaristic and nationalistic, and are identical in a good many other characteristics, and within them lies the danger of embroiling the world in a great catastrophe—war.

But here the similarity or the identity between Germany and Italy on one hand and Russia on the other disappears, and a greatly important factor enters which changes not only the internal complexes of the dictatorship but its attitude and its aims in carrying out and accomplishing its ambitions and designs. This discrepancy in character of the dictatorships is based upon natural resources, which Russia possesses in such great abundance, while on the other hand, Germany and Italy are in such great want of them and are far short of their needs.

Russia's possession of unlimited natural resources and wealth, and her unlimited supply of raw materials, make her independent and self-sustaining; and with the exception of a desire to carry out the original fantastic theory of a world revolution, which has been given up, at least temporarily, by Stalin and his followers, there is

nothing to lead her willingly into war, for there is nothing which her neighbors have which she wants. What she wants and needs is peace in order to enable her to try to carry out her projected program of internal expansion and development.

Germany and Italy, on the contrary, are confronted with the insurmountable problem of feeding and taking care of their dense and ever growing populations; and even with the most intensive methods, they are and always will be unable to supply the badly needed foodstuffs and raw materials from within their own borders.

The burden of indemnity placed upon Germany, the taking away of her colonies, building of high tariff walls against her, and the discontinuance of credit formerly extended to her have deprived the Reich of her source of raw materials and of outlets for her unfinished products. The outcome has been her economic plight, with millions of unemployed; and the despair and uncertainty this created resulted in Hitler's dictatorship.

The methods which the dictator uses in handling this problem—the building a huge army and spending enormous sums in making war materials and war armaments and building military roads—is a make-believe solution. Although

it temporarily relieves the situation or the tension by taking the unemployed off the streets and putting them to work in the munition plants and on the highways, in actuality it does not increase the resources of the country and is not a source of accumulation. Bullets, bombs, and airplanes do not make a diet, but on the contrary serve as a drain on the meager resources which Germany does possess.

This state of affairs will inevitably lead to war. A nation in want and despair is similar to an individual in the same condition. (After all, a nation is a composition of so many individuals.) The result of want and despair in an individual is stealing or robbing; the same conditions lead a nation to similar acts in obtaining something she must have through war. The danger of war which confronts Europe, and even the rest of the world, is not only the threat of dictators; the cause lies deeper, in the circumstances and conditions which made dictatorships possible and plausible—the economic plight of the people.

Their different positions in regard to natural resources make a difference in the dictatorships of Russia and Germany as factors in instigating war. From this it becomes clear that the trends which

Germany and Italy on one hand, and Russia on the other, must take in solving their problems are greatly different. Italy and Germany, desperately in need of land and resources, are looking to conquest—in other words, war—in order to gain their needs; while Russia, with her tremendous resources, is eager for peace in order to be able to consolidate, manage, and retain what she has within her own borders.

Russia and Germany are in the positions of two cooks: one has her pantries full, but under-nourishes the people she feeds by bad cooking; the other, an excellent cook, knows all the culinary arts but has a meager supply from which to draw.

Constant hatred toward Russia emanates from the Hitler-controlled press of Germany, accusing Russia of fomenting revolutions and spreading communism in Germany. Hitler's accusations and condemnations of Russia do not rise from the fear that Russia will attack Germany; his extreme dislike for the U.S.S.R. originates from his desire to get something from her which does not belong to him, and in Russia he sees a caricature of his own image. Russia's design of making the rest of the world, especially Germany, communistic, which

was a great disturbing factor in the past, if it has not been completely given up, is at least dormant.

But getting rid of Hitler or his dictatorship will not eradicate the possibility of war. The most difficult and the most important problem that confronts Europe and the whole world is the riddance, not only of dictators and dictatorships, but of the causes and conditions which made them possible. To believe that the problems which the dictatorships of Mussolini and Hitler present to the world would be solved by the removal of Hitler and Mussolini would be to believe that an evil is cured by removing the effect without removing the cause.

Germany and Italy have a joint population of one hundred ten million people to feed. In order to do this adequately, they must either increase their own holdings of land and other natural resources or they must find outlets for their manufactured goods in order to be able to import food and raw materials from other countries. The first course inevitably leads to war, as it led Italy into Ethiopia, and as it will inevitably lead Germany to war with Russia, since Hitler and the Nazi régime have already pointed out that their only possible direction of expansion lies toward the east.

The high walls of tariff and the complete lack of

colonies are forcing them, especially Germany, to choose this course. With all the condemnation which other nations of the world are heaping upon the heads of Italy and Germany today for the threat of war which they are offering the world, other nations must share the responsibility, since in the high tariff walls which they have erected against both countries, and in the total absence of colonies which they have forced upon Germany, they have actually created the condition which is mapping out the course which those two countries are taking.

On the other hand, the co-operation and assistance of other nations in helping those two countries solve their economic difficulties and problems, by removing the trade barriers which at present make it impossible for them to exchange their finished products for raw materials and foodstuffs, are the essential first steps in enabling Germany and Italy to solve their problems peacefully.

Along with such a removal of the threat of war would doubtless come also the beginning of the removal of the threat of dictatorship, for a dictatorship, being the result of an anomaly, becomes stifling and undesirable as soon as conditions correct themselves.

The death or the removal of Hitler or Mussolini

without alleviation of the economic situation in Germany and Italy would only result either in another dictatorship or in internal revolution, similar to the one which is taking place in Spain, and anarchy.

But in Russia the disappearance of dictatorship, which is the underlying cause of the painful and slow progress that country is making in developing her mental, spiritual, and unlimited physical resources, would not only accelerate the tempo within the country and enable her to raise the standard of living of her own people; but, being the only country in Europe which is not as yet overpopulated and whose resources have hardly been tapped, Russia could be a great source of supplying other European countries with their much-needed food and raw materials, in exchange for manufactured articles of which Russia is a long way from being able to produce herself and of which her own people are in great need. This would serve not only as a stimulus and an incentive in the effort to develop an improved economic structure in the U.S.S.R. and in bettering living conditions within that country, but it would also serve as a great force in maintaining peace in Europe, since it would help to remove the potential causes of war at

both ends: in supplying food to countries like Germany and Italy and in giving them an outlet for their manufactured products.

In order to be able to analyze the present trend and try to tell where the U.S.S.R. is going and where the experiments and changes she is making in her economic and social life are leading, one must try to understand the important effect which the threat of war has on the mental state not only of the government but of the whole nation.

Until a few years ago Russia's hate propaganda was directed toward the generality of capitalism. Her people were constantly fed with statements of the necessity for destroying the capitalistic enemy, who, in the communistic concept, was only waiting the chance to destroy Russia, the torchbearer of communism. There was no implication at this time of specific threats from any nation intent upon conquest in Russia for the sake of her natural resources.

But with the rise of Hitler, with his display of aggressive ambition and his definite statement that Germany must find a place in the sun in order to survive, and that it would direct its expansion toward the east, the general capitalistic threat against communism has become subordinated to

the specific threat of a war of conquest instigated by Germany. The fear of a capitalistic struggle to destroy communism, which at all times was largely a synthetic tool of propaganda used by the government to foster solidarity within its own country, has given place to the concrete and actual fear of the need to defend, not the abstract communistic society, but the actual fatherland, against an invader.

It is this fear that has driven Russia into the arms of her "deadly enemies" such as France, America, and England, and she is now desperately engaged in the once condemned and despised capitalistic diplomacy, playing one nation against the other by making alliances with capitalistic countries in order to protect herself from war, and even making treaties to defend one capitalistic country from the attack of another capitalistic country, such as her recent treaty with France. Thus the communists have been compelled to give up another cherished idea: that of fomenting a world revolution through war. In case of an attack by Germany on either one of them, France and Russia obligate themselves to aid each other.

One of the pet doctrines of Karl Marx, or Marxism, is that war and wars are inevitable under

capitalism. Capitalism and imperialism are synonymous with the ambition and desire of the capitalists to conquer more and more world markets for the unloading of their manufactured products, and competition in this eventually leads to wars between capitalistic nations. Thus war becomes the first step in the progress of the world revolution, since the workers of the world, who in war become the armies of the world, realizing that they have nothing to gain through war, will seize the armaments with which they have been furnished to destroy each other and, turning them instead upon their capitalistic enemies, will destroy the capitalists and capitalism. This pet assumption and theory of all Marxians and Leninists, which, according to their belief, will play an important rôle in preparing the ground for the world revolution that is to lead eventually to socialistic and communistic society, has been at least given up by the present Stalin régime.

Life realities and facts are driving the Stalin dictatorship to give up gradually not only its original aims but even its contentions. Russia's present course is not, properly speaking, the result of choice on the part of the dictator. He is driven by the realities of life and human nature to accept

results far different from those which he intended or would like. The Gordian knot which the present Russian régime is trying to untie in order to supply the want of the people forces and leads it farther and farther away from its original ideas and aims.

Outside forces over which the government had no control, and the gradual internal improvements which it was able to make in the last few years, especially those that bettered living conditions for the upper strata of her people, have created and uncovered forces which are directing the methods and the policies of the U.S.S.R.

The outside factors—the fear of war with Germany and Japan—have not only compelled the Russian government to change its attitude and modify its diplomatic policies in relations with other foreign capitalistic countries, but have also changed its course in regard to its own people. Russia, under her present system and management, is a long way from being able to give her people anything that approaches a life of plenty, or even a decent living. This is especially true in regard to clothes, shoes, and living quarters. But by discontinuing the exportation of grains and other food-stuffs she has been able to abolish the card system under which she kept the workers on semi-starva-

tion rations. By this policy and effort she hoped to reconcile the people within her own borders.

The difficulty which the Stalin régime encounters in trying to solve the economic problems that confront the U.S.S.R. lies within that government itself. The Soviets are caught within the web of their own inconsistency and self-contradiction. In their desperate attempts to extricate themselves they are faced with this dilemma: they must, by speeding up production, furnish the workers with the necessities of life in greater abundance; yet the one proper stimulus to increased production is the greater abundance of food and clothing, better housing, and greater general comfort which they are unable to supply.

The Russian worker, who is the poorest-paid worker in Europe, not only lacks the incentive and will to do his best, but is physically unable to do a good day's work because of his poor and meager diet. The government, on the other hand, is unable to increase his pay and rations because no economic system has as yet been conceived that is able to distribute something it does not produce.

X

NOTHING can be more misleading or deceiving than generalities and names. This is especially true in any discussion of present-day Russia. The U.S.S.R. is called communistic or socialistic by enthusiasts and friends from within and without. Some even go so far as to say that socialism is an accomplished fact in Russia today. Even some of the more conservative observers depict the country of the Soviets as one which is developing into a classless society. Nothing could be farther from the truth than these statements.

The truth is that in the U.S.S.R., birthplace of Leninism and communistic doctrines, true interpretations of communism are not only forbidden but even punished. Fantastic as it may seem, the most unsafe place of abode for a true communist is Russia. In a country which claims to be socialistic, in a society which pretends to be classless, social inequality is becoming more and more marked.

To be sure, this is the result largely of difficulties

encountered by the Bolsheviks in their attempts to carry out their original aims. But these difficulties lie not only in outside factors and conditions which were inimical to the ideas of communism, but even more in the innate inconsistencies and self-contradictions within communists and communism itself.

Of these inconsistencies and contradictions I offer the following examples:

The intense drive to collectivize agriculture on one hand and on the other the privilege given members of *kolkhozi* of owning parcels of land and of engaging in private trading.

The theory that free love is the accepted form of wedlock; and the insistence upon fidelity and the forming and honoring of close family ties.

The condemnation and persecution of formal religion and the creation of a religion of hero worship.

The inconsistency of preaching that world revolution will be achieved through capitalistic wars, and making alliances with capitalistic countries to prevent wars.

But the outstanding anomaly is the great want prevalent in a country of unlimited natural resources and in which everybody is working.

In order to extricate herself from this predica-

ment Russia gave up the idea of the leveling-off process, which was to establish equality, and created a group of better-paid and well-to-do, and a great mass of poor and underpaid workers. But this system of social inequality tends inevitably to produce what a good many communists within the U.S.S.R. call "bourgeois respectability," a condition in which those subject to it grow farther and farther away from communism and socialism, since the change affects not only the economic status among different groups of workers, but also conditions and changes mental attitudes.

Influenced by past environment and my upbringing in revolutionary ideology, I was shocked a good many times on my last visit to the U.S.S.R. as I listened to young women of the new generation discussing the desirability of marrying someone because of his earning capacity and social standing. Only a few years ago this attitude would have been unthinkable. But this "bourgeois" outlook expresses itself in many other phases of life in the U.S.S.R. Parents are eager to have their children make the best possible grades in higher educational institutions since it gives them the opportunity to occupy a higher position in life and enables them to earn much more than an average worker. The

students themselves are stimulated to get a higher education not only by their desire for knowledge, but also by their ambition to obtain better positions and higher pay. Likewise, efforts to join the Communist Party are motivated by the desire for the better positions in life which membership automatically creates.

These changes in the methods and policies in economics and education are without doubt of some benefit to the U.S.S.R. They have served useful purposes in creating incentives among the technological and engineering groups and have helped somewhat in increasing the productivity of the nation. The new educational policy or merit system will without doubt help in producing a better and a more efficient intelligentsia. But the results obtained through these changes are as yet so meager and insignificant that their benefits have hardly touched the average wage earner.

The Stalin régime proclaims that it is ready and eager to admit mistakes, and engages often in "self-criticism," but the criticism is directed always to the effect and not to the cause.

In the first few days of my recent visit to Russia I was taken through a plant in Moscow where lathes were being built. In it the workmanship and

efficiency were very mediocre. Nevertheless the management was proud of the progress which they claimed they were making. They pointed out to me with pride a picture on the wall portraying an inefficient manager sitting in the top of a tree, without enough ambition to climb down in order to see that the workers in the plant had the proper tools with which to do their jobs. The picture was drawn by one of their own workers.

According to their idea, this practice of criticism by the workers serves as a constructive force in removing inefficiency. Further, they claim that the Russian worker possesses more freedom than any other worker in the world, as he is permitted and encouraged to criticize inefficiency and mismanagement of the heads of his plant—a procedure that is not allowed in any capitalistic country, they assured me.

The Russian papers are full of stories and articles describing, ridiculing, and criticizing directors or managers of certain plants for inefficiency and mismanagement, and the heads of the government, men like Kaganovitch and Orjonikidze, constantly lay stress, in their public speeches, on the mismanagement of plants and factories. The blame is laid to overlapping bureaus, committees,

and boards which are the causes of delays, duplications, and general inefficiency of managers, all of which limits both quality and quantity of output in the plants and factories. Not infrequently managers and directors of plants are removed from office and it is not unusual for them to be punished by exile to Siberia or other similar points.

But it is obvious that such criticism and punishment cannot and do not remove the cause, as everything is planned, directed, and controlled by the Central Planning Committee in Moscow. Everything that is done in the remotest parts of the country is done as a result of instructions issuing from this committee, or from the carrying out of plans which it has approved. And here, in this over-centralized bureaucratic red-tape machine, is the real cause of the slowness and inefficiency that exists in the economic and industrial system in Russia.

In the free democratic countries where constructive criticism is permissible, a faulty condition can be corrected, though even in those countries changes and improvements are comparatively slow because government at its best is cumbersome. In any free country a matter of misdirection or mismanagement can be openly discussed and criticized

and the blame can be traced to its real source, even though that source may be the heads of the government. But in Russia such a procedure is prohibited, is unthinkable. Any plan or idea, whether good or bad, that comes from Stalin or his Planning Committee cannot be questioned. But if such plan or idea should happen to prove a failure, the blame is placed on some unimportant director or manager who is made the "goat." Russia has become expert in the system which we call in this country "passing the buck."

After a plan or technique has proved impractical and has been abandoned, criticism is not only permitted but encouraged; but by then the damage has been done. Yet only through criticism of the old can the government's new plan be sufficiently glorified. Regardless of the failures of the past, the dictator must be given credit for the success, or seeming success, of the present—even for successes with which he had nothing to do.

You will often hear in Russia now the expression "*ooshas*," the meaning of which is "horrible," "terrible," "indescribable." It is a summing up of all the worst of derogatory conceptions into one word in order to tell how bad times were just a few years ago and how much better they are today,

but those who use it would have been considered counter-revolutionists if they had dared to point out the horrible conditions at the time they actually existed in Russia. Every scrap of evidence available is marshalled to support the claim that times are much better in Russia—thanks always to Stalin. As the result of favorable seasonal conditions the U.S.S.R. had an unusually good crop in the year 1935. The credit really belonged to the weather, but the communist press hastened to praise Stalin and to point out that the result was due to his wisdom and leadership.

Stalin himself, as far back as 1931, pointed out the weakness of Russia's position—its failure to build up internal accumulation and thus strengthen the weakest link in the whole economic structure of Russia—but failed to admit its source. This practice of "self-criticism," this glorification of the new and condemnation of the old, serves actually to obscure the real issue.

Under its present system of economy the government, which makes arbitrary prices for everything that is bought and sold in the country, purchases under compulsion the farmer's grain and other products for extremely low prices, then resells them to the city worker and the rest of the urban popu-

lation at profits as high as 1,000 per cent. This fact has been substantiated by John Chamberlain, Knickerbocker, and other reputable commentators.

The arbitrary wage scale in industry and the minimum wage law which applies to all the workers throughout the country operate to place upon the more efficient and better-managed trust or enterprise the burden of keeping up the less efficient and mismanaged plant or factory. An efficiently managed industry has to carry the load of a badly mismanaged one. The agrarian population must suffer the burden of cost which the government has assumed in building new plants and factories. Clearly, this economic policy of taking from one pocket and putting into the other does not increase internal accumulation.

The whole economic system is owned, managed, and run by the most ruthless capitalist in the world—the state—from which the worker has no redress. This is not a system of socialism, but purely of state capitalism.

Another great achievement for which the Stalin régime credits itself is the establishment of a planned economy.

A planned economy is not only desirable but can be of great benefit under any economic system so

long as it does not overstep certain boundaries. In the United States after the prolonged panic through which the country recently passed, when the whole economic structure was thrown out of gear and became disorganized, the government tried to find a solution by establishing the N.R.A., the underlying principle of which was planned economy. Even now, with the N.R.A. declared unconstitutional and therefore abandoned, a technique designed to balance supply and demand is still beneficially and successfully practiced in a number of industries. The oil industry offers a good example. The mining bureau of the government furnishes the industry with data and figures as to the amount of oil needed monthly to supply the demand. Production is then limited to this figure. This practice has been of great aid in keeping the industry from becoming disorganized and unbalanced, a former chronic evil in the oil business. On the other hand, when the government tried to extend the policy of planning, regulating, and controlling the industry in detail through its complicated bureaus, it tended to become bureaucratic and retrogressive.

In Russia, where the whole economic life is owned and controlled by a bureaucratic machine, directed by Stalin's dictatorship, the benefit of a

planned economy is greatly lessened. For the planning and management of industry is not carried out where the work is done, or by experts who are familiar with the immediate needs and requirements, but is handled by a complicated machinery of bureaus and boards remotely removed from the industries themselves.

Most of the progress that Russia has made under the Soviets has come about through retreat from the government's original policies—the abandonment of the leveling-off process, the bringing back of the old engineering groups and technicians and paying them substantially more than the average wage; the attempt to reconcile the *kulak* and the rest of the agrarian population by permitting them to possess parcels of land and allowing them to engage in private trading; and the inauguration of the new merit system in education.

But these forced deviations from its original aims which the Russian government is making have antagonized a great many of the old Bolsheviks and created a source of unrest, and the average worker, disillusioned by unfulfilled promises to better his life, swells the ranks of secret dissenters.

Desperately the Russian government has used the press, radio, and other means of propaganda over

which it has complete dictatorial control to build up public sentiment in its favor. Yet its propaganda is not by any means completely successful. The Russian press does not portray the true state of feeling and mental attitude of the people.

Russia is no exception to the obvious truth that throughout the world, the press, which has so grossly abused the public trust, is losing its power over public opinion. In the United States the presidential election of 1936 serves as a good example that the press is not the true barometer of the ideas and sentiments of the people. Eighty per cent of American newspapers, opposed to the policies of the "new deal" and to Roosevelt, and fighting against him, hadn't sufficient power to prevent one of the biggest landslides in the history of popular suffrage. Obviously, the press of the United States did not truly mirror the state of mind of the people of the United States.

In the old days of an honored press, people substantiated their thoughts and ideas by quoting the daily journal. Today they say: "You can't believe everything you see in the papers."

This is even more true in dictatorial countries, where the more intelligent classes know that statements which emanate from the government-con-

trolled press are manufactured and deliberate lies. It is most conspicuous in an intelligent, cultured country such as Germany, which I visited last summer. Of many persons there—workers, business men, soldiers, Nazis, Jews, communists—I asked: “What’s in the papers?” And many answered without hesitation: “A lot of lies.”

And even in Russia, where the rule of dictatorship is of long duration and every medium of propaganda and every phase of life is controlled by the government, members of the more intelligent class disbelieve in and dissent from the present régime, and in so doing express not only their own dissatisfaction but also the undercurrent of resentment that exists among a good many in the masses.

In order to reconcile the workers, the dictator has given the Russian people a new constitution, a gesture intimating greater freedom. The dictator was driven to this course in order to pacify the undercurrent of unrest that exists in Russia despite the government’s drive to suppress unpleasant facts and belittle their importance to its own people and to the outside world. The new constitution promises the right to work, leisure, material security in old age, education, equal rights for women, universal equality of citizenry, freedom of con-

science and of worship, freedom of speech, press, assembly and meeting, and the right of the people to organize in any group, *except political bodies.*

But all the above-enumerated articles of freedom are reduced or even canceled by the constitution's last clause, which retains the absolute power of the dictator and the Communist Party and denies the right to any political freedom or freedom in molding and directing the policies of the dictator. Since the government is the sole owner of the tools of production, and through them is in complete control of the economic life of the people, it is obvious that this freedom is only a gesture.

Stalin claims that in the U.S.S.R. economy has already accomplished the following:

"The tools and means of production, the land, factories, etc., have been taken away from the capitalists and handed over to the working class and to the peasantry.

"The development of production is subordinated, not to the principle of competition and the safeguarding of capitalist profit but to the principle of planned guidance and systematic improvement of the material and cultural level of the toilers.

"The distribution of the national income takes place—in the interest of systematically raising the

material position of the workers and peasants, and extending socialist production in town and country.

“The systematic improvement of the material position of the toilers and the ceaseless growth of their requirements [purchasing power] guarantees the working class against the crisis of overproduction, against the growth of unemployment, etc.

“The working class is the master of the country, working not for the capitalists but for its own class.”

Here then is a young state—nineteen years old—with a new constitution which promises much and a dictator who makes fulfilment of the promise impossible so long as he retains control. What lies ahead for Russia and for the whole of Europe? And for the world, whose destiny is so closely linked with that of the great social experiment?

According to Stalin, the only problem which confronts Russia is distribution. The desirability and fairness of any economic system rests on its distribution, as fair distribution or good wage tends to increase the productivity of each worker's unit, since high wages and productivity go hand in hand. With adjustment and correction of distribution, according to Stalin, a communistic society will evolve.

The problem of production, he says, has already been solved.

But the method of handling distribution which the government made effective recently is leading to anything but communism, which has already been defined as a system governed by the rule: "From each according to his ability to each according to his needs." For the discrepancy in wages, or purchasing power, between the efficient and intellectual group and the average worker is gradually being widened, and is building up social inequality.

In Russia, where the productivity and wages of each worker's unit is lower than in any other European country, neither the problem of production nor of distribution has been solved.

The friends and sympathizers of Stalin and his régime claim that he is indispensable to the U.S.S.R.; that he is the genius and the driving force which is making Russia an industrial nation. The same observers, journalists and "experts" characterize the Russian people as "Asiatic and Slavic," a race of people slovenly, lazy, unambitious, who need to be driven out of their inertia by leadership such as Stalin's.

The same accusations were made against the Russian people by the old Czarist régime, whose claim

for leadership and rule over its subjects was based on the same assertions. It used to be a favorite expression of the Romanoff's that "the Russian peasant and worker need the whip." But the Russian people, who were the last in European countries to be freed from serfdom (about 1860), and who, after being freed, were still kept in a state of semi-slavery by low wages, who were abused, ruled, exploited and ill-treated by the Czarist régime (and are now also driven under Stalin's dictatorship), were able to create and contribute to the world some of the greatest productions in art, literature, music and science.

There is little difference in origin between this attitude toward the Russian people, Hitler's doctrine of Aryan superiority, and Mussolini's theory of the supremacy of the Italian people due to their Roman origin. The dictator's dogma of the supremacy or inferiority of one group or race or nation is in each case only a fantasy created because it is suitable to his own demagogic plans and ambitions.

Just as the friends of Stalin neatly label the Russians as Slavic, lazy, slovenly, and given to inertia, Hitler, in his book *Mein Kampf*, labels the Aryan race, and specifically the German people, the salt of

the earth, a race that must be segregated and kept pure from admixture with inferior nations. He also accuses them of gullibility, yet portrays them as a fighting militaristic race destined to conquer a great part of the globe.

But expediency makes strange bed-fellows and these highly-touted dogmas and doctrines of superiority and inferiority of races are overlooked when Aryan Germany and yellow Asiatic Japan become friends and partners in their ambition to slice off parts of Russia for themselves.

A long time ago, during an earthquake in Messina, Italy, a fashionable resort, crowded with people of intelligence and culture, was cut off from the outside world by lava erupting from a volcano. Without food supplies, these half-starved people reverted to cannibalism. This is a measure of the influence on human behavior of environmental conditions.

The facts (if they are facts) that the Russian people are inefficient and lazy and that the German people are militaristically inclined, are the effects of their different environments, not basic and peculiar characteristics.

The militaristic German, being assured of a job, would rather be served wurst and saurkraut and a

good stein of beer for his dinner, than be served a Russian. The Russians, working for thirty and fifty cents a day, cannot be and are not efficient. The same Russians, stimulated and supported by better wages and better living conditions, could and would become efficient and do a good day's work.

In relation to the phenomenon of dictatorship, Russia and Germany are in distinctly different positions.

Although Hitler's dictatorship may have served a temporary purpose and accomplished a historical mission in keeping Germany from disintegrating into the anarchy toward which she was drifting, his continuance in power can be expected so long as the difficulties that confront the country have not been solved. These, as I have said, lie within the restrictions placed upon the Reich by other nations and can be solved only by expansion or by fair and just treaties and arrangements with the outside world which will enable Germany to produce and sell the manufactured articles for which she has not sufficient outlet at present.

In Russia the situation is quite different. Ridance of Stalin and his régime would enable the U.S.S.R. to hasten in developing her unlimited resources. This would not only fill her own needs, but

would make available a source of supply of all sorts of raw materials and foodstuffs for other countries which are in need of them. And thus she would be a great factor in easing the tension and the threat of wars that are engulfing all of Europe. Thus she would become a great force in maintaining peace.

The future historian, removed from the hysteria and emotionalism which is incited and kept up by the constant outpouring of lies, misstatements, and propaganda saturated with poison and hatred, will focus the proper light and place the true value on the present dictators and dictatorships. The result of despair and uncertainty in Russia as well as in Germany and Italy, an ugly growth on the sick body of the people most closely concerned, a source of aggravation and disturbance and fear to others, a product of anomaly, dictatorship will disappear or be removed as soon as the cause is eradicated.

Thus Stalin and his régime are able to sustain themselves so long as the threat of war exists from Germany on one side and Japan on the other, but any event of consequence such as war with Germany or the death of Stalin would hasten the downfall of dictatorship in Russia and would intensify

the conditions which are leading and directing the changes inevitably taking place in Russia.

The new constitution, which is only a make-believe document and a gesture toward democracy and freedom so long as dictatorship functions in Russia, can, with the departure of Stalin and his régime, serve as the framework for a new social order, regardless of name, composed of free, autonomous, co-operative units managed and run by the local intelligentsia under the supervision and guidance of a representative democratic national government. Far from being indispensable, Stalin and his régime are detrimental, a reactionary force slowing up the tempo, delaying the progress which the Russian people would be able to make in developing their potential economic, physical and intellectual wealth if they were free from dictatorship.

And Russia will, eventually, be rid of its incubus. For dictatorship becomes irreconcilable with an improved state of affairs. Its inconsistencies become more conspicuous and obvious as the lot of the common man becomes better. The improvements that are taking place in Russia and the changes which the dictator was compelled to make will be

determining factors in the beginning of the end of dictatorship.

Paradoxical though it may seem, the newly created, more well-to-do group will be one of the causes that will lead to the downfall of the dictatorship which created it. All revolutions or changes that take place are accomplished, not by the masses directly, but through the leadership of the more intellectual elements who are guiding the masses in their efforts to bring about changes and improvements. This newly created well-to-do intelligentsia is beginning to realize more and more that a dictatorship is a reactionary force which is retarding economic progress.

Behind and supporting their leadership will be the tremendous weight of Russia's agrarian population, which constitutes 85 per cent of the population of the U.S.S.R. At best the peasants are only enduring and tolerating Stalin's ideas and his régime; and with their innate aversion to communistic ideas and the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the Russian peasantry will be the prime mover in eventually disposing of the dictatorship and building a new social and economic order.

The French utopian socialist, Proudhon, once said that the first thief was the one who built the

first fence around a plot of land. Perhaps it would have been more accurate to call that man the first economic individualist. Farmers the world over, including Russia's own peasants, are individualistic and not susceptible to socialistic and communistic ideas and doctrines. The historical trend of present-day Russia is in the direction neither of capitalism nor of communism. Russia will never return to the old form of capitalism with its unplanned economy by which supply and demand are not regulated and are therefore out of balance, which results in wasteful squandering of natural resources. She will never go back to the terrible certainty of chronic periodic crises and panics, with all their disastrous results, which are the inevitable fruit of the present capitalistic system. She will never again adopt a system in which millions of men may be automatically thrown out of work and be literally starving while warehouses and stores are overloaded with the food and clothing essential to life.

But while Russia alone has completely cut down the tree which bears such bitter fruit, the historical developments and readjustments that are taking place in other countries are also leading them away from the present form of capitalism into a new

economic and social order, and Russia will not be uninfluenced by the trends of other nations.

Without taking into consideration the differences in the stages of development of different nations and countries, comparisons and parallels are meaningless. In the United States capitalism has passed through changes, and we are still making radical readjustments in our economic and social life. Fortunately, we are not confronted with the same dilemma as Russia, where the present Stalin régime, inheriting from the old czarist government a half-feudalistic and half-capitalistic state, tried to skip capitalism and build a communistic economy forthwith. But the Bolsheviks not only have failed to establish true communism in regard to distribution, but, falling miserably short as to efficiency and productivity, have been compelled to adopt many capitalistic ways and means. In the United States the much despised and condemned capitalistic system has not only been a great force in developing the resources of our country and building the finest and best technological and engineering group to run and manage the plants and factories, but has made the American worker the best-paid worker in the world. Trying to retain these advantages, America is attempting to work

out a modification of the present system which will enable her to be rid of the peculiar evils of capitalism, while Russia, well aware of the advantages of much of our technique, is trying to seize them without taking also the disadvantages. Thus Russia and America approach the same ideal from two opposite directions.

Karl Marx asserted that extremes create extremes, that capitalism will inevitably lead to socialism and communism through these stages: the economic structure becomes overcentralized, with wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, and thus conditions of the worker become more and more deplorable and unbearable. These conditions then eventually lead to a world revolution.

This assertion has proved historically untrue, both as to the concentration of wealth and as to the condition of the worker. In the more highly developed capitalistic countries, such as the United States, huge trusts and small enterprises exist and prosper side by side. America, England, and the Scandinavian countries prove that the well-being of the workers is in comparison to the degree in advancement of capitalism in those countries. On the other hand, in Russia, Spain, Mexico, and similar countries where industrialism and capitalism have

not made great strides, the conditions of the workers are bad and wages are low. And in those countries revolutions and extreme tendencies find a fertile soil and demonstrate Marx's assertion that extremes create extremes.

Nothing remains static. The only permanence is change, and in every new system there is the embryo of another that is to follow, its form depending on the interplay of many factors, which factors it is difficult to foretell and foresee.

Before an idea can become a concrete fact and accomplish its destiny, it must be carried out by the ability, will, and intelligence of proper leadership. The elimination of dictatorship and the establishment of this leadership for a true democratic order are the hope and destiny of a new Russia.

Russia, along with our own country and the rest of the world, in a zigzag manner, by trial and error, is building a new social order under which life will become more secure, more wholesome, and happier.



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